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 ABSTRACT 
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Marquette University, 2012 
 
 
 
  
 A central problem in the mind-body debate is the generation problem: how consciousness 
occurs in a universe understood as primarily non-conscious.  This problem is particularly 
bothersome for physicalists.  I argue that the generation problem stems from a non-critical 
presupposition about the nature of reality, namely, that the mental is an exception in the universe, 
a non-fundamental property.  I call this presupposition mental specialism.   Despite the fact that 
mental specialism dogmatically ingrained in the debate, there has been little reason offered either 
to accept or reject it.   And doing so would dissolve the generation problem.  But rejecting mental 
specialism, though it would dissolve the generation problem, would mean accepting another 
anathema presupposition:  panpsychism.  The resistance to panpsychism stems from the 
perception that panpsychism runs counter to science, that it is based on dogmatic metaphysical 
(even transcendental) arguments, and that it entails doctrines that cannot be accepted by science, 
such as mysteriousness.  This perception is misguided and here I argue that a naturalized 
panpsychism, one that does not run contrary to science in these ways, can be developed and 
defended.  I argue that consciousness emerges from proto-consciousness, the fundamental 
property that is disposed to give rise to consciousness.  Proto-consciousness is not an arbitrarily 
posited property; following an important contemporary approach in neuroscience (the integrated 
information account), I understand proto-consciousness as information.  The thesis that 
consciousness emerges from proto-consciousness elicits a fatal problem with panpsychic theories, 
the combination problem.  This problem is how to account for higher-order conscious properties 
emerging from proto-conscious properties.  I solve the combination problem that by adopting 
Giuolio Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness and demonstrating emerging 
higher-order conscious properties just is a system integrating information.  Thus information is 
the fundamental property that, when integrated in a system such as a human being, is 
consciousness.  Proto-consciousness is thus a natural property and the formulated panpsychic 
theory based upon information is a naturalized panpsychism.   
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 The core problem physicalism faces is the generation problem: how 
consciousness arises from something not-conscious.  The generation problem originates 
from the view I call mental specialism, which is the view that the mental is more rare or 
exceptional than the non-mental.  The way out of the generation problem is to reject 
mental specialism and then formulate a “science friendly” panpsychic theory, a 
naturalized panpsychism.  Panpsychism’s core thesis is that the mental is as fundamental 
to the world as the physical.  I understand panpsychism to be constituted by the following 
tenets: 1) the mental is a fundamental property that permeates the universe; 2) the mental 
is ontologically independent of matter (entailing that the mental cannot be reduced to the 
physical); 3) the physicalist worldview requires expansion to include the fundamentality 
of the mental; 4) higher forms of mentality (e.g., conscious thought) emerge from the 
basic mental constituents of reality. 
 In this dissertation I will work to naturalize panpsychism.  A viable naturalized 
panpsychism will show that panpsychism is a scientifically plausible solution to the 
mind-body problem.  I will not be arguing that naturalizing panpsychism definitively 
solves the mind-body problem, nor am I attempting to argue directly against any other 
theory.  I am not arguing that reality is in fact panpsychic nor am I definitively arguing 
that the human mind is a certain way rather than another.  I am not even seeking to 
demonstrate that naturalized panpsychism is superior to any other account of the mind.  I 
seek merely to establish that naturalized panpsychism is coherent and has its own virtues, 
and thus is a plausible theory of mind and possible solution to the mind-body problem.  
 2 
 The idiom ‘the devil is in the details’ means that there are often hidden problems 
or disadvantages in the details of one’s endeavors, theories, or plans.  For philosophy the 
idea is better expressed as ‘the devil is in the presuppositions,’ for it is often in a 
theorist’s apparently innocuous assumptions that undermine an otherwise well-conceived 
theory. Even more notably, the assumptions within a debate determine the dialectic 
topography of that debate.  These sorts of assumptions constrain the theories of not just 
particular theorists, but rather an entire community’s theorists.  This is the case with the 
mind-body debate.  Except for a very few exceptions, the mind-body debate is dominated 
by the ontological assumption that mental properties are anomalous in the universe.  
Anomalous properties are deviations from the “standard order” of the universe; they are 
not fundamental.  I call this assumption mental specialism. Quite obviously physicalistic 
accounts of the mind subscribe to mental specialism, since they endeavor to show that 
mind is really just physical properties arranged in a particular way.  Substance dualism—
and more specifically Cartesian dualism—assume mental specialism as well.  Descartes’ 
account is so entrenched in mental specialism that it subscribes to supernaturalism; his 
theory works only by positing extra-natural entities with supra-natural powers.   
 Mental specialism is an assumption, not a fact and not generally supported by 
arguments.  True, a theorist may occasionally appeal to observation, though observation 
itself is conditioned by a landscape of assumptions.  There is an alternative to mental 
specialism, an alternative that has a rich history within philosophy.  This alternative is 
panpsychism.  Panpsychism holds that mental properties are the standard order of the 
universe, a fundamental feature.  Galen Strawson notes that “there is absolutely no 
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evidence whatever against panpsychism” (2006a, 20).1  William Lycan repeats this 
statement and then adds that “there is no scientific evidence for panpsychism, there is no 
scientific reason, as opposed to philosophical argument, for believing it” (Lycan 2006, 
66).  Lycan (2006, footnote four) notes that the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum 
mechanics does provide evidence for panpsychism, but scoffs at such evidence since the 
Copenhagen Interpretation is an interpretation of quantum facts and not itself a quantum 
fact. These statements from Strawson and Lycan are indicative of the lack of conclusive 
evidence for or against panpsychism.  Support for either ontological position, as I will 
argue below, will rise or fall on the explanatory value of the theories that grow out of one 
or the other of these positions.    
 Naturalized panpsychism (NP) rejects mental specialism.  Rejecting mental 
specialism leads to the commitment of four principles that I take as constitutive of NP.  
These four principles are:  1) that proto-consciousness or information is a fundamental 
property that permeates the universe; 2) that proto-consciousness/information is 
ontologically independent of matter, which entails that the proto-
consciousness/information cannot be fully explained physically; 3) following principles 
(1) and (2), the physicalist worldview must include the fundamentality of proto-
consciousness/information; 4) consciousness just is integrated information (Tononi 
2008).   The first principle does not entail a strong version of the all-thesis, that every 
existent is conscious.  NP does not hold that rocks and billboard signs are conscious.  NP 
assumes that theories of the mind and reality in general must be commensurable with 
science.  Thus NP is decidedly anti-substance dualist, but not due to the immateriality 
                                                          
1
 Emphasis Strawson’s. 
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thesis of substance dualism.  Rather NP rejects substance dualism on the basis that 
substance dualism contradicts the naturalistic principle of causal closure. NP does hold 
that mental properties permeate reality; as a fundamental entity it will permeate reality.  
But this fundamental property is not consciousness, but rather the fundamental 
constituents of consciousness, proto-consciousness.  Proto-consciousness is ontologically 
independent in the sense of being unable to be ontologically reduced to another category 
of existence, though it is not a separate substance.  One cannot account for proto-
consciousness in terms of physical facts, but proto-consciousness can have interaction 
with the physical.   
NP maintains that mental properties have a degree of causal efficacy.  Much of 
current science is missing something significant about the universe—something branches 
of science itself (such as quantum physics) have the ability to see, namely that mental 
properties are fundamental to the universe. Finally NP is committed to the thesis that 
higher-order mental properties, such as consciousness, emerge from ‘mental-simples’ 
such as proto-consciousness.  This thesis requires that NP offer a solution to the famous 
combination problem.  Because of NP’s naturalistic commitments, its solution to the 
combination problem will not rely on transcendental arguments nor resort to a doctrine of 
mysteriousness.  Naturalism demands that the solution be continuous with a scientific 
understanding of the mind. 
 The above discussion clearly shows that NP is a scientifically acceptable theory, a 
theory that accepts the authority of science, not necessarily as an univocal “trump card,” 
but certainly as a fully equal partner in the inquiry, with respect to what we know about 
the universe.  Thus NP also accepts, acknowledges, and relies upon non-scientific (i.e. 
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philosophical) methods for coming to a full understanding the mind.  Science alone will 
not find the solution to problems like the nature of the mind, nor can a philosophical 
inquiry ignore or run afoul of the results and methods of science.  Yet, where a priori 
metaphysical presuppositions conflict with results from the natural sciences, the power of 
veto rests with science. So while NP maintains that science has a powerful seat at the 
table, and particular sway in the case of conflict, this does not fall into scientism, which 
takes science to be the only method able to produce meaningful results about the universe 
and ourselves.  Accordingly NP’s metaphysical discourse about the mind may be seen as 
the “applied metaphysics” of John Heil (2004), which works hand in hand with science 
and is only vindicated to the extent that its application fits with what science does and 
discovers. 
 Mental properties and physical properties both describe reality, and an account of 
both is required for an understanding of the universe.  NP holds that fundamental mental 
properties (not necessarily higher-level mental properties) share an inherent bond with 
fundamental physical properties.  So, in cases where fundamental mental properties and 
fundamental physical properties share a bond, both properties constitute an ontological 
event.  NP is not necessarily committed to the thesis that all events are constituted by 
both properties, though at least some events are so constituted.  NP holds that causal 
relationships are relationships between discrete events.  It is this view of causal 
relationships as between events combined with the thesis that some events are 
fundamentally constituted by mental and physical properties that provides an account of 
mental causation.  When such an event is constituted by the combined properties, the 
causal efficacy of the event is due to both the physical and the mental properties.   
 6 
 Proto-consciousness is the fundamental lower-level state from which higher-level 
conscious states emerge.  On the particular issue of how to naturalize panpsychism I am 
proposing here (NP), proto-consciousness is information.  Consciousness arises when 
information is arranged in a specific way by an appropriate system, as for example in the 
case of a mammal’s brain.  Following Guilio Tononi (2008), NP maintains that 
consciousness just is integrated information, which itself is just information arranged in 
specific (that is integrated) ways.  It is the identification of proto-consciousness with 
information that enables NP to provide a naturalized account of panpsychism that solves 
the combination problem.  Information is the reduction of uncertainty, the elimination of 
alternatives in a given configuration; it is a precise formal scientific theory that traces 
back to Shannon’s work in the 1940s and 50s.2  Intuitively, the more alternatives that are 
eliminated reduce more uncertainty, producing more information.  The human brain has a 
vast amount of information because its connections and states number in the billions.  
The information is highly integrated because that the neurons are organized into higher 
involuted structures on multiple levels.  This integration is what a computer with high 
information-states lacks.  This measure of integrated information explains why humans 
have consciousness and mere computers possessing information states do not. Integration 
is the key to the proto-consciousness of information becoming full blown consciousness.  
And notice that in this there is no appeal to mysteriousness:  the NP solution to the 
combination problem grows out of a scientific account with real empirical credentials. 
 Before moving on to a chapter summary, I recapitulate below the various 
presuppositions I will be employing as outlined above. 
                                                          
2
 See Cover and Thomas 2006 for the current state of the theory. 
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1. Consciousness is a real phenomenon in the universe.  This assumption does not assign 
any particular nature to consciousness.  Conscious states could turn out to be brain states 
under this assumption, though I will argue that consciousness is integrated information.   
2. I reject the brute emergence of properties from ontologically distinct realms. I hold that 
brute emergence—cases of emergence where a property, X, emerges from a property that 
is fundamentally and in all ways not-X—is impossible.  Thus, if consciousness emerges 
from the physical, the physical must, in some way, be so constituted to produce 
consciousness.  In other words, I hold that something cannot come from nothing.   
3. I accept the principle of causal closure of the universe, though with some modifications 
in how the principle is interpreted.  Thus, I reject all forms of supernaturalism, especially 
substance dualism.  I accept Barry Stroud’s characterization of ‘supernaturalism’: “the 
invocation of an agent or force that somehow stands outside the familiar natural world 
and whose doings cannot be understood as part of it” (Stroud 2004, 23).   
4. I accept scientific credibility of the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics; 
again I only need to do so provisionally.  My account of a plausible naturalized 
panpsychism need not (and should not) be any more certain than credible scientific 
theory. 
I now turn to a brief summary of each of the chapters. 
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Chapter One 
 
 
 
 In chapter one I formulate mental specialism, the assumption that the mental or 
consciousness is an anomaly in the universe and how it continues to dominate the mind-
body debate.  The mental, it is held, is something to be explained away rather than a part 
of the universe that is necessary for a complete understanding of reality.  The mind-body 
problem arises from failure to treat the mental as a distinct and fundamental category of 
reality.  But this failure is only part of the problem.  The second part of the problem is 
that it is conceived that the category of the mental can only be posited as the opposite of 
the physical.  It should be understood that mental specialism is not a necessary aspect of 
the mind-body debate.  Thus I assert that the rejection of mental specialism is the key for 
a better understanding and a possible solution to the generation problem.  Rejecting 
mental specialism lands us squarely into panpsychism, the view that the mental is 
fundamental to the universe. 
Chapter Two 
 
 
 
 In chapter two I demonstrate the compatibility of naturalism—the view that the 
universe is thoroughly natural as opposed to supernatural—and panpsychism.3  I do not 
argue that panpsychism is the only theory that is compatible with naturalism.  I merely 
aim to naturalize panpsychism, to make panpsychism compatible and even coherent with 
science.  If, for example, dualism or property dualism can be shown to be compatible 
with naturalism, then my project is not harmed.  Demonstrating the compatibility of 
                                                          
3
 I merely characterize naturalism with the view that the universe is ‘natural’ and not supernatural.  This 
characterization is not meant as a theory or as a definition. 
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naturalism and panpsychism discourages an a priori dismissal of panpsychism because it 
is unscientific (in the sense of being unable to be put in conversation with scientific 
results).   First I shall determine the dispositions that are necessary aspects of naturalism.  
I do not mean for this to be a definitive understanding of naturalism.  My purpose is 
rather to determine a method with which to test whether a proposed disposition of 
naturalism is a necessary aspect of naturalism or not.  I test the proposed dispositions by 
determining whether the disposition is entailed by naturalism’s core or fundamental 
thesis, which I assume to be:  ‘A conclusion about reality is only defensible if it fits with 
what and how science discovers and is not categorically removed from empirical 
(dis)confirmation.’  I call this the ‘defensibility thesis.’     While I believe that the 
defensibility thesis is in fact the central thesis of naturalism, it is irrelevant if another 
theorist argues that some other thesis is in fact the central thesis.  The issue in this chapter 
is a method for determining whether naturalism and panpsychism are compatible.  If 
another theorist in fact demonstrates that a new thesis is central, such as anti-
supernaturalism, for instance, then it is a small matter to re-test the compatibility in 
question and advance from that point.   I understand naturalism to be completely 
constituted by its core dispositions.  Then I shall demonstrate that panpsychism does not 
contradict these core theses.   
 The two most obvious objections to panpsychism-naturalism compatibility are 
that panpsychism is a supernatural doctrine and that panpsychism demonstrates that 
science is incomplete.  To refute the supernaturalism objection, I note that my version of 
panpsychism does not require recourse to supernaturalism. The next objection is about 
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the authority of the sciences on what exists.  This objection depends on the view that 
today’s science universally or significantly holds mental specialism.   
 Because of the special status of physicalism in naturalist circles, I take special 
issue to reconcile physicalism and panpsychism.  I proceed by offering an account of a 
dual physical-mental causation.  I accomplish this by adopting much of the work of 
Embodied Minds in Action by Robert Hanna and Michelle Maiese (2009).  The key is 
rejecting the standard interpretation of causal closure, or fundamentalism, which holds 
that fundamentally physical properties necessarily exclude any sort of intrinsic 
connection with fundamental mental properties (Hanna & Maiese 2009, 273-274).  This 
allows for events with both mental and physical properties instantiated in those events.  
Thus, the mental does not inject free-causation and in fact works within the physicalist 
disposition.   
 The ultimate goal of this dissertation is to naturalize panpsychism and thus give 
panpsychism plausibility that it did not as of yet posses.  While metaphysical theories 
may be proposed and may be considered meaningful independently of naturalism, one of 
the greatest hindrances to real progress on the mind is a lack of substantive 
commensurability between philosophical and scientific theorizing.  A successful theory 
just cannot contradict science or even operate entirely outside of science.  Thus, any 
theory must be sensitive to the current science and must be accessible and willing to be in 
serious conversation with science.   Thus the first step in naturalizing panpsychism is to 
show that the two doctrines are in fact compatible.  
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Chapter Three 
 
 
 
 In chapter three I offer an empirical solution to the combination problem.  If 
panpsychism is true, then either each and every thought exists in its own right perfectly 
formed, or higher-order mental properties emerge from lower-order mental properties.  
The latter is combination.  The former contradicts metaphysical minimalism and creates 
the problem of instantiation of these thoughts in particular thinking beings.  The 
combination problem has proved difficult to solve except through appeals to 
mysteriousness or by establishment through transcendental arguments.   Mental 
properties are quite different from physical properties.  The emergence of higher-level 
mental properties is not a matter of the summing of lower-level mental properties like 
physical properties.  Phenomenal properties like consciousness simply cannot sum. 
 I offer a scientific solution to the combination problem.  My solution adapts 
Guilio Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness (IITC) (2008).  Tononi 
proposes that consciousness just is integrated information, both the existence of and 
character of specific conscious states.  A conscious state is a result of the relationships 
between different mechanisms processing information in a system, such as a human 
brain.  So, combination results from one set of neurons communicating with another—
systems that are part of a larger system.  Each system receives input that results in that 
system entering into an internal informational state.  Thus, Combination is input that 
results in an internal state of a system. 
 Excluding the emergence of conscious properties from physical properties, which 
are taken to be fundamentally non-conscious, physical reduction works.  Higher-order 
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physical properties can be successfully explained by referring to fundamental particles.  
Panpsychism hold that this success cannot be repeated in order to explain conscious 
properties that conscious properties cannot reduce to non-conscious properties.  But, 
unless a panpsychist can offer an empirical and convincing solution to the combination 
problem to explain where higher-order mental properties come from, then the panpsychic 
proposal just does not explain enough to consider it as a possible solution to the mind-
body problem.  By offering a solution to the combination problem I advance one more 
step to establishing a viable panpsychic theory, because I overcome the major difficulty 
to panpsychism.  If my solution holds, then naturalized panpsychism holds as well. 
Chapter Four 
 
 
 In chapter three I offer a solution to the combination problem.  This solution 
depends upon Guilio Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness.  In turn, 
my solution depends upon the viability of Tononi’s theory.  Anthony Peressini, in his 
article “Consciousness as Integrated Information: A Provisional Philosophical Critique,” 
offers several maiming if  not fatal objections to Tononi’s project.  In this chapter I meet 
Peressini’s objections in order to solidify Tononi’s.  First, Peressini’s division of 
qualitative experience and subjective experience is not warranted.  I argue that 
introspection and conceptual distinctions (being able to talk about phenomena as if they 
are different) are problematic.  Next I demonstrate how accounts of qualia are 
oversimplified, focusing on singular aspects of experience.  I then argue that information 
is intrinsic to a system.  I establish information’s intrinsic-ness by demonstrating that the 
information meets the basic intuition about the ‘intrinsic,’ namely that if an informational 
system was in a lonely universe (the only existent), that system would still have           
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information.  Then I argue that information is fundamental by utilizing Galen Strawson’s 
argument that emergent experience requires an emergent base that is fundamentally 
mental (Strawson 2006a).  I then argue that information is fundamental if one considers 
its role in the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum physics.  Finally I explain that since 
full-blown consciousness is, in fact, an arrangement of fundamental properties, it has the 
theoretical and ontological strength to carry IITC’s basic propositions.   
Chapter Five 
 
 
 
 I have argued that a naturalized panpsychism is a possibility.  This final chapter 
answers two questions.  The first question is:  What is naturalized panpsychism (NP)?  
The second is:  What is the character of human consciousness according to naturalized 
panpsychism?  I shall conclude with a brief examination of areas that require further 
investigation and some possible areas that NP may benefit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14 
Chapter One 
Where We’re at, the Mind-Body Problem; Mental Specialism to Panpsychism 
 
 
 
1.0 Synopsis of Chapter One 
 
 
 
 In this chapter I address the generation problem, the problem of where 
consciousness comes from in our universe, which is taken to be primarily physical.  The 
physical is taken to be fundamentally non-conscious.  So, how consciousness occurs in 
the universe is a mystery.  My diagnosis of the generation problem traces its origin in the 
Modern period until today, though I certainly do not cover every aspect due to space and 
time.   I trace a basic history of the evolution of the mind-body problem to display that 
the generation problem, how conscious properties come to exist, is not in fact a problem 
of a particular theory but a problem of the debate itself.  Behind the debate is the 
assumption of mental specialism, the principle that the mental is an aberration of nature 
or something that is out of place in the universe.  This assumption leads to at least the 
generation problem, but it is not an assumption needed for a complete understanding of 
the universe, only particular theories.  It is un-argued for and seems to be a matter of 
dogmatism rather than scientific support.  Rejecting mental specialism lands us in another 
assumption, that the mental is a fundamental part of nature, or panpsychism.   Both are 
assumptions but both are actually equally acceptable.   
 My first goal is to explain the switch of mind as intellect to mind as consciousness 
that arose in the philosophy of mind.  This change is due to the qualia objections to 
functionalism and physicalism.  The second is to describe the method the majority of 
theorists employ to circumvent what David Chalmers calls the hard problem of 
 15 
consciousness.  I shall only describe some of these theories due to limited space.  The 
method in question I call the method of conversion, for these theories seek to convert 
consciousness into cognition.  Next I will diagnose and explicate where the primary and 
fatal problem of physicalist theories arises from, that is how to explain the emergence of 
consciousness from non-conscious matter.  The origin of the physicalist difficulty is the 
ontological assumption that I term mental specialism, the assumption that the mental is an 
anomaly in a universe that is fundamentally non-mental.  Finally I shall offer what I take 
to be the only answer open to theorists if they wish to solve the generation problem.  This 
answer is to abandon mental specialism and embrace the notion of consciousness as a 
fundamental feature of the universe, or panpsychism   
1.1 Intellect to Consciousness 
 
 
 Science routinely takes observable phenomena and explains them with more 
basic, underlying structures.  For example, water is explained by the more basic 
underlying account of the molecular structure, H2O.  Thus, we have the identity 
statement:  “Water is H2O,” with H2O representing the nature of water.  Herbert Feigl, 
U.T. Place and J.C.C. Smart applied this reduction to the mind-body problem, asserting 
that a mental state—as a thing and not as a concept—is nothing other than a brain state 
(Place 1956) (Feigl 1958) (Smart 1959).  These thinkers’ method was to demonstrate that 
there is nothing contradictory in the statement “mental states are brains states” and then 
point to the simplicity of the identity theory, simplicity in the sense of positing fewer 
entities in the universe.  Since the simplest theory is the superior theory, the identity 
theory should be accepted. Both Place and Smart are careful to note that their theory does 
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not state that talk about mental states is talk about brain states. Thus, their theory is about 
an ontological reduction and not an analytic reduction.  Water and H2O do not mean the 
same thing even though they are in fact the same ontological object.  Identity theorists 
also assert that the statement “mental states are brain states” is not a logical necessity, 
that is a de dicto necessity (a property of language), and thus an analytic truth, but a de re 
necessity (a property of the world), and a contingent truth.   
 Jaegwon Kim asserts in his article “The Mind-Body Problem after Fifty Years” 
that after the short lived hypothesis of the Mind-Body Identity Theory
4
, physicalism 
became the assumed stage of the mind-body discussion and the task for theorists would 
become fitting the mental into the assumed physicalist framework (J. Kim 1998).  Most 
contemporary theorists accept that the universe is thoroughly physical—non-mental—
with mentality as an anomaly.
5 
 This is physicalism, the ontological theory holding that 
everything in the universe is either physical or has a physical foundation. 
 In “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?” U.T. Place initiates the change by stating 
that  
“cognitive concepts” such as “knowing,” “believing,” “understanding,” “remembering,” 
                                                          
4
 See U.T. Place, “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?”, British Journal of Psychology 47/1 (1956), 44-50;  
J.J.C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes,” Philosophical Review 68 (1959), 141-56; Herbert Feigl, 
“The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’”, in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. II, eds. Herbert 
Feigl, Grover Maxewell, and Michael Scriven (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958). 
5
 It is rather strange that the physical is considered the basic material of the universe since it is through the 
mental that we, as conscious beings, have access to the universe.  In fact, the physical seems to be available 
to any conscious being only through a veil of consciousness.  One would think that the most natural 
question would be how to fit the physical into a universe that is fundamentally mental, as Russell asserts in 
his Problems of Philosophy.  Russell, Bertrand, (1912).  Problems of Philosophy, Oxford, NY:  Oxford 
University Press, pg. 11.  Galen Strawson’s paper ‘Realistic Monism’, in which he argues for a panpsychist 
account of conscious experience, distinguishes between two types of physicalism, real physicalism and 
physicSalism.  Real physicalism accepts the reality of conscious experience and understands that conscious 
experience is the beginning of a realist theory of what there is.  PhysicSalism is the article of faith that 
physics can provide a complete explanation of all concrete reality.  PhysicSalism, according to Strawson, 
opposes real physicalism unless it is supposed that physics can capture the full essence of conscious 
experience. 
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and “volitional concepts” such as “wanting” and “intending” can all be explained by 
appeal to behavioral dispositions.  In Place’s article have an early, albeit misguided, 
division between what comes to be called a-consciousness, that data within a system that 
is available for the purpose of reasoning, and p-consciousness, subjective experience, or 
between tractable problems and truly hard problems (Place, 1956, pg. 44) (Block 2002) 
(Chalmers 1995). For Place the easy problem is dealt with in terms of Logical 
Behaviorism, but we address the same problem with our contemporary cognitive science 
and neuroscience in saying that science can explain the intellect, calculative intelligence, 
and so forth.  What is still left unexplained and which therefore becomes the focus of the 
mind-body debate is consciousness.  This is Chalmers’ ‘hard problem’ of consciousness: 
subjective experience.  The easy problem for Chalmers (and note the similarity to Place’s 
terminology) is:  “the ability to discriminate stimuli, or to report information, or to 
monitor internal states, or to control behavior” (Chalmers 1995, 200).  Chalmers himself 
calls these the ‘easy’ problems because there is no mystery behind their nature and 
Physicalist doctrines, i.e. Cognitive Science, Functionalism and Eliminative Materialism, 
can provide an account of these various mental states (Chalmers 1995). 
 If we compare the mind in the mind-body problem displayed by Place, Nagel, 
Chalmers, and Block with earlier theorists, such as Descartes for instance, it is easy to see 
the change in topics. Descartes claimed that the mind and the body are two substances 
complete in themselves and independent of each other in their existence and function. 
There is nothing mental in the physical and nothing physical in the mental.   If one 
examines Descartes’ The Discourse on Method and The Meditations on First Philosophy, 
one finds a concept of mind that is thoroughly, though not exclusively, cognitive.  For 
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Descartes, the mind is what calculates, judges between stimuli, is responsible for 
volitional and language behavior, understands, and perceives (Descartes 1641/2003, 27).   
What makes a mind what it is, on pain of inexistence, is thinking, not consciousness.  
Further on in the second chapter of The Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes 
clarifies that this “thinking thing” is “a thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is 
willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions” (Descartes 
1641/2003, 28).  Descartes’ wax argument at the end of the second meditation displays 
that the mind discriminates between stimuli (Descartes 1641/2003, 32).  Finally, in the 
Discourse of Method, Descartes argues that the two qualities that signify a mind-full 
entity are language and complex problem solving, each of which falls into the category of 
‘easy questions’ according to Chalmers (Descartes 1641/2003, 56-57).6  
 Both dualism and identity theory consider the mind as an entity.  Functionalism 
challenges this assumption, asserting that a mental state is a functional relation between 
stimuli and an organism’s behavior.  The function of a thing is what that thing does.  If 
we apply functionalism to the mind-body problem, the mind is the function of the brain.  
Pain is a functional state of an organism, resulting from tissue damage as the input and 
pain-behavior as the output.  A common way of imagining the functionalist theory of the 
mind is that of a computer.  Computers were made, from the simplest abacus to the Apple 
                                                          
6
 At VI, 56-57, Descartes poses the possibility of philosophic zombies and explains why philosophic 
zombies are an impossibility.  An entity without a mind cannot communicate via language and would lack 
the ingenuity that humans display.  Descartes’ differentiation between mindful entities and automatic 
entities rests on his observation of these two entities and an analogy between himself and other humans. 
Compare this to the difference between the Sphex ichneumoneus Daniel Dennett describes in his book 
Elbow Room; The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting.  Here Dennett describes a wasp that, no matter 
how many times her task is interrupted, operates purely on some instinctual programming  (pg. 10-11).  Not 
only does the wasp lack language, the wasp cannot solve problems and perhaps does not even understand 
that there is a problem at all.  The behavior of this sphex can be explained purely by a functionalist 
program, for what the sphex lacks—conscious behavior—is just what the functionalist explanation cannot 
provide an account of. 
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iPod, to perform functions.  Computers receive input, process that input according to a set 
program, and, depending on the input and program, provide an answer as their output.  
The mind is what the particular program does, taking information and transforming that 
information into behavior. 
 The shift from the intellect to consciousness is fully apparent in some of the most 
influential objections to functionalism.  The objections demonstrate that, given that 
functionalism is normally conceived as embodied in a physical system, functionalism and 
physicalism fail to account for the qualia, the felt aspects, of experience. Two examples 
are Ned Block’s “Chinese Nation” objection (Block 1991, 215) and Frank Jackson’s 
Knowledge objection (Jackson 1991).  These thought experiments are objections to 
functionalism and physicalism not merely because the quale of experience is left out of 
these two theories, but because the two theories assert that consciousness is not the mark 
of the mental—what makes a mental state a mental state—but that a mental state is a 
mental state because of the functional state of the event in question. For the functionalist, 
a mental state is a mental state because it fulfills a function program.  The functionalist 
tries to demonstrate that the mark of the mental is functional operation and the 
representationalist tries to demonstrate that the mark of the mental is an intentional state.  
For the representationalist, by contrast, a mental state is what it is because it represents 
the world or is about something.   
 Ned Block’s “Chinese Nation” objection demonstrates that an organizational 
system, such as all the people of China, could be functionally similar to the 
functionalist’s conception of the human mind and yet lack subjective experience or the 
quale of experience (Block 1991). To demonstrate this, Block constructs a thought 
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experiment in which the Chinese people act as the physical instantiation of the functional 
system of a human mind.  If one investigates the inner working of the “Chinese Nation” 
functional system, one will not discover the subjective experience that human beings 
enjoy.  Thus, it is plain to see that functionalism leaves something important out of a 
theory of the mind, namely consciousness.
7
  Conscious experience is our most intimate 
quality of our mental life.  To leave it out leaves out something that is central to the 
nature of mentality. 
 Frank Jackson has us envision a scientist who lives in a black and white world 
(Jackson 1991).  This scientist is named Mary.  Mary knows all the physical explanations 
of vision.  So, when Todd views a red tomato, Mary can give a complete physical 
explanation of the light waves absorbed and reflected by the surface of the tomato and 
what goes on when the light reaches Todd’s eye, and the accompanying synaptic firing.  
Now, Jackson asks us to imagine that Mary is released from her black and white prison.  
When Mary sees a tomato outside of her prison, she perceives the redness for the first 
time, and learns something new.  From this Jackson asserts that something new is learned 
and so physicalism does not give a complete explanation of the conscious experience.  
So, functionalism and physicalism fail to account for something quintessential to mental 
life.  One would expect that if a mental state were essentially a functional state or a 
physical state, then Mary would be able to conceptualize Todd’s phenomenal experience 
of redness.  However, the only way for Mary to know Todd’s experience is through 
                                                          
7
 There are, of course, objections to Block’s argument.  However, the validity of the argument is not 
important to my project.  It suffices to show that the problem of consciousness serves as an obstacle to a 
strong theory. 
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phenomenal experience.  This shows that the essential nature of a portion of, if not all, 
mental states is something other than a functional or physical state. 
 The move from cognition to consciousness takes place as a result of the various 
objections to functionalism and to other incarnations of physicalism.  Physical theories 
are able to explain cognition, or are at least sufficiently on their way so that confidence is 
justified.  But what is left—consciousness—is a true conundrum.  The issue arises from 
the aberrant nature of consciousness.  It simply does not fit within the physicalist system.  
Science deals in external relations, and consciousness is an entirely internal experience.
8
  
Science can speak about anatomy, chemicals, neurotransmitters and so forth, but it cannot 
describe or understand what an adolescent feels when kissing someone for the first time, 
an experience that is quintessential to the human experience.  This is why theorists 
attempt to change the nature of the question of consciousness, converting it from p-
consciousness to a-consciousness.  It is an attempt to transform that aberrant phenomenon 
into something with which we have had explanatory success.   
1.2 Converting Consciousness into the Not-Consciousness 
 
 
 
 Jaegwon Kim asserts that the mind-body problem is the problem of accounting for 
the emergence of consciousness in a fundamentally non-conscious world, fitting the 
mental into an assumed physicalist system, or closing the explanatory gap (J. Levine 
1983).  Emergence refers to complex properties or entities developing out of basic 
                                                          
8
 There has been a general movement to exclude part of psychology from the scientific community 
precisely based on the fact that that part of psychology has internal experience as its object.  The aspect of 
psychology the scientific community recognizes as science is external relations, i.e. neuroscience and 
physiology.  The area of psychology that studies internal experience has been termed “folk psychology” 
and is now generally thought scientifically suspect if not altogether false.   What is a valid object of 
psychological study to the scientific community are the external relations of neuroscience.   
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properties or entities, such as the generation of liquidity out of micro-properties such as 
H2O and other molecules. The physicalist must either develop a theory of emergence that 
works or eliminate the mental all together.  Developing a theory of emergence, 
explaining how the mental originates out of the physical, would explain just how the 
mental is physical.  Yet, there is a significant difference between explaining how 
liquidity, heat, lightening, or digestion originates from their more basic constituents.  
After all, liquidity, heat, lightening and digestion are in the same ontological category as 
H2O molecules, the motion of molecules, electrical discharges and the various internal 
organs of a living creature.  But, our experience of our mental nature seems to have a 
different quality than our experience of our physical nature.  The “explanatory gap”, a 
phrase coined by Joseph Levine, signifies just this problem of an adequate theory of the 
emergence of consciousness from physical constituents.  No matter how thoroughly the 
various non-conscious theories of mind explain or explain away consciousness, there is 
something that is always left over that the various theories cannot explain.  
The most influential theories on the nature of the mind—Functionalism, 
Representationalism, Eliminativism—remove consciousness as the mark of the mental 
and replace it with a property that belongs to what Chalmer’s calls the ‘easy problems’ of 
consciousness, namely making the mark of the mental a functional state, a 
representational state, or baldly denying the existence of consciousness altogether like 
Churchland’s eliminitivism.  These theories seek to close the explanatory gap and solve 
the problem of emergence by shifting ontological categories or denying the ontological 
category of the mental completely, which is eliminitivism.  Let us call this the Method of 
Conversion (MC).  One last issue to notice about these various theories is that they are all 
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thoroughly physicalist.  These theories are conceived assuming that the universe is 
entirely exhausted by physical facts without recourse to mental facts.   
 We have discussed functionalism, highlighting that the functionalist holds that a 
mental state is the functional relation between stimuli and the behavior of a system. The 
functionalist has several different responses.  She may deny the importance of 
consciousness, yet not consciousness’ existence, regarding the mental life of an entity, 
making consciousness epiphenomenal, causally impotent in an organism’s behavior.  
Functionalists have also asserted that entities such as the “Chinese Nation” simply are not 
implementing the correct functional system.  Related to these responses is William 
Lycan’s rejoinder to circumvent objections like Block’s “Chinese Nation”.  The “Chinese 
Nation” does not represent the actual state of the functional mind for it leaves out the 
mind’s teleological nature such an example does not have the right evolutionary purpose 
and history.  Finally, regarding the explanatory gap, functionalists will assert that there is 
an unbridgeable gap, but the gap is insignificant in relation to a complete theory of 
mental states.  As the examples above show, the functionalist tactic is to deny the 
importance of consciousness, to deny that a theory of the bat’s mind is incomplete 
without accounting for ‘what-it-is-like-to-be’ a bat or understanding consciousness as a 
functional relation.  Again, the functionalist’s basic assertion that what is essential to a 
mental state is its functional relation within the organism’s behavior.   
 Functionalism conceives the mind as a processor of stimuli in order to produce 
behavior that meets the conditions of satisfaction for a particular organism.  Another 
theory with the same basis as functionalism though cashed out in slightly different terms 
is Representationalism.  The theory is an adaptation of functionalism and retains the 
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functionalist doctrine that an organism’s behavior results from a functional relation.  Yet 
representationalism describes the functional relation in terms of symbol processing.   So, 
the mind is a symbol processor, which means that a mental state is what represents a state 
of affairs with another symbol, much like the intentional powers of language.  Possessing 
a particular mental state, say the belief that (a) the cat is on the table, is to have a symbol 
or series of symbols representing the proposition or meaning of (a) processed in whatever 
system in the mind processes beliefs.  Beliefs are one half of the process which 
determines the behavior of an organism.  The other half is the system that processes an 
organism’s desires, which amounts to an organism’s having a symbol representing (b) 
wanting the cat off the table.  The mental states (a) and (b) combine to produce the 
organism’s behavior which results in removing the cat from the table.   
 Having beliefs, desires and other mental states is a matter of possessing a symbol 
that expresses the reference to some state of affairs beyond itself.  Such reference 
requires postulation of a vocabulary of symbols.  Jerry Fodor calls this vocabulary a 
‘language of thought’ (1975).  How the mental apparatus applies this language reflects 
the meanings, the semantic relations, of the symbols, but the mental apparatus does not 
use the meanings of the symbols.  In fact, theorists hold that the symbols and the 
meanings expressed by those symbols do not hold an intrinsic connection.  The apparatus 
reflects the various meanings entirely by principles of the language’s syntax.  Thus, the 
mind is a symbol processor, applying sentences in the language of thought without 
comprehending the meanings of those symbols. The meaning of the symbol is due to the 
external world and how an agent applies that symbol.   
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 The representational theory of mind easily fits the mental into the material world 
and the mind-brain relation.  Fodor uses a computer paradigm to explain the place of the 
mental in the world.  Mental states and brain states are related in a mode similar to the 
relationship between computer programs and computer hardware.  The hardware 
executes—realizes—programming, but the programming is not reducible to the 
hardware.  Mental states and brain states are the same in that brain states realize mental 
states.  Mental states cannot be reduced to brain states for just the same reason that 
programs are not reducible to the hardware that implements them. 
9
 
1.2.1 Michael Tye’s PANIC Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness 
 
 
 
 One need not study the representational theory of mind long to recognize that 
these theorists reconfigure the mind to fit into a physicalist framework by establishing the 
mark of the mental as a representational state.  Just like functionalism, however, 
representationalism’s obstacle is accounting for consciousness.  Take for example 
Michael Tye’s PANIC theory (M. Tye 1995).  The PANIC theory accounts for 
consciousness by referring to what Tye refers to as the phenomenal content of an 
organism’s experience.   
 The cognitive activities depend upon representational content, according to Tye.  
The cognitive capacities have as objects sensory representational content, or sensory 
                                                          
9
 If mental states admitted of reduction to brain states, the various mental states would not be able to 
transcend a particular physical organ. One of the flaws of reductionism is the strict physical identity of a 
mental state.  Mental states that we intuitively conclude are shared by different organisms and perhaps even 
artificial life (machines with artificial intelligence) could not be the same because of a strict identity 
between mental states and brain states.  To have shared mental states between organisms and artificial life 
would require each organism to possess the same physical state.  The attractiveness of functionalism and 
representationalism is its principle of non-reductionism or multiple realizability: the fact that a mental state 
can be instantiated in multiple physical foundations. 
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symbols.  These sensory symbols are the input that an organism cognizes.  These sensory 
representations are products of the stimuli the organism acquires through contact with the 
external world.  In stimuli there are non-sensory representations. Tye locates the quale in 
the interim between the non-sensory representation and the formation of sensory 
representations and the quale is identical with phenomenal content, or PANIC:  Poised 
Abstract Non-conceptual Intentional Content (M. Tye 1995, 137).  This phenomenal 
content is within the external stimuli that affects an organism and produces beliefs and 
desires.   
 Tye’s PANIC theory sweeps qualia into what Ned Block calls “access 
consciousness.”  Phenomenal content certainly are not directly manipulated by cognitive 
faculties, but the nature of phenomenal content is representational.  This is the same 
nature of the content of access conscious states.  The ‘what-it-is-like,’ under the PANIC 
theory, equates to having a phenomenal concept (M. Tye 1995, 166). What the Mary in 
Frank Jackson’s objection did not know amounts to lack of the phenomenal concept of 
red and the inability to apply that concept in the external world (M. Tye 1995, 174).  
1.2.2 Eliminative Materialism and Radical Conversion 
 
 
 
 Eliminative Materialism is a global usage of Mental Conversion (MC).  As stated 
before, MC is the tactic of explaining phenomenal mental states and the emergence of 
these mental states from a physical foundation by re-interpreting or reducing those states 
into non-phenomenal states.  Eliminative Materialism does not merely seek to convert 
phenomenal consciousness into access consciousness, as in the previous theories we have 
discussed.  Eliminative Materialism (hereafter EM) seeks to convert the entire framework 
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of the mind-body dialogue into an entirely scientific framework, thereby removing 
propositional attitudes from the discussion.
10
  The mind-body debate, according to 
eliminitivist’s assessment, is founded upon a faulty theory, namely Folk Psychology, 
(hereafter FP) sometimes called common sense psychology.
11
  Eliminativists seek to 
expose FP’s faults in order to elicit the theoretical community’s rejection of FP and the 
adoption of a theory that conforms to the principles and nature of the contemporary 
scientific theories in other fields, by which eliminativists mean Neuroscience.  The 
problems that arise in the traditional mind-body debate result from adherence to FP. 
 Proponents of EM take the discussion of the nature of the mind to be dominated 
by two and only two
12
 theoretical frameworks—science and FP—that attempt to 
chronicle a consistent and meaningful story about the human body, development, society 
and behavior.  Neuroscience, biology, evolution, and physiology—to name a few—
constitute the scientific framework, explaining and predicting human behavior through 
reference to chemicals, synapses, neurotransmitters, hormones, and physiology.  Folk 
Psychology is constituted by mental concepts: beliefs, desires, pains, pleasures, emotions, 
and intentions, explaining and predicting human behavior by positing a mind.  The 
majority of the human population, perhaps excluding eliminativists, employs FP to 
navigate the human and animal world.  The majority holds that minds, or at least mental 
states—whatever the nature of these states—are valid ontological entities.  Positing these 
                                                          
10
 This is apparent in S.P. Stitch’s book From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: the Case Against 
Belief where he argues that a theory of propositional attitudes like belief and desire is not required for a 
science of the mind.  As support he points out that semantics is not necessary for an explanation, a 
prediction or the coordination of verbal behavior, and non-verbal behavior. 
11
 Paul Churchland calls FP ‘pre-scientific’ in his article Folk Psychology in On The Contrary (1998), 
casting FP as an antiquated and naive theory. 
12
 It seems fairly obvious that eliminative materialists consider FP and EM to be the only candidates for 
general theories covering the debate on mind.  They merely argue against the elimination of FP and the 
elimination of any theory, such as functionalist dualism, that employs the concepts and laws of FP. 
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entities is a way of understanding and interacting with others successfully by ascribing 
mental concepts to them as the cause of behavior. So, FP is a theory about minds and EM 
is not.  
 Eliminative materialism is an elegant solution to the mind-body problem.  One of 
the main tasks in the crafting of a successful answer to the mind-body problem is 
explaining how mental states emerge from physical states.  The troubling aspect of the 
problem, which invites MC, is that the mental and the physical are assumed to be two 
different ontological categories.    If consciousness is taken as the essential element of 
mental states, then consciousness seems opposed to the physical.  What better way to 
avoid providing an answer to the difficult and elusive problem of emergence than to 
eliminate the emergent altogether?  Note this is not reducing consciousness to some 
physical state, for reduction actually affirms the existence of the mind.  According to EM, 
there is nothing to reduce.  When one asserts that one believes, one says nothing, in fact, 
for there is no referent for the term ‘belief.’   
 Since Paul Churchland’s work is central to EM, I shall focus on his arguments.  
Folk Psychology, Churchland asserts, is a poor theory; it does not do its job.  Poor 
theories in science have one of two fates:  elimination or reduction.  Science, and even 
society, in fact, is a history of the elimination or reduction of one theory for a better 
one.
13
  So, Churchland asserts that if neuroscience and physiology can produce a theory 
that explains and predicts human behavior better that FP, then FP should be reduced to 
neuroscience or replaced completely.  Folk Psychology, Churchland asserts, is like the 
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 Society exhibits this principle by the advancement of theories like civil liberties, democracies, 
communism etc.  Better theories on how to govern replace worse theories.  Human history can be seen as 
the continual replacement of theories about human social life. 
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case of replacing the hypothesis of demons causing illness with bacteria theory.  There 
are simply no such things as minds and mental states, like there is no such thing as 
demons.  Thus, just like demon-talk was eliminated from medical practices, talk of minds 
and mental concepts should be eliminated from the discussion of human behavior, 
according to Churchland.   
 Churchland’s arguments aim to show that FP is false, and thus should be 
eliminated in future discussion of the nature of the mind and consciousness.  Churchland 
offers three arguments supporting this assertion.  The first insists that FP fails to explain 
and predict human behavior in several areas of human activity.  There are some 
successes, but there are many mental phenomena that FP does not explain, namely, 
mental illness, creative imagination, the differences of intelligences between individuals, 
the phenomena of sleep and dreaming, and human learning process (Churchland 1981, 
73).  The second argument shows the infertility of FP.  Folk Psychology’s explanation of 
human behavior is effectively identical to the FP of the ancient Greeks.  If FP were a 
complete theory it would have no need to expand and improve.  Finally, FP is 
incompatible and isolated from the other explanatory frameworks within which people 
operate (Churchland 1981, 75).  The mental concepts of FP are valid only within FP.  
Folk Psychology concepts are out of place when discussing biology, quantum physics, 
and neuroscience.   
 Consciousness is the obstacle facing a full physicalist account of mentality, 
whatever definitive form this takes.  Most physicalist theories attempt to overcome the 
consciousness obstacle by 1) converting consciousness into something of an oddity, such 
as functionalism or representationalism. Doing so disregards just how important 
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consciousness is to the human experience. Or 2) theorists attempt to transform 
consciousness into a purely cognitive state, to show that the hard problem is in fact 
merely an easy problem.  This approach is laudable.  If something is difficult to explain, 
turn it into something that is easy to explain.  But this approach has a hidden assumption.  
Physicalism assumes that the mental is a nomological danglee, an oddity in the universe.  
Taking the mental as an oddity an anomaly in a given system fuels the complex systems 
of explanations and excessive reactions such as EM.  This assumption I term mental 
specialism, and it is only by rejecting this assumption that a full explanation of mentality 
will develop. 
1.3 Specialism 
 
 
 
 We have discussed above how the mind in the mind-body problem has shifted 
from mind as cognition to mind as consciousness.  We have further shown that the 
preferred technique to address the mind-body problem is the MC (mental conversion), in 
various guises, so that the task has become one of converting consciousness into 
cognition.  The final element in the modern mind-body debate is mental specialism.  
Specialism itself is an ontological meta-theory—a theory about theories—that avers that 
within the fundamental categories of the universe, namely the physical and the mental
14
, 
one or more of the categories is an aberration or a nomological danglee, an entity that 
does not fit within an assumed system or a theory in which one category is given 
                                                          
14
 The two categories of entities in the universe are usually restricted to the physical and the mental.  
Because I am not asserting that the physical and the mental are fully inclusive categories, positing 
additional categories does not seem warranted.  The closest that one gets to a system with additional 
categories seems to be the ontological status of universals and numbers.  For the sake of brevity I shall be 
glossing over the question of universals and  numbers as a categorical constituent of the universe. 
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preference over the other.
15
  George Berkeley’s subjective idealism is an example of 
physical specialism, because the category of the physical just does not fit within 
Berkeley’s system.  Physical objects have no place within subjective idealism.   
 Physical specialism is a rare ontological position.  The norm is the mind as a 
nomological danglee.  As we saw in the efforts of functionalists, representationalists, and 
eliminativists, consciousness is considered the anomaly within the theory of mind. 
Consciousness is considered a non-fundamental feature of the universe, and if it is not 
eliminated as an ontological category, it must in some way emerge from something that is 
essentially non-conscious. The traditional and current mind-body debate (excluding 
subjective idealism) assumes the misfit status of the mind.   
 When one’s system is incompatible with consciousness and one assigns 
consciousness the status of misfit, the mind-body problem arises, because it is only at this 
point that the mind becomes something mysterious that requires a special explanation.  
Take, for example, liquidity and solidity.  At the surface, molecular microstructures do 
not exhibit either state.  Yet, liquidity and solidity, while a difficult problem, are not a 
hard problem in the sense of a Chalmer-hard problem because liquidity, solidity and the 
molecular microstructure are part of the same system.  If liquidity and solidity were 
considered an anomaly of one explanatory system, then the situation would qualify as a 
Chalmer-hard problem. The theoretical attachment to mental specialism is the culprit that 
prevents an adequate solution to the mind-body problem, and in particular the emergence 
problem.  The mind-body problem does not arise from conceiving the nature of the mind 
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 A theory of this sort is Baruch Spinoza’s parallelism.  Each physical object has an idea, so ideas are just 
as profuse as physical objects, but the physical is given dominance in Spinoza’s theory. 
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in a particular way (though ascribing to certain interpretations of mind may generate 
various difficulties).  
 The various contemporary theories of mind generally subscribe to a physicalist 
world-view and it is for this reason that these theories subscribe to mental specialism.  
Physicalism entails mental specialism.  Physicalism is the doctrine that everything in the 
universe is either physical or explained by something that is physical.  Anything in the 
universe that appears to be non-physical is merely an appearance—it is actually physical 
is some more basic aspect. Contemporary physicalist theories entail mental specialism, 
given how the “physical” is conceived.  The first characterization of what “physical” 
refers is “non-mental”.  These two concepts are usually thought of, if not officially 
designated as such, as synonymous.  The official designation of “physical” is that which 
is studied by the physical sciences, e.g. physics, astrophysics, chemistry, biology, or 
neuroscience.  Such a designation allows for the inclusion of scientific phenomena such 
as gravity that are left out from bare materialism, the doctrine that all that exists is matter.  
Of course, the official designation of “physical” leaves out the entities of supernatural-
based religion, ethics, sociology, psychology, and the mind (unless these entities can be 
shown to originate from a physical foundation which is MC).  So, in the very conception 
of physicalism is the notion of mental specialism, for the mental is some sort of 
aberration to the very nature of the universe and is an obstacle to a complete scientific 
description of reality, even if the mental is broadly conceived as a physical manifestation.  
This is because the brain is a “special” organ, an organ that is an aberration of matter.  
The same holds for any entity that emerges from the brain.  Physicalism asserts that the 
physical is the dominant expression of matter in the universe.  Even with the identity 
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theory mental specialism is entailed (Feigl 1958) (Place 1956) (Smart 1959).  So, 
physicalism entails mental specialism, and so any theory that subscribes to physicalism 
also entails mental specialism. 
 Mental specialism will not be considered a problem by most physicalists, for to 
consider mental specialism a problem is to consider the physicalist framework itself a 
problem to be overcome.  This faith in physicalism stems from several sources.  First, our 
intellectual culture is predominantly physicalist or scientific.  So, the onus of proof rests 
with those who reject mental specialism or alter physicalism.  Second, the causal closure 
principle is the foundation of physicalism.  The argument is that every physical 
phenomenon that has a cause has a physical cause.  According to our experience, mental 
events cause—at least some of the time—physical events. Thus, the mental, in order to be 
efficacious in the universe, must in some way be physical.  The mental must be an 
aberration, because it is outside of the causal chain.  Third, physicalism and the methods 
of natural science have successfully explained much of the universe.  Thus, physicalists 
assert, it is safe to assume that methods of natural science should guide our ontological 
foundations.  Natural science has accrued quite a reputation and would seem to be the 
highly reliable.    
 These three physicalist commitments support the acceptance of mental specialism. 
Mentality, in particular p-consciousness, is made into a nomological danglee that needs to 
be converted into a physical property or a property acceptable to physicalism.    Such an 
act is accomplished by accepting a theory of emergence or by converting the nature of 
mentality into something that complies with the principles of physicalism.  It is here that 
the most difficult objections against the physicalist project lie, namely the qualia and 
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intentionality objections, which aim to show that physicalism cannot accommodate these 
two mental phenomena.  These two objections have their strength only in the physicalist 
commitment to mental specialism.  So, mental specialism is the problem with 
physicalism, and the solution is not to employ MC, but rather to broaden the conception 
of physicalism by rejecting mental specialism. 
1.4 Panpsychism 
 
 
 
Any physicalist account that takes consciousness seriously subscribes to a form of 
emergentism.
16
  How the physical generates the mental has become known as the 
generation problem (W. Seager 1995, 272).  
 Rejecting mental specialism entails the acceptance of the following four positions. 
First, (1) the mental is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the universe.  Second, (2) 
the mental is ontologically independent of the basic physical constituents of the universe, 
so that emergence and supervenience theory is false.  This position will be charged with 
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 Eliminative Materialism does not escape the generation problem.   Eliminative Materialism claims that 
FP is a false theory, though FP itself may be false and that neuroscience and physics will provide a 
complete theory of the phenomena previously known as the mind. But, what makes the explanation of 
consciousness a “hard” problem is that consciousness and other mental states remain a distinct ontological 
category, despite the efforts of eliminativists.  Combine this with mental specialism, and theorists still have 
the generation problem.  Even if FP is eliminated, any other theory will still have a “hard” problem, 
because the phenomena will still remain.  Perhaps the theoretical system of pains and sensation is wrong—
but the phenomena that FP sought to explain remains.  Eliminating a theory does not eliminate the entity 
that the theory sought to explain.  Let us call this the Elimination Fallacy in which elimination of the theory 
is thought to eliminate the phenomena that the theory sought to explain.  So let us grant that pain-theory or 
pain-talk—how we make sense of the events accompanied and seemingly produced by damage to a 
biological organism—is false.  The phenomena previously known as pain still does not appear to act like 
physical damage, for this even can arise without physical damage, can be altered through meditation 
orhypnosis, the quality of the pain can change, and the phenomena previously known as pain can change 
due to concentration.  Finally, as noted by Saul Kripke in Naming and Necessity, one knows the 
phenomena previously known as pain by what was previously known as the feel of that phenomenon.  This 
phenomenon is known subjectively, not objectively.  Physical events are known only objectively. Physical 
damage does not act in any of the ways that the phenomena previously known as pain does.  So, the two 
events seem distinct.  Thus, eliminativists still have strange phenomena to explain, especially since 
neuroscience and physics are completely in the realm of the objective and the relational. 
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espousing a form of substance dualism.  This consequence need not follow, however, for 
independence does not entail separate substances or properties.  Nor does independence 
entail an inability to interact.  I employ the term “independent” not in the sense of 
“separate” or “fundamentally distinct” but “free from external control” and “not 
contingent on something else.”  Thus, interaction is possible.  Further, the charge is that 
the mental is ontologically independent from basic physical constituents of the universe.  
But independence does not entail that the mental has a physical—“physical” in the sense 
of a scientific entity—presence of some sort.  Obviously this sort of entity does not have 
to be an ontological substance like a rock, chair, atom, or electron.  As stated earlier there 
is a possibility for a physicalist conception of panpsychism—that what is mental is 
physical in that it is studied by the sciences but is not dependent on the physical.  I have 
in mind entities like numbers. Third, (3) given the second position, the physicalist 
worldview is incomplete.  Obviously if the mental possesses the sort of independence of 
described in (2) and occurs throughout the universe (1), then the physicalist theory that 
treats everything either as physical or supervening on the physical must be false, and so 
the physicalist cannot explain the mental exclusively through a physical explanation.  It 
follows from (3) that EM is incompatible with the denial of mental specialism, 
panpsychism.  It does not follow that FP is true.  Folk Psychology may in fact be as false 
as EM.  A panpsychist theory may in fact be a third option independent of FP and EM.  
Recent work in quantum physics, as Seager notes, hints that the physical story may be 
incomplete without consciousness, and so physics may need to be altered by creating at 
least an altered form of quantum physics.  So neither physical systems nor psychic 
systems are going to be adequate for a complete account of our universe (W. Seager 
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1995, 284).  Fourth, (4) complex occurrences of mentality, such as consciousness, arise 
out of basic mental constituents of the universe.  Or, basic constituents of consciousness 
merge to give rise to more complex mental entities (W. Seager 1995, 284 & James 1983, 
158).  If the mental is an independent entity from the physical, not originating from the 
physical, then complex mental occurrences in the universe must emerge from something.  
Note that this is not the same problem that plagues physicalism, the generation problem.  
Rather this emergence is analogous to the phenomena of complex physical entities, like 
diamonds, from basic physical entities, such as atoms.  This mental-mental emergence is 
a difficult problem, but by no means Chalmer-hard. 
Rejecting specialism amounts to the affirmation of panpsychism.  Panpsychism is 
understood to be constituted by propositions (1) through (4) taken in unison.  John Searle 
calls panpsychism an absurd theory without a shred of evidence in its support (1997, 50).  
David Skribina suggests that Searle mistakenly interprets panpsychism to assert that all 
things, such as rocks, docks, clocks, and atoms, have human consciousness (2003, 5).   
This view is obviously false, yet this sort of interpretation is needed for a panpsychist 
theory (PT henceforth) to be absurd.  It is clear that PT is neither unreasonable nor 
illogical.  There are actually quite logical reasons for accepting that the mental, in a basic, 
atomic sort of mentality, is as fundamental to our universe as mass, motion, and other 
fundamental physical entities. Yet, Searle’s misinterpretation raises the right questions, 
namely, just what is the nature and level of mentality that is fundamental to the universe 
and just what does the panpsychist mean by “fundamental?”  Part of the answer depends 
upon how one takes the nature of “mental.” If the essential nature is consciousness, then 
the nature of psychism will be consciousness.  But if one takes the conscious/non-
 37 
conscious division seriously, then the basic constituent could be a non-conscious aspect.  
If one denies non-consciousness mentality, then “psychism” will be consciousness, but 
not necessarily human, animal, or sea slug consciousness.  If the nature of the mental is 
intentionality or representational states, then consciousness need not be a fundamental 
aspect of the universe but rather an emergent quality of intentional states, or 
information.
17
  The hard problems of consciousness would not need to be answered to 
arrive at an understanding of the mind.  The mind could be understood in terms of non-
mysterious properties.  But, whatever the specific nature of psychism, one does not have 
to take that which is ubiquitous to be human consciousness.  Obviously this is true if 
psychism is colloquial in terms of information, for information occurs on a continuum, 
and different bits of information combine for greater bits of information.  So, the basic 
constituent that is the psychic element can be proton-like: simple entities that combine to 
result in more complex entities. 
 By “fundamental” I mean that the mental is an irreducible element of the 
universe, required for a complete understanding of the universe.  The mental is part of the 
nature of the universe.  I also adopt William Seager’s description of “fundamental”: the 
mental is not dependent on any physical description and the mental has its own causal 
efficacy (1995, 279).  Seager’s description is entailed by the four principles of 
panpsychism discussed above.   An entity could hardly be a fundamental element of the 
universe if that entity could not affect the universe through its own powers.  This does not 
mean that the fundamental element affects the world through powers resembling the 
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 Whatever the specific nature of the mental that fills the content of a panpsychist account of the mind, it is 
possible that several problems will remain for the theorist to explain.  For example, the explanatory gap 
may remain for the panpsychist, depending on the specifics of the theory.  I claim that panpsychism will 
avoid the problem of emergence, not necessarily the aggregate problems of the mind-body debate.  
However, the panpsychist will need to provide a solution to these traditional problems. 
 38 
powers of human mentality.  The fundamental entity will more than likely have little 
resemblance to the causal powers of human, or even animal, mentality.  As stated earlier, 
Searle’s absurd-panpsychism is not the hypothesis presented in this article.  Rather, these 
fundamental mental entities are responsible for at least a portion of human capacities and 
are unlikely to be the sole foundation of those capacities. 
 Panpsychism, like naturalism and physicalism, is not a definitive account of the 
mind.  Rather, panpsychism is a meta-theory that connects the mental and physical 
realms into one cohesive whole. Any panpsychist must further formulate a positive 
theory of mind.  It is possible to note some general characteristics of this positive theory.  
First, the mental will have a fundamental place in reality and will be a basic building-
block of reality.  Second, neither the physical nor the mental will have a preferred 
ontological status.  This effectively rules out mental emergence from the physical and 
physical emergence from the mental.  Finally, a successful explanation of the universe 
will require reference to both the mental and the physical.  
1.3 Conclusion 
 
 
 
 I have endeavored to show our current understanding of consciousness and the 
likeliest answer before theorists, namely panpsychism.  We can understand that the core 
problem that physicalism faces is the generation problem, the problem of explaining just 
how consciousness is produced by something that is essentially non-conscious.  
Physicalism has not been able to bridge the gap between physical facts and phenomenal 
facts.  I have asserted that the generation problem originates not from individual 
definitive theories of the mind, but from the worldview I dubbed mental specialism.  
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While the term “mental specialism” is new, the concept is not and has been commented 
upon several times before.  However, it has not been commented upon as a definitive 
trend in the philosophy of mind.  The solution to the generation problem is found by 
rejecting mental specialism and not by forever developing measures designed to 
circumvent and deny the multitude of objections posed by advocates of consciousness.  
Rejecting mental specialism is in fact adopting panpsychism, the worldview that the 
mental (however one conceives of that term) is as fundamental and ubiquitous as the 
physical.   
 There are three difficulties facing the panpsychic theorist.  The first is the 
prejudice that most theorists hold for this world system.  Theorists see panpsychism as 
something supernatural and fail to recognize the scientific and rational support that has 
been emerging on the side of panpsychism for centuries.  The second problem is that 
there are various objections that must be dealt with definitively.  William Seager 
describes four major objections to panpsychism:  the combination problem, the 
completeness problem, the no sign problem and the non-mental problem (1995).  The 
final objection comes from Peter Carruthers and Elizabeth Schechter.  It is an objection 
not only to panpsychism but to physicalism as well, the explanatory gap problem.  Before 
any panpsychist theory will even be entertained, it is necessary for a panpsychist to 
account for these five objections.  The third problem is that the panpsychist must develop 
a concrete theory of mind that both fits with the current world view and can be 
demonstrated as a better explanation for the phenomena at hand. 
The first objection is the combination problem and Seager considers this the most 
difficult problem facing a panpsychist account of the mind (1995, 208). He is correct.  
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The combination problem is the core issue of panpsychism and will determine the fate of 
any panpsychist theory.  As stated before, a panpsychist will be forced to accept that 
complex mental states, such as human consciousness, emerge from more basic (proto-
conscious) elements.  William James' challenge is that it is “logically unintelligible” to 
hold that consciousness sums, or elements of consciousness combine to create higher and 
more complex forms of consciousness.  A conscious thought, in whatever sense, is a full 
thought—not a thing of parts: it is indivisible.18 In short, as complete states they are 
simply not the sort of thing that can combine.  James colorfully illustrates this by 
suggesting the following thought experiment:  Divide the words of a sentence between a 
corresponding number of individuals. Have the individuals all think their particular word.  
Arrange these individuals in any way possible as closely as possible; the words will not 
combine to form a whole coherent thought.  James states that feelings and emotions are 
the same, they do not combine to form new, more complex and higher forms (James 
1983, 160 & W. Seager 1995, 280).  So, James rejects the necessary principle of 
panpsychism that complex mental states result from the combination of less complex, 
more basic mental states or properties. 
 Panpsychism posits consciousness as a fundamental feature of the universe in 
order to avoid the physicalism’s generation problem.  It is here that the completeness 
problem arises.  If consciousness is as fundamental as panpsychists wish to prove, then it 
is obvious that consciousness should have at least a significant effect on the universe. 
Seager states that physically indistinguishable systems should display divergent behavior, 
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  This is reminiscent of Descartes’ divisibility argument that asserts that the body and soul are different 
substances, because the body is divisible and the soul is not.  Thoughts and mental states are, no matter 
how simple, fully mental states and complete in themselves.   
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at least occasionally (1995, 280).  Or, in other words, physicalism should not be able to 
account for everything that goes on in the universe; our sciences should be incomplete.  
However, I wish to point out at this point that the completeness objection is flawed 
because it looks for human behavior in the other constituents of the universe.  Seager 
states, “I thankfully don't have the additional worry about [my car’s] failing to start even 
when there is absolutely nothing mechanically wrong with it but just because it 'feels like' 
staying in the garage today! (1995, 281).”  This complex desire is analogous to the 
desires of a complex animal.  The point is clear:  whatever the nature and behavior of this 
fundamental consciousness, there is no guaranty that it will exhibit the complex behavior 
of insects.  This does not answer the objection, however.  In a panpsychist universe there 
should be something that is beyond the physical sciences.  But, when looking for this 
“something”, we must not fall into the trap of looking for human behavior from rocks and 
docks.    
 Seager calls the no-sign problem and the not-mental problem the ‘simplest’ 
objections to panpsychism (1995, 282).  The no-sign problem is the issue of finding 
evidence of a nonphysical aspect of the basic constituents of the universe.  This is related 
to the completeness problem, for obviously if there was evidence of a nonphysical aspect 
of the universe—evidence of something that the physical sciences could not account—
our physical sciences would not be complete.  The not-mental problem raises the 
objection that even if there was some sort of phenomenon that theorists denote as mental 
in the universe, how does one justify categorizing that phenomenon as mental?  This 
objection is about the justification of denoting a phenomenon as a mental phenomenon.  
Even if one argues a priori (and Seager does not do this) that there are only two 
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categories in the universe that are both defined as mutually exclusive—whatever is 
mental is essentially non-physical and whatever is physical is essentially non-mental—a 
theorist could not argue that since a phenomenon does not appear to be physical it must 
be mental.  A defense would still be required to explain why phenomenon should be 
denoted as mental rather than physical if the phenomenon is merely inexplicable within 
the physical system.   
The final objection that faces a panpsychist theory also faces a physicalist theory, 
the explanatory gap problem. Peter Carruthers and Elizabeth Schechter ask whether 
proto-consciousness can explain macro examples of consciousness, or whether macro-
experientiality can be reductively explained in terms of micro experientiality (2006, 36). 
The point is important, for if panpsychism cannot answer this question then do we gain 
anything?  The answer is no.  Carruthers and Schechter argue that nothing can be known 
about the basic particles that comprise consciousness.  All other explanatory systems can 
be explained by reduction to less complex constituents, and it follows that this is what we 
should look for in a panpsychist account.  Any explanation will require knowledge of the 
constituents that are being explained.  Carruthers and Schechter ask a final question:  
Does panpsychism, if everyone was committed wholly and fully to it, completely solves 
the problem of other minds and the conceivability of Australian zombies or even regular 
zombies (2006, 36)?  Carruthers and Schechter obviously believe that it does not.  The 
problem of other minds remains, and Australian zombies remain conceivable.   
Thirdly, a concrete panpsychist theory of mind must be developed, for 
panpsychism is not only a theory of mind but also a theory about reality.  It is in this third 
task that the nature of the psychic ultimates must be settled.  The greatest hope for a 
 43 
concrete panpsychist theory of mind will come from the work of quantum physicists like 
Goa Shan, David Bohm, and Stuart Hameroff
19
 and from neuroscientists working on 
information integrations applications to consciousness, namely Giulio Tononi, Olaf 
Sprons, and David Balduzzi.
20
  Any theory (at least since roughly the 1950’s) will take 
place within the bounds of science.  This does not mean that a successful theory of mind 
will be required to be physicalist or depend upon the physical.  Science will, however, 
have a crucial part to play in any theory of mind.  So, any supernatural or immaterial 
substantial account of the mind will be rejected.  Luckily, panpsychist entails neither 
supernaturalism nor substance dualism. 
The tasks before the panpsychists are clear but seem impossible.  Though so is 
explaining mental properties that have been a priori set up as, dare we say, a miracle in a 
physical system? In the very least mental properties are but an aberration.  Panpsychism 
is in much the same standing as physicalism.  Physicalism is plagued by what seem 
intractable objections, to the point that eliminating the mind altogether is an attractive 
alternative.  Theorists of the mind are not in a position to ignore any possibility. 
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 See: Shan, Goa,  A Possible Quantum Basis of Panpsychism, in NeuroQuantology; Bohm, David, A New 
Theory of the Relationship of Mind and Matter, in the Journal of the American Society for Psychical 
Research; Hameroff, Stuart, ‘Funda-Mentality’:  is the conscious mind subtly linked to a basic level of the 
universe? 
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 See: Tononi, Giulio and Sporns, Olaf, Measuring Informatikon Integration; Balduzzi, David and Tononi, 
Giulio, Integrated Information in Discrete Dynamical Systems:  Motivation and Theoretical Framework; 
Tononi, Giulio, An Information Integration Theory of Consciousness; Tononi, Giulio, “Consciousness as 
Integrated Information:  a Provisional Manifesto.” 
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Chapter Two 
The Compatibility Between Naturalism and Panpsychism 
 
 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
 
A viable panpsychist theory cannot merely be a matter of faith, a doctrine of 
mysteriousness, or a result of a purely semantic argumentation.  The investigation into 
reality and the investigation into the nature of the mind have been heavily influenced and 
directed by science – especially physics, quantum physics, and neuroscience.  
Neuroscience has revealed more about our minds than two millennia of semantic 
argumentation and faith.  Any viable theory of the mind must not contradict the findings 
of science or the major tenets of science.  Endorsing this assertion is my motivation for 
demonstrating that panpsychism cannot be merely dismissed as incompatible with 
naturalism—that in fact empiricism and naturalism are compatible with panpsychism.  
Panpsychism has to be part of the scientific world, not merely exist beside it; otherwise it 
should be jettisoned with the flotsam and jetsam of armchair philosophy.  My argument is 
intended to demonstrate that a panpsychic theory of mind is an equal candidate in the 
mind-body debate and will offer valuable insights into the nature of this debate. For this 
theory to receive serious consideration by the scientific and philosophic community, 
however, it must be shown to be compatible with naturalism.
21
 Naturalism is a 
philosophical movement which holds that nothing exists beyond the natural universe.  
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 It is not necessary that panpsychism is the only doctrine that is compatible with naturalism.  All that is 
important is the possibility that panpsychism is one of perhaps many naturalistically compatible theories.  
So it is irrelevant whether property dualism or substance dualism are also compatible with panpsychism.  
Their compatibility will not entail that panpsychism is incompatible with naturalism.  Of course these 
theories have problems of their own, i.e. property dualism faces the generation problem or falls into 
epiphenomenalism or substance dualism is ultimately a supernatural doctrine with serious issues 
concerning mind-body interaction.  
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Here I will defend the compatibility of panpsychism and naturalism, demonstrating that 
panpsychism cannot be disregarded a priori on the basis that it is unscientific or 
supernatural.  This conclusion will thus lead us to my main assertion: that panpsychism is 
a plausible research approach in the mind-body debate.   
Before proceeding I need to clarify our topic.  At this point I am not arguing for a 
particular panpsychic theory of mind, like the type-type identity theory, token-token 
identity theory, or eliminative physicalism. I argue that naturalism is compatible with a 
general panpsychic meta-theory.  A distinction often is made in panpsychist theories is 
between a general metaphysical panpsychist theory and a panpsychist theory of mind.  
The former is a theory about reality and the latter about a particular class of existents—
namely, those properties with minds in whatever degree.  Physicalism is a similar general 
metaphysical theory of reality, and the identity theory is similar to a particular panpsychic 
theory of mind.  The identity theory assumes and requires physicalism as a general 
metaphysical theory.   The former concerns the nature of reality and its ultimate 
constituents.  The panpsychist theory of mind assumes a panpsychist theory of reality, but 
concentrates on explicating a psychic theory that covers any existent that can be said to 
have a mind, on describing the nature of the mind and its constituents, and on resolving 
the basic issues confronting every psychic theory.  These issues include the proper way to 
distinguish between entities having and not having minds, overcoming the various classic 
problems challenging the various theories of mind – such as the nature and possibility of 
mental causation, for example – and responding to objections particular to the 
panpsychist theories, such as the combination problem and the accusation of being 
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unscientific.
22
   The purpose of the general metaphysical panpsychist theory is to lay the 
foundation for the development of a satisfactory panpsychist theory of mind which 
adequately accounts for and unifies our scientific observations and intuitions with our 
phenomenal intuitions concerning reality.   
2.1 Specific Details of Chapter Two 
 
 
 
I shall first discuss the four exhaustive constituting claims of panpsychism (2.2 
Panpsychism).  I shall stress the difference between a panpsychist theory in its most 
abstract formulation (i.e. concerning reality) and more concrete theories, like particular 
panpsychist theories of mind.  The viability of a panpsychist theory of reality is not 
necessarily linked to a viable panpsychist theory of mind.  Next I shall offer a brief 
interpretation of naturalism in a broad sense (2.3 Naturalism).  In a brief discussion of 
naturalism, I describe its two central convictions: the methodological conviction and the 
ontological conviction. The former states that the proper method, thought not the only 
method, of investigating reality is via the natural sciences, and the latter states that natural 
sciences are the authority on what is real.  Despite the various conceptions of naturalism, 
there appears to be a central core of assertions that any naturalist accepts.  My 
presentation of naturalism shall exclude a discussion of these various core claims.  I 
employ the core claims of naturalism in the body of my main argument, and so shall 
leave a discussion of naturalism’s core claims until then.  In my interpretation I merely 
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I shall offer a solution to the combination problem in chapter 3; meeting the charge of being unscientific 
is the topic of the present chapter. 
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provide the most general account of naturalism, which in part follows Michael Rea’s 
conception of naturalism as a research program (2002 & 2007).
23
   
Next I discuss and offer a solution to two primary objections to the compatibility 
of panpsychism and naturalism (2.4 Primary Objections to the Compatibility of 
naturalism and Panpsychism), which are the assertion that panpsychism is a supernatural 
doctrine, and that panpsychism entails that science is necessarily incomplete, meaning 
that science is fundamentally wrong about reality.  To refute the supernatural objection, I 
note that my version of panpsychism is thoroughly natural and does not require recourse 
to supernaturalism. The incompleteness objection is an ontological objection; it is about 
the authority of the sciences on what exists.  The objection does not claim that the natural 
sciences have been wrong about reality in the past, but rather it pertains to the 
contemporary natural sciences.  This objection depends on the assumption that today’s 
science universally or significantly holds mental specialism to be true.  I reject this 
assumption – and thus the objection which requires it – by citing the feasibility of the 
Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics, which enables panpsychism to fit in 
with the contemporary natural sciences without massive revision.  
Next I offer a plausible position of the most likely standard central concept (or 
essential attribute) of naturalism and, from this, that:  a conclusion about reality is only 
defended to the extent that its application fits with what science does and discovers.  I 
call this the “defensibility thesis”.  Then, I develop a method to glean core naturalistic 
concepts from non-core concepts (2.4 A Method for Determining the Core Dispositions 
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 I shall refer to the core claims of naturalism as ‘dispositions’ instead of ‘claims.”  I accept Michael Rea’s 
conception of naturalism as a research program with various dispositions to the inquiry of reality.  These 
dispositions I understand to be the core claims of naturalism.  
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of Naturalism).  The next step of my argument is to establish a way to separate the core 
dispositions of naturalism from dispositions merely amiable with naturalism and 
incompatible dispositions.  By “core disposition” I mean a disposition that cannot be 
denied that simultaneously holds naturalism’s central concept, the defensibility thesis.  
Panpsychism, I hold, must be compatible with the core disposition of naturalism and not 
dispositions merely amiable with it. This is because some amiable dispositions contradict 
other amiable dispositions, but are still considered dispositions of naturalism.  The 
method I propose is simple: I claim that any disposition which can be denied without 
simultaneously denying the central disposition of naturalism – the defensibility thesis – is 
not a core disposition.  Any disposition that can be true or false, or that science 
determines to be true or false, is merely an amiable disposition of naturalism.  Anything 
that cannot be true unless the defensibility thesis is rejected is incompatible with 
naturalism.   
Finally I shall offer my main argument.  I examine the core dispositions that a 
naturalist must accept and then demonstrate the compatibility of naturalism’s core 
dispositions with the four constituting claims of panpsychism (2.5 Vollmer’s Core Thesis 
of Naturalism).
24
  I apply this method to the six core dispositions of naturalism proposed 
by Gerhard Vollmer in his article “Can Everything Be Rationally Explained?” (2007).  
While I do not recognize Vollmer as the authority on naturalism, his article provides an 
excellent basis on which to found my method to distinguish core and non-core 
dispositions of naturalism.  It could be asserted that other dispositions should be 
                                                          
24
 Giehard Vollmer provides a discussion of the core dispositions—dispositions any naturalist is obliged to 
accept—in “Can Everything Be Rationally Explained Everywhere in the World?” (2007).  I shall follow his 
list of necessary dispositions of naturalism with little deviation. 
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examined that Vollmer fails to include in his list.  However, the issue at hand is not that 
Vollmer’s list is exhaustive but that any proposed disposition can be tested and 
determined to be either core or non-core.  Then these other dispositions, if suggested to 
be core dispositions, can be examined as to their compatibility with panpsychism.  Thus, 
while I do assert that panpsychism will be tested against the most likely core dispositions 
of naturalism, it may be the case that other scholars will propose further dispositions to 
test panpsychism against.  Regardless, we have a method to determine naturalism’s and 
panpsychism’s compatibility that we can employ at any time new dispositions are 
proposed.  I am convinced that whatever new disposition is proposed, panpsychism will 
be found to be compatible with naturalism.    
Vollmer’s theses are:  1) metaphysical minimalism; 2) a realist view of reality; 3) 
the superiority of the scientific method; 4) the primacy of an inanimate matter-energy 
ontology or physicalism; 5) reductionism – the claim that all complex properties are 
constituted from more basic simple particles, which entails the rejection of supernatural 
properties or causes; 6) human cognition does not go beyond nature (I do not discuss this 
disposition since by naturalizing panpsychism I demonstrate that human cognition does 
not go beyond nature).   
Metaphysical minimalism (and a prohibition against supernatural agencies, 
though this is dealt with in a different section) is the only core disposition of naturalism, 
because denying it denies the authority of science.  Realism, reductionism, and 
physicalism are dispositions that science rules over, and all can be denied while holding 
the essential concept of naturalism.  Since naturalism is taken to be characterized by its 
core dispositions, and panpsychism is taken to be entirely comprised by its four 
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constituting claims, demonstrating the compatibility between the core dispositions and 
the four constituent claims is sufficient to demonstrate the compatibility between 
panpsychism and naturalism to be true.   
The most difficult naturalist disposition to reconcile with panpsychism is the 
physicalist account.  While I argue that the physicalist account is not a core disposition of 
naturalism, due to its importance to the naturalist community, I shall reconcile the 
physicalist account with panpsychism utilizing theories of Robert Hanna and Michelle 
Maiese (2009).  In its current form, the physicalist account cannot be reconciled with 
panpsychism, because physicalism entails mental specialism, a doctrine that contradicts 
panpsychism.  Thus, I shall revise the physicalist account so that mental specialism is no 
longer and thus reconcile the physicalist account with panpsychism.  But I shall weaken 
the physicalist account as little as possible, because panpsychism is largely a physicalist 
doctrine.  While there is general agreement in the literature that physicalism is not a core 
disposition of naturalism (although science could well determine that physicalism is 
wrong), physicalism is still considered the  major part of naturalism.  Because of the 
special status of this disposition, I offer a more in \-depth discussion aimed at reconciling 
between physicalism and panpsychism.   
Constituting the matter-energy primacy thesis, according to Vollmer, are three 
claims: matter-energy is the only fundamental property in the universe, there are only 
matter- energy causes, and mentality exists because of matter-energy.  I proceed by 
establishing the possibility of a dual physical-mental causation.  I establish this by 
locating an example of mental causation that can fit with a minimally modified 
physicalism, which I accomplish by adopting much of the work of Embodied Minds in 
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Action by Robert Hanna and Michelle Maiese (2009).  The key is rejecting the standard 
interpretation of casual closure—that is, fundamentalism—which holds that 
fundamentally physical properties necessarily exclude any sort of intrinsic connection 
with fundamental mental properties (2009, 273-274).  Fundamental physical properties 
thus can share an inherent connection with fundamental mental properties.  This is called 
mental-physical property fusion.  This allows for physical events to have both mental and 
physical properties instantiated in those events.  This property fusion allows for dual 
mental-physical causation, with mental properties adding their own (though perhaps 
slight) impetus.  The causal efficacy of Hanna and Maiese’s property fusion allows for a 
robust panpsychism and a minimally weakened physicalism.   My method is simple:  
First I shall determine the core naturalistic dispositions, by which I mean the dispositions 
that are necessary aspects of naturalism (I understand naturalism to be completely 
constituted by its core dispositions).  Then I shall demonstrate that panpsychism does not 
contradict these core theses. 
2.2 Panpsychism
25
 
 
 
 
 Panpsychism, in the sense employed in this paper, is a meta-theory regarding the 
basic structure of reality.  It states that reality is composed of both mental and physical 
properties and that those mental properties are as fundamental as physical properties.
26
  
The formulation of panpsychism employed in this paper comes from the rejection of 
mental specialism.
27
  As we have seen, this theory currently dominates the mind-brain 
                                                          
25
 A more in-depth discussion of mental specialism and panpsychism can be found in chapter one. 
26
 I do not equate ‘nature’ with ‘physical’ nor does ‘not-material’ mean “non-physical” or “non-natural.” 
27
 I discuss mental specialism in depth in chapter one. 
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problem debate, holding that mentality is an aberration in the universe. It is the 
attachment to mental specialism that produces some of the most basic and intractable 
problems within the mind-brain debate, such as emergentism.  However, if we reject 
mental specialism, then we can claim that the mental is a basic constituent of the 
universe, and it is this basic constituent that produces consciousness. Thus we reach the 
four tenets of panpsychism, which are:  1) the mental is a fundamental property that 
permeates the universe; 2) the mental is ontologically independent of matter, which 
entails that the mental cannot be fully explained via the basic physical constituents of the 
universe; 3) following tenets (1) and (2), the physicalist worldview requires expansion to 
include the fundamentality of the mental; and 4) higher forms of mentality, such as 
consciousness and thought, arise and are explained, at least in part, by the basic mental 
constituents of reality. 
 By “the mental as a fundamental property of the universe.” one should not 
understand a fundamentalism of the mental (Hanna and Maiese 2009, 299-300). The 
opposite would be physicalist fundamentalism, the doctrine that fundamental physical 
properties can have, not an intrinsic, but only an accidental connection to the mental.  
Thus, though it is a fundamental property, the mental may possess a basic or intrinsic 
connection to something physical.  The connection that I have in mind here is like the one 
that obtains between DNA and a person, say for example Nazareth Long.  The DNA 
strand is physical and has an intrinsic connection to Nazareth Long, but that DNA strand 
is not sufficient to identify Nazareth with that strand, since that strand could have 
produced Nazareth Wrong instead of Long.  There are multiple possibilities within the 
strand.  It is also conceivable that there could be differences within a DNA strand, say via 
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genetic therapy, so that Nazareth Long remains who he is while having a given genetic 
strand altered every few years, to the point that a significant portion of the DNA changes, 
yet Long remains Long.  Panpsychism does not depend on the idea that fundamental 
mental properties cannot have an inherent bond with fundamental physical properties.  
Mental independence in no way entails an ontology comparable to substance dualism.  
Panpsychism is neither a doctrine of substance dualism nor necessarily a doctrine of 
property dualism. Panpsychism leaves open the possibility that particular mental and 
particular physical properties are inherently and fundamentally bonded in such a way that 
certain atoms have a corresponding mental property as equally fundamental to reality. 
This connection itself is fundamental and ontologically necessary, though not cognitively 
necessary, which means that one can think about the mental and physical properties 
separately, although they are in fact unable to be separated ontologically.  Further, the 
nature of the two is complementary.   
 Two terms, “fundamental” and “independent”, require further explanation.  First, 
I adopt William Seager’s conception of “fundamental”:  a property or class that is 
independent of another property’s or class’ description and that possesses its own causal 
efficacy (Seager 1995).  Inferred from the fundamentality of the mental is the 
irreducibility of mental to physical. The mental is part of nature, but it affects the world 
through its own powers.  This statement does not entail that these causal powers are 
identical, or even similar to, the powers of human mentality.  Nor does it entail that these 
fundamental properties are the sole foundation of human capacities—this is unlikely. 
What it does entail, however, is that these fundamental properties are responsible for a 
portion of an agent’s capacities.  Second, I do not employ “independence” in the sense 
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used in the second tenet as “ontologically separate” or “fundamentally distinct”, but 
merely of “free from external control” and “not contingent on some other property”.  The 
mental is not a different substance from the physical even though mental properties are 
fail to be determined by physical properties and fail to emerge from physical properties.   
  A panpsychic theory of mind will first and foremost specify the nature of the 
mental.  For our present purposes that is not required, just like the specific nature of 
“physical” is not required for a physical theory of the universe.  Development of a 
panpsychic theory of mind will be offered later.  One issue that a panpsychic theory of 
mind does not need to account for is how the mental occurs in the universe.  As stated 
before, the current climate of the mind-body debate assumes that the mental is not a 
fundamental part of reality but comes from something essentially non-mental or else does 
not exist at all.  What a panpsychist theory of mind must explain is how complex 
expressions of mentality—for instance, consciousness, awareness’ or cognition—arise 
from more basic forms of mentality, like a mental fundamental particle such as an atom.  
Of course, one could assert that full-fledged consciousness is the basic nature of 
mentality.  This position produces further difficulties, because it is not a necessary part of 
a panpsychist theory of reality. A panpsychist theory of reality need not affirm any 
particular mental property higher than the basic proto-mental property to account for 
reality.  This is similar to the fact that a physicalist theory of reality does not need to 
affirm any particular higher physical property than atoms to provide a physical account of 
reality.   
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2.3 Naturalism
28
 
 
 
  
   The core conviction of naturalism is that , which I assume to be:  ‘a conclusion 
about reality is only defensible if it fits with what and how science discovers and is not 
categorically removed from empirical (dis)confirmation.’  I call this the ‘defensibility 
thesis.’29  All naturalists adhere to the authority, but not to the absolutism, of science 
(Clarke 2009).  This is the methodological conviction of the naturalist project.  There is a 
corresponding ontological conviction following the methodological conviction, which 
states that science is the conclusive authority on the ultimate structure of reality.  If the 
methods of science reach the true conception of reality, then the concepts and theories of 
science must tell us what is real.
30
  Ontology is, then, completely directed by science.  
Just what is real (e.g. mental properties or numbers) is a matter of dispute, but what is not 
a matter of dispute is the defensibility thesis.    In whatever characterization of naturalism 
is offered, these two convictions appear as the core.  But caution is needed.  Just what 
counts as “science” is disputed.31  Science may be the conclusive authority of truth and 
reality, but this does not entail any particular results, nor does it mean that truth and 
reality cannot be reached via some other avenue. It only means that regardless of 
whatever avenues of inquiry are employed those avenues cannot exceed the bounds of 
science and can place no restrictions on scientific findings.  
                                                          
28
 Naturalism is a philosophical thesis and not a scientific one.  The central concept and the core 
dispositions are thus determined a priori.  Naturalism is thus taken as a research disposition, a way of 
approaching reality rather than a metaphysical thesis as such.  So the central concept here is assumed on the 
basis that said concept allows for adequate separation between natural and non-natural thesis. 
29
 Hereafter I refer to “natural science” as “science”.  By “natural science” I denote the sciences that are 
considered as relevant to the naturalist project.  Reference to other non-natural sciences will be denoted 
appropriately. 
30
 This does not entail that other methods cannot reach the same conclusions by other investigatory 
methods. 
31
 See  (Gasser and Stefan 2007). 
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2.4 Primary Objections to the Compatibility of Naturalism and Panpsychism 
 
 
 
Most naturalists would classify panpsychist theories as supernatural theories, and 
since one of naturalism’s most dearly held principles is an embargo against supernatural 
properties and explanations, panpsychism contradicts naturalism.  I follow Barry Stroud’s 
understanding of “supernaturalism”, namely, “the invocation of an agent or force that 
somehow stands outside the familiar natural world and whose doings cannot be 
understood as part of it” (Stroud 2004, 23).  The prohibition against supernatural 
properties eliminates properties with ‘free-causation’: causation that contradicts the law 
of conservation of energy.  This includes a prohibition against transcendent properties 
and authorities such as gods, miracles, and any sort of extra-sensory cognitive power, 
such as clairvoyance or divine illumination.  So, the charge that panpsychism is a 
supernatural doctrine accuses panpsychist theorists of positing authorities, causes, and 
powers outside the realm of nature.  This is not to say that immaterial properties are 
synonymous with supernatural properties.  John Dupré notes that “there are of course 
perfectly respectable immaterial property concepts, numbers, or hypotheses, for 
example—but souls and such like are not the right kinds of things to be immaterial” 
(Dupré 2004).  The major difference between naturalist and supernatural senses of 
“immateriality” is that entities which are “immaterial” in the supernatural sense of the 
word, such as souls, are considered to be causally efficacious outside of the realm of 
science (Dupré 2004).  Thus “outside of nature” means unable to be observed, detected, 
or studied via empirical or scientific methodology.  Any causes with such features would 
be immaterial in the supernatural sense of the word.  For instance, a miracle would be a 
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supernatural cause, since its existence cannot be proven or studied scientifically. 
Panpsychism as I describe it is not a supernatural doctrine, such as Descartes’ substance 
dualism.  The “mental” in the panpsychist doctrine—whatever its nature will turn out to 
be—will need to meet the following requirements in order to be acceptable:  1) the 
mental will need to be observable, at least indirectly; 2) empirical evidence supporting its 
existence is required; and 3) the mental’s causal efficacy must fall within the law of the 
conservation of energy.  If panpsychism turns out to be a supernatural doctrine, then 
panpsychism must be rejected.    
There is a rather more sophisticated objection.  If one subscribes to panpsychic 
ontology, then science is fundamentally mistaken about reality and requires revision.   
Since naturalism holds the defensibility thesis, science requires no such revision; science 
is basically a complete view of reality.
32
 Thus, the objection goes, panpsychism is 
incompatible with naturalism.  But, the objection is not a methodological objection.  The 
objection does not state that panpsychism holds that the scientific method—collecting 
objective (i.e., third-person evidence available to anyone) data through observation and 
experimentation, and formulating and testing theories based on that objective data—is 
fundamentally flawed.   The objection is that science is missing a part of reality, a 
fundamental property that is necessary for a complete understanding of the universe.  It is 
thus an ontological objection—that naturalism is mistakenly assuming mental specialism: 
the mental as a supplementary aspect of reality.
33
   
                                                          
32
 This attitude towards panpsychism was developed from objections to panpsychism discussed by William 
Seager and Sean Allen-Hermanson (Panpsychism  2005). 
33
 See Chapter One. 
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I will venture a possible solution to the ontological objection to panpsychism, 
namely that science does not universally or even significantly hold mental specialism.  
Quantum mechanics (QM) is a remarkably successful theory.  It is reported that no 
prediction made from quantum mechanics has failed; it is a perfect system viewed 
pragmatically (Rosenblum and Kuttner 2006).  QM holds that quantum properties are 
produced by conscious observation.  I refer to the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, which requires wave function collapse, a debated theory which holds that the 
results of a wave function are a relation between a superposition of states and something 
observed consciously.  We must be cautious of relying too much on the Copenhagen 
Interpretation as it is a debated theory’s but it is safe to say that it requires the mental to 
be something more important than in physicalism’s standard ontology.  QM enters more 
and more into our conception of reality, applying increasingly to the ‘macro-world.’  QM 
is vital to an understanding of reality and it is a strong possibility that QM supports 
rejecting mental specialism under the Copenhagen Interpretation.  It is an adequate, 
though not definitive, rejection of the ontological objection to panpsychism.   
2.4 A Method for Determining the Core Dispositions of Naturalism 
 
 
 
Naturalism is associated with a remarkable number of diverse claims, claims not 
always compatible but often considered essential to naturalism itself.  For instance, Steve 
Clarke claims that naturalism and the supernatural are in fact compatible (2009).  If such 
variance can occur even among naturalists, a method to distinguish “core dispositions” of 
naturalism from “non-core dispositions” is necessary to determine a working account of 
naturalism.  The obvious application of this project is to determine the dispositions of 
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naturalism that must be compatible with panpsychism.  The phrase “core disposition” I 
understand to mean “necessary disposition,” a disposition that cannot be denied while 
holding naturalism’s central concept, with the understanding that some dispositions may 
be compatible with naturalism while not necessary to naturalism, or contingent upon the 
sort of universe within which naturalists position themselves.  “Necessary disposition” 
also implies that the contrary disposition is incompatible or contradictory with 
naturalism.  Thus, a core disposition of naturalism is such that naturalism can retain its 
central concept.   
The key to the method I propose is to utilize naturalism’s central concept:  a 
conclusion about reality is only defended to the extent that its application fits with what 
science does and discovers.  I call this the ‘defensibility thesis.’34  It is through this 
central concept that we will be able to demonstrate what dispositions or themes are 
central to naturalism.  Any disposition that cannot be denied without denying 
naturalism’s central concept is a core disposition.  Following this, any disposition or 
system containing a disposition that contradicts that core concept is necessarily rejected 
by naturalism.  Dispositions or a system containing a disposition that neither contradicts 
nor is necessary for the core concept of naturalism is compatible with naturalism.   
Compatible dispositions may be varied and different for each thinker.  The apparent 
variation between naturalists largely depends upon the choice between compatible 
dispositions.  So, I am applying an old distinction in philosophy, a distinction made by 
Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Descartes: namely, the distinction between essential and 
                                                          
34
 This phrase does not imply that the natural sciences are the only way to learn about reality or to 
discover truth.  The phrase only entails that the natural sciences and the results of the other modes of 
investigation must be consistent. 
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accidental properties.  Some dispositions of naturalism are part of the essential nature of 
naturalism, and some dispositions merely do not contradict the essential nature of 
naturalism.  Theories and ontological hypotheses are not required to be compatible with 
accidental dispositions, only with the essential dispositions of naturalism.   
As stated above I take the essence of naturalism to be the defensibility thesis.  
This central concept does not restrict modes of investigation, only the results of that 
investigation.  All results from any method of investigation must be consistent with 
science.  This is clearly distinct from scientism which holds that the natural sciences are 
the only viable method for inquiry into reality.  It is entirely possible that I am incorrect 
in assuming the central concept of naturalism to be the above formulation.  This is, 
however, irrelevant.  What is at issue here and of greatest import is the method of 
determining the core dispositions of naturalism.  If the central concept is, say, anti-
supernaturalism, then panpsychism should be tested against this thesis.  What is shown 
here is not that panpsychism is consistent with a particular central concept or a  certain 
core disposition, but that a scientific panpsychism is possible.  This discussion removes 
one hurdle to that endeavor.  As stated above, there are even arguments that seek to show 
that naturalism is compatible with supernaturalism.  If naturalism is recast as a 
supernatural doctrine, then by all means let us re-test panpsychism.  But given any 
characterization of naturalism, I demonstrate a way to determine whether panpsychism 
can be rejected a priori due to its conflict with naturalism.   
Let us examine this method.  So, the central concept describes how reality should 
be investigated and what property we should accept as real.  If we hypothetically allow 
supernatural properties and explanations, we can easily demonstrate that anti-
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supernaturalism is a core disposition of naturalism.  If supernatural properties and 
explanations, i.e. miracles, are accepted, then this would be something science cannot 
defend as either true or false.  There would be properties beyond the ken of science and 
there would be truths that were not defended by science.  Properties and entities would be 
added to one’s ontology without consideration of science, the most reliable mode of 
determining the nature of reality.  This clearly contradicts naturalism’s central concept.  
So, it is clear that one cannot hold naturalism’s very core without also affirming anti-
supernaturalism. 
Naturalists commonly believe that the universe is primarily matter-energy in 
composition.   This disposition is obviously consistent with the naturalistic attitude, since 
this disposition also requires no supernatural properties.  The question is whether this 
disposition, which we can call the physicalist account, is a core disposition of naturalism 
or merely compatible with naturalism.  Does denying the physicalism disposition 
invalidate naturalism’s central concept?   I shall argue it does not.  The central concept is 
the defensiblity thesis.  So, the constituents of reality, whether physical, material, energy, 
or immaterial, are there for science to defend.  Science is our most reliable path to truth.  
The universe does not fix the nature or methodology of science.  The universe exists 
indepedently of science and of humanity.  But science’s role is the most authoritative and 
reliable method to discover the nature of the universe.  The scientific method is not 
validated or invalidated by any commitment to a particular ontological theory.  The truth 
of the scientific method does not depend on one’s ontologcial commitments.   It is 
through science that one develops ontological hypotheses.  Thus, the nature of the 
universe, whether physical or panpsychic, is a truth that science defends and not 
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something that establishes the veracity of science.     A matter-energy conception of the 
universe is something that science determines to be true or not.  So, the physicalist 
disposition is not a core disposition of naturalism.  A hypothesis may be contrary to the 
physicalist dispostion and still be an acceptable hypothesis of science and naturalism.   
2.5 Vollmer’s Core Thesis of Naturalism 
 
 
 
 Vollmer lists six core theses of naturalism.
35
 These theses are:  1) metaphysical 
minimalism; 2) a realist view of reality; 3) the superiority of the scientific method
36
; 4) 
the primacy of an inanimate matter-energy ontology or physicalism; 5) reductionism, 
which asserts that all complex properties are constituted from more basic simple 
particles, and rejects supernatural properties or causes; 6) the claim that human cognition 
does not go beyond nature (Vollmer 2007, 40).  The sixth thesis asserts that any solution 
to the mind-brain problem must cohere with the tents of naturalism. I shall not cover this 
disposition, since this is the topic of this dissertation.  I have discussed the disposition of 
anti-supernaturalism in the section Primary Objections to the Compatibility of Naturalism 
and Panpsychism (2.4) and so shall not revisit these dispositions.  The most complicated 
discussion will involve harmonizing the matter-energy ontology and panpsychism, so I 
shall deal with this discussion at the end of this section.  In the preceding discussion I 
demonstrated that since the physicalist account is not a core disposition of naturalism, 
demonstrating the compatibility of panpsychism and this disposition may not be 
                                                          
35
 I have combined two of Vollmer’s core thesis, namely a prohibition against supernatural entities and 
miracles. 
36
 I shall not revisit this theme because it was discussed in the section: ‘Primary Objections to the 
Compatibility of Naturalism and Panpsychism’ in chapter 2, section 2.4.     
 63 
technically necessary.  However, I grant that the physicalist account is a deeply-seated 
disposition within naturalist circles and so does require further analysis. 
2.5.1 Metaphysical Minimalism 
 
 
 
The failure of the Vienna Circle and the Logical Positivists demonstrated that the 
empirical and theoretical sciences cannot proceed without some metaphysical 
assumptions (Vollmer 2007, 29).  Naturalism cannot be hostile towards metaphysical 
assumptions, but must accept them to a certain extent, though metaphysics and empirical 
science must be clearly distinguished.
37
  The ‘extent’ of acceptance is what is necessary 
to investigate reality and to increase the pool of knowledge (Vollmer 2007, 29).  
Assumptions about properties, principles or theories are employed only as needed for 
science to proceed.   It is a main assertion of naturalism that metaphysics must fit into the 
scientific conception of the world and should not seek to go beyond this conception.  
Further, it only includes a metaphysics open to rational criticism following the standards 
of non-contradiction, value of explanation, self-applicability, freedom of arbitrariness, 
intellectual economy and high productivity (Vollmer 2007). 
It seems quite clear that a minimal metaphysics is a core assumption of 
naturalism, even if one discounts supernatural metaphysics—that is, metaphysics 
investigating properties and causes from without the universe, e.g. Plato, Aristotle, 
                                                          
37
 I have changed the tone of Vollmer’s discussion slightly.  Vollmer’s language is descriptive rather than 
the normative tone that I employ.  The reason is simply due to the fact that there are several different 
concepts of naturalism and many differing degrees of naturalism.  Quine’s naturalism seems as hostile 
towards metaphysics as A.J. Ayer’s logical positivism.  Thus, and I would venture that Vollmer would 
agree, his article describes what is necessary for a naturalist stance to investigate reality and remain 
consistent with itself.  Vollmer asserts that the naturalist does not consider metaphysics to be inferior to 
empirical science, but I do not see how such a view of inferiority can be avoided.  Metaphysics is certainly 
not given an equal role to empirical science as metaphysics is to be employed only as a facilitator to 
scientific research. 
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Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, Descartes.  Given a large role in the investigation of 
reality, metaphysics would rival and nullify science as the final defense of a conclusion 
about reality.  Entailed from the core thesis of naturalism is the assumption that science 
sets limits upon other disciplines, metaphysics included.  To allow a role for metaphysics 
to determine science, like Descartes’ First Philosophy, would contradict naturalism.   
 We should begin by noting that science and scientific theories are a type of 
metaphysical inquiry.  Metaphysics is characterized as the inquiry into the nature of 
reality—what exists and the nature of these existents (Inwagen 1998).  Science, though it 
proceeds empirically, certainly is an inquiry into the nature of reality.  Yet Vollmer 
clearly assumes a strong distinction between metaphysics and empirical science.  This 
statement seems to imply that theoretical sciences, such as quantum mechanics and 
mathematics, are metaphysical endeavors.   It is unclear whether Vollmer places the 
theoretical sciences under the category of metaphysics, but we can gain an understanding 
of what Vollmer means by metaphysics if we investigate the concept of “empirical 
science.”  The basis of empirical science is the scientific method:  testability via direct or 
indirect objective observation.  Thus, the metaphysical assumptions of which Vollmer 
speaks must refer to properties, principles, and laws that cannot be tested via direct or 
indirect observation, or properties, principles, and laws that are arrived at through a priori 
reasoning.
38
  This is borne out by the description that Vollmer gives of the rational 
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 What is remarkable is how prolific a priori reasoning of this sort is within empirical science.  For 
instance, realism, materialism, and physicalism, according to these standards, are metaphysical principles.  
Causation, the causal closure principle, and induction are metaphysical assumptions.  There is no direct or 
indirect evidence for any of these assumptions.  Science itself is based upon these assumptions, but it is true 
that without these assumptions science could not occur and could not investigate reality.  Vollmer’s term 
‘minimal metaphysics’ is misleading.  It is not that there are few metaphysical assumptions; there are in 
fact a multitude of such assumptions.  Rather science must remain as the final truth-sayer, and parsimony 
must reign for science to proceed. 
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criticism that checks the metaphysical assumptions of naturalism—namely non-
contradiction, value of explanation, self-applicability, freedom of arbitrariness, 
parsimony, and high productivity.  If a panpsychist theory is to be compatible with 
naturalism, it must be consistent with the requirements of the metaphysical assumptions 
that Vollmer outlines above.   
The first question one may ask is whether panpsychism is completely a priori, 
completely empirical, or a mixture of the two.  Gao Shan in his paper “A Possible 
Quantum Basis of Panpsychism” offers an argument supporting the truth of panpsychism 
based on revised quantum physics (2005).  He asserts that the universe is not complete 
without consciousness.  Thus, consciousness is part of the physical schema of the 
universe.  According to Shan, a basic principle of revised quantum physics is that non-
orthogonal single states cannot be distinguished.  However, Shan demonstrates that a 
conscious agent can distinguish said states, even though the standard physical measuring 
device cannot.  So, matter without consciousness cannot distinguish what matter with 
consciousness can.  However, if consciousness was reducible to or emergent from matter, 
or was matter itself, then the conscious agent should not be able to distinguish non-
orthogonal single states.  If consciousness is reducible or emergent, then the conscious 
being must follow the same rules and protocol as matter.  Since this is not the case, 
consciousness is neither reducible nor emergent.  If emergence and reduction are off the 
table, then the only option left is that consciousness is a fundamental feature of the 
universe.  This implies that the present physical theory is incomplete and that 
consciousness needs to be included as a fundamental feature of matter and part of a 
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theory right at the beginning, which means that mental specialism must be rejected (Shan 
2005, 3).   
Shan does not directly perceive consciousness or any other sort of mental property 
as a fundamental aspect of the universe.  His observation is via effects, which he then 
explains by affirming consciousness as a fundamental aspect of the universe.  He posits a 
property that explains phenomena, as would any empirical scientist.  Rosenblum and 
Kuttner state, “The quantum experiment [the two-slit or box pairs experiment, such as 
Shan’s experiment above] is thus objective evidence for consciousness.  Evidence, of 
course, is not proof.  But the quantum experiment is the only objective evidence for 
consciousness” (2006, 186).  We have reason, then, to suspect that the panpsychist theory 
is not wholly a priori. Note that this does not prove that panpsychism is metaphysically 
required for science.  However, it is still a possibility to be further considered.  What can 
be seen is that panpsychism does not contradict the minimal metaphysics of naturalism 
because it is not merely first philosophy but also the subject of quantum physics. 
2.5.2 Maximum Realism 
 
 
 
Vollmer holds that human beings are dependent on the universe for their 
existence.  Space, time, matter, and evolution are real properties independent of 
consciousness.  This allows for the quantum mechanics observation principle.   The 
naturalist maximizes objectivity and allows only for a minimum amount of subjectivity 
(Vollmer 2007, 71).  This is not a core disposition of naturalism because, whether idealist 
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or realist, one could still hold true the defensibility thesis.
39
  Our understanding of the 
nature of the universe may change, but science as the most reliable method of 
investigation remains unchanged. 
A panpsychist can agree with each of Vollmer’s points.  It is the mental, whatever 
its nature turns out to be, that is fundamental to the universe, not the human being nor the 
human mind.  Humans can most certainly be considered to be dependent on a universe 
that can exist without them, but the mental may still be fundamental to the universe 
despite this fact.  Space, time, matter, and evolution can be just as real for the panpsychist 
and independent from consciousness.  It must be remembered that the “mental” of 
panpsychism does not mean pan-consciousness or pan-experientialism.  The panpsychist 
does not assert idealism. 
2.5.3 Evolutionary Naturalism 
 
 
 
Contemporary naturalism explains the complex phenomena of reality utilizing an 
evolutionary paradigm.  Thus, modern naturalism is an evolutionary naturalism (Vollmer 
2007, 34).
40
  Complex phenomena have been most succesfully explained through 
reference to their development from less complex, more basic and simple phenomena, for 
example biologial systems are best explained by citing chemical systems and these 
chemical systems by quantum systems (Vollmer 2007, 34-36).  So, the evolutionary 
paradigm is a methodological dispositon, dictating how reality should be explained.  
According to this paradigm, reality is composed of various levels of phenomena, each 
                                                          
39
 George Berkeley was an Idealist and yet an empiricist.  There is no a priori reason that an Idealist could 
not embrace Naturalism’s central concept. 
40
 Emphasis Vollmer’s. 
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lower level consisting of smaller and more basic phenomena and systems.  Each level has 
its structure and powers due to the structure and powers of the levels beneath it  (Hanna 
and Maiese 2009, 316).  
At this point the truth of the evolutionary paradigm is not in question.  The 
question is whether the central concept of naturalism could be true if the evolutionary 
paradigm were false.  Although the veracity of the evolutionary paradigm is determined 
by the standards of science, the paradigm does not in turn influence those standards.  
Granted, other scientific hypotheses may be rejected due to their incompatibility with the 
evolutionary paradigm, but this does not grant the paradigm authority over science and 
the scientific method.  The evolutionary paradigm is something science has defended 
rather than something needed to be true for science’s authority (in terms of defensibility) 
for the investigation of reality.  If the evolutionary paradigm had influence over the 
pursuit of truth, then science would be the servant of its hypothesis. 
Panpsychism agrees with and supports the evolutionary paradigm.  The fourth 
tenet of panpsychism entails that complex mental systems come from less complex and 
more basic mental systems.  This proposition entails the acceptance of the evolutionary 
paradigm.  Higher-order mental properties evolve out of more basic lower-order mental 
properties; the higher-order mental phenomena are explained by reference to lower-order 
mental phenomena.  So this disposition is compatible with panpsychism.  One may argue 
that the combination of mental systems into more complex mental systems is impossible 
and thus that panpsychism has to hold that mental systems cannot and do not evolve.  The 
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combination problem is one of the major problems facing a panpsychist theory of mind.
41
  
If the combination problem is insolvable then a panpsychism is necessarily at odds with 
the evolutionary paradigm, but this problems may well be solvable.  It also follows from 
tenet four that the panpsychist ontology will be layered, though not exclusively physically 
layered. 
The tension between panpsychism and the evolutionary paradigm arises when the 
paradigm is combined with the physicalist account.  This combination makes 
explanations valid only if the explanation utilizes simple physical particles.  Panpsychism 
certainly adheres to an explanation of systems in which complex mental properties (such 
as consciousness) are explained by less complex mental properties, and are even partially 
explained by less complex physical properties.  What panpsychism must deny is that 
complex mental processes can be exclusively explained via less complex physical 
properties. 
2.5.4 Primacy of Inanimate Matter-Energy 
 
 
 
The universe in which we are situated is constituted primarily by matter-energy 
(Vollmer 2007, 33).  There are no other substances that are either needed to explain the 
universe nor are there any other substances to be found in the universe.  So, we have a 
physicalist universe where causation is primarily due to the causal efficacy of material-
energy systems. Any other system, such as a function system, derives its causal efficacy 
entirely from the material-energy system which instantiates that functional system 
(Vollmer 2007, 33).  The existence of mental phenomena as such is not denied under the 
                                                          
41
As I summarized in chapter one.   See Seager, 1995 
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physicalist account, only mental phenomena as incorporeal properties.  Mental 
phenomena are conditions and processes of material-energy systems, such as the central 
nervous systems of various life forms (Vollmer 2007, 33).  So, anything that is in the 
world is primarily composed of matter-energy systems and has its causal efficacy due 
primarily to a matter-energy basis.  The only properties that have a substantial efficacy—
that is, an existence in its own right—are matter-energy systems (Vollmer 2007, 34).   
There are three claims constituting the principle “primacy of matter-energy.”  
First, matter-energy is the only fundamental property in the universe.  Consequently, 
facts about matter-energy will thoroughly exhaust our facts about the universe.  Second, 
if there is any sort of effect in the universe, it is due to a physical cause.  So, there is only 
physical-physical and possibly physical-mental causation, but never mental-physical 
causation.  Finally, mental phenomena only exist because of physical systems.  So, 
mental phenomena cannot be fundamental to the universe and are not required for a 
complete account of the universe, and thus are not ontologically independent of matter-
energy.  The primacy of matter-energy, which I shall call the physicalist account, is a 
form of mental specialism, and thus the physicalist account cannot be compatible with 
panpsychism.  However, it is possible to preserve the spirit of physicalism and reject 
mental specialism, thus allowing for compatibility between a weakened physicalism 
disposition and panpsychism.   
My first step shall be to establish the possibility of a dual physical-mental causal 
efficacy.  Independent causal efficacy is the essence of ontological independence and of a 
property’s fundamentality.  If the mental has an effect on a property, in some way, 
independent of physical systems, then explanatory and ontological independence of the 
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mental follows.  If an event, e2, is caused by a prior event, e1, independently of another 
event, e3, then e3 does not add to the explanation of the generation of e2.  If e1 has causal 
powers outside of e3, then these powers of e1 cannot be explained by reference to e3.  
Thus, e1, if it has its own causal efficacy and explanation, is fundamental to the universe.  
What is not shown is that e1 permeates the universe.  What also follows is that any theory 
that does not seek an account of e1 needs to be expanded to include e1 if a complete 
account of the universe is to be achieved.  Next, I shall explain the possibility of 
reconciliation between panpsychism and the physicalist account. 
2.5.4.1 Causal Efficacy 
 
 
 
The understandings of “causal efficacy” and “causal relevance” that I employ in 
this paper are adopted from Hanna and Maiese (2009).  According to this understanding, 
a singular event e1 is causally efficacious iff either (i) e1 is itself a nomologically 
sufficient simple singular “event cause” of some physical event e2 or (ii) e1 is a necessary 
proper part of e3, which itself is a nomologically sufficient complex singular event cause 
of e2; a property P is causally efficacious if and only if P is instantiated as an inherent or 
intrinsic property by events that are causally efficacious; and a physical substance S is 
causally efficacious if and only if S is constituted by causally efficacious events and 
properties (Hanna and Maiese 2009, 291-292).  An event e1 is causally relevant iff either 
(i*) e1 is a necessary condition for some event e3’s being a nomologically sufficient cause 
of some physical event e2 or (ii*) some correct description of e1 enters directly into an 
informative characterization of e3’s being a nomologically sufficient cause of e2; a 
property P is causally relevant iff some of P’s instantiations are causally relevant; and a 
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physical substance S is causally relevant iff S is constituted by causally relevant events 
and properties (Hanna and Maiese 2009, 292). 
The physicalist account is intimately connected to the causal closure principle, 
since it claims that physical events can only be caused by physical events.  Thus, if 
something has a physical effect, that something must be physical or operate via a physical 
base.  So, the physicalist account, in regard to causation, must be weakened if 
panpsychism is to be compatible with naturalism.  Panpsychism does not require that the 
mental’s casual impetus rivals the causal impetus of matter-energy—only that, in some 
way, mental events have their own causal efficacy in the actual world.  Panpsychism is 
not limited to conscious, intentional minds, as the mental is not exhausted by conscious 
and intentional events.   Thus, to be compatible with naturalism yet retain the core ideas 
of panpsychism, three principles must be retained:  (1) The irreducibility of the mental. 
(2) The mental’s possession of its own causal efficacy or relevance.  (3) Preservation of 
the principle of the conservation of energy.  So, mental causation cannot be a system of 
energy injected from outside of nature.  Principle (1) leads one to the conclusion that the 
mental is non-physical, though this in no way entails that the mental is not-natural, that is, 
supernatural or contradicting the principle of causal closure, as I have argued above—
unless one defends the rather dubious claim that only physical events are natural.  
Further, it does not necessarily follow that the mental is immaterial in the sense of a 
ghost in the machine, unless one holds only two sorts of things in the universe, 
immaterial and material properties.  Combining this conclusion from principle (1) with 
principle (2), we are led to the conclusion that a non-physical property has physical 
effects. Principle (3) establishes panpsychism’s status as a natural property, because it is 
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securely placed within the universe.  So, if an example of mental causation can be found 
that can fit with a minimally modified physicalism, then we have a method that 
naturalizes panpsychism, moving panpsychism from an exclusively first philosophy 
thesis to a thesis acceptable to the empirical sciences.
42
   Fortunately Hanna and Maiese, 
in their work Embodied Minds in Action, have outlined such a theory (2009). 
 Hanna and Maiese’s solution to the mind body problem is the rejection of the 
standard interpretation of the causal closure principle (CCP), which they call 
fundamentalism.  The fundamentalism interpretation holds not merely that only physical 
events can cause other physical events, but that fundamentally physical properties 
necessarily exclude any sort of intrinsic connection with fundamental mental properties 
(Hanna and Maiese 2009, 273-274).  If an event possesses a fundamentally physical 
property, that event is fundamentally physical, or fundamentally excludes mental 
properties.  Rejection of this interpretation allows adoption of the thesis of mental-
physical property fusion.
43
 The idea is that fundamental physical properties can share an 
inherent connection to fundamental mental properties; some space-time events are both 
mental and physical (Hanna and Maiese 2009, 305).  Combining property fusion with 
                                                          
42
 The mental causation problem for panpsychists is wider than the traditional problem of mental 
consciousness concerning phenomenal consciousness, conscious intentionality, intentional agency, and 
perhaps unconscious mental states. The panpsychist holds that complex macro-psychological state i.e. 
phenomenal consciousness or intentional agency, like complex macro-physicalist states, emerge from 
micro-psychological phenomena. These micro-psychological properties are not minds, neither conscious 
nor experiencing.  This is the difference between pan-experientialism and panpsychism.  The panpsychic 
theorist does not necessarily hold that every property in the universe experiences, only that the mental is a 
fundamental and natural aspect of the universe.  Just like the basic physical constituents of life are not 
alive, the micro-psychological property is not conscious nor intentional.  But, the panpsychist is not 
required to demonstrate that the various levels of mentality have a causal efficacy.  If the panpsychist 
demonstrates the plausibility of one level of mentality, such as conscious experience, determining, through 
its own impetus, some physical event, and this causation is compatible with naturalism , i.e. does not 
violate the principle of conservation of energy, then our panpsychist account can be sufficiently settled as 
naturalized (Hanna and Maiese, 271). 
43
 I will refer to mental-physical property fusion as “property fusion.” 
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Hanna and Maiese’s interpretation of CCP,44 and the thesis of jointly sufficient essentially 
mental-and-physical causation, we have a view of mental causation that preserves the 
panpsychic-fundamentalism (Hanna and Maiese 2009, 297).
45
   This view of mental 
causation preserves mental-physical independence as well as the causality of both the 
mental properties and the physical properties while respects the principle of the 
conservation of energy.  So, a property has causal efficacy if that property is an inherent 
property of events that are causally efficacious (Hanna and Maiese 2009, 291-292).
 46
   
Property fusion, Hanna and Maiese’s interpretation of CCP and mental-physical 
causation, allow both mental and physical properties to inhere in a physical event and to 
become instantiated in reality with that event.   A physical event as a whole constituted 
by both mental and physical qualities.  The event is the causally efficacious entity.  This 
event is constituted by at least two properties, a mental property and a physical property.  
These two properties share a fundamental, intrinsic bond.  The event’s causal efficacy is a 
result of its constituting properties: the mental and the physical.  These properties entail 
that each contributes to the causal efficacy of the event, imparting a causal relevance to 
both properties. Thus as this sort of property, the mental can retain its ontological 
independence via causation and its panpsychic fundamentality.   
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 Hanna and Maiese’s interpretation of CCP is:  (i) that only physical events can nomologically sufficiently 
cause physical events, (ii) that the fundamental physical properties of the natural world do not necessarily 
exclude inherent or intrinsic connections with fundamental mental properties, and (iii) that it is both 
metaphysically possible and also actually the case that fundamental physical properties include inherent or 
intrinsic connections with fundamental properties (Hanna and Maiese 2009, 297-298), 
45
 Hereafter mental-physical causation. I refer to the fundamental quality a panpsychist account provides 
for the mental and physical, namely that both are needed to understand the universe. 
46
 See footnote 29. 
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2.5.4.2 Hanna and Maiese’s Argument Contra Fundamentalism 
 
 
 
 The devil is in Fundamentalism (F), meaning that F’s interpretation of CCP 
prohibits the mental causation of physical events (Hanna and Maiese 2009, 297).  To 
summarize, F’s interpretation of CCP is as follows (and  I shall follow Hanna’s and 
Maiese’s lead and denote this as CCPF). (1) Only physical events can cause physical 
events, (2) a physical event is any real occupant of space-time that possesses some 
fundamental physical properties, (3) fundamental physical properties necessarily exclude 
inherent or intrinsic connections with fundamental mental properties (Hanna and Maiese 
2009, 299).  F is constituted by holding both (2) and (3).  Hanna and Maiese reject CCP
F
 
(3) and posit Post-Fundamentalism: the possibility of inherent connections between 
fundamental physical and fundamental mental properties (Hanna and Maiese 2009, 300).  
Hanna and Maiese offer two arguments to defend their position, which I will call 
epistemic uncertainty and property fusion possibility: (1) The epistemic uncertainty 
argument maintains that there is no justification for holding the truth of F since there is 
no justification for claiming we know the nature of the physical world, nor is there 
justification that our current scientific theories have any special truth-making position 
over any other period’s scientific theories (Hanna and Maiese 2009, 301-2).  There is 
simply no satisfactory reason to accept F to the exclusion of other theories except for 
adherence to a particular dogma.  (2) The property fusion possibility argument rests on 
the plausibility of property fusion.  F’s position is that property fusion is impossible, but 
if there are doubts about the possibility of F, then property fusion is possible.  There 
seems to be no justified reason that property fusion is impossible, especially if a 
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fundamentalist cannot provide a justified account of the nature of the physical.  The two 
fused properties are co-extensive in the sense that they are both inherent structural 
properties of a given event (Hanna and Maiese 2009, 303).
47
  Fused properties are 
complementary properties, i.e., properties that are not identical, yet are necessarily 
mutually and equivalently inherent in a spatio-temporal event (Hanna and Maiese 2009, 
304).   Hanna and Maiese offer the following actual examples of property fusion:  The 
relationship between concavity and convexity; particle-position and particle-momentum 
in quantum entanglement; DNA-structure and organismic structure in cellular life (Hanna 
and Maiese 2009, 303-7).  The relationships that obtain between these types of properties 
are contingent in the sense that they could have been otherwise but in fact are not, and 
although the relata of each of these relations can be separated conceptually, they cannot 
be separated ontologically. For example, concavity can be conceptualized independently 
of convexity, but cannot exist independently of convexity, and vice-versa.  
   The application of Hanna and Maiese’s property fusion allows for the 
compatibility of a robust panpsychism and a weakened physicalism.  First, property 
fusion allows for a robust sense of the causal efficacy of mental properties while 
preserving the conservation of energy.  Property fusion, in Hanna and Maiese’s reading, 
preserves the ontological independence of mental properties from physical properties.  
Mental properties have their own description which is independent of the physical; one 
cannot offer a complete description of mentality via physical facts.  There are more facts 
about the universe than physical facts.  Under property fusion the mental is a natural, 
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 How the mental is part of an event’s structure will be determined by the particular nature of the mental.  
It is possible that the mental is the intrinsic property of an event to which physical properties are “pinned”.  
Or, if the nature of the mental is information, then the mental could plausibly be asserted to be the “what” 
the event is and the physical to be substratum that is the “what.” 
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fundamental aspect of the universe, an aspect that is required in order to understand the 
universe completely. Finally, property fusion requires expansion of the sciences to 
include mental properties while preserving the status of physical properties (Hanna and 
Maiese 2009, 304).  There is simply more to say about the universe than is expressed by 
physical facts. 
In sum, the panpsychist and the physicalist account still have not yet been 
reconciled.  The physicalist account described before is simply too strong.  The “matter-
energy primacy disposition” I will call the absolutist disposition (AD), for it describes the 
universe absolutely without possibility of variation in properties; it says the universe is 
one thing and that thing alone.  Under AD the universe is necessarily homogeneous 
because AD holds that there is only one type of property in the universe.  Hanna and 
Maiese’s argument against Fundamentalism can be applied to AD.  Obviously if 
physicalists do not know the nature of the physical, combined with the possible fallibility 
of current scientific theories, the blind faith placed in AD seems to be misplaced.  If AD 
is taken, as the name implies, as a disposition for research, then AD is detrimental to 
research, due to the limits the former places on the latter.  The spirit of AD as a research 
program is to enhance the possibility of positive results for researchers investigating 
reality.  AD seems to be—if not self-defeating—at least overly restrictive to research.  
So, I suggest that we accept a physicalist account that allows for property fusion, 
property fusion physicalism, which is compatible with panpsychism.  Thus we will have a 
universe-view with the following additions:  (1) An ontology founded upon an event 
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neutral monism.
48
 (2) The existence of fundamental mental properties. (3) The existence 
of fundamental physical properties. (4) Events constituted as a whole by both 
fundamental mental and fundamental physical properties. (5) Mental and physical 
properties both have causal relevance via a mutual connection providing for the causal 
efficacy of a space-time event. (6) Neither physical nor mental facts alone can provide a 
sufficient account of an event. (7) Both fundamental physical and fundamental mental 
properties are co-extensive. 
So, the universe is not all physical, though part is still significantly physical.  But, 
the object of investigation will not be physical events or properties, but rather events that 
share mental and physical properties.  Current science would not, in a significant sense, 
be altered, for their object of study still is a significant portion of the universe. 
Returning to the matter of aligning panpsychism and physicalism, Vollmer’s 
account of physicalist means that:  1) everything is matter-energy or reduced to matter-
energy; 2) there are only physical causes; 3) mental phenomena are fully reducible to 
matter-energy systems; 4) the existence of mental phenomena depends on matter-energy 
systems; 5) matter-energy can exist without mental phenomena.  Themes 1-5 cannot be 
compatible with panpsychism, but if mental-physical property fusion is possible, then it is 
possible to weaken 1-5.  So, 6-8 will replace Vollmer’s 1-5:  6) the basic ontological 
property is the event; 7) every event is composed of fundamental matter-energy 
properties that are co-extensive with fundamental mental properties; 8)  causation is 
between nomologically singular events, and causal efficacy depends upon the whole 
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  “Event neutral monism” equates to an ontology in which there is one basic constituent of reality.  This 
constituent is the “event” and this “event” is neutral or neither primarily mental nor physical, but composed 
of both mental and physical properties. 
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event being constituted from fundamental mental and fundamental physical properties.  
The mental is the inherent structure of a property, that which gives matter-energy 
definition.  The capacities and features of the whole property depend upon both the 
structure and the matter, including causal efficacy.  The mental, like the structure of any 
property, while not strictly physical, is not immaterial like a Cartesian ghost in the 
machine.  The structure and organization of a property are fully accessible for study by 
science.  If we provisionally understand the fundamental mental properties as the 
irreducible structure of property, then we have a way of reconciling the physicalist 
account with panpsychism, because panpsychism posits nothing beyond the ken of 
science. 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
 
 
If panpsychism is a viable disposition for research into the fabric of reality, it will 
meet with Vollmer’s requirements for metaphysical assumptions that I outline above in 
section 2.5.1,  Minimal Metaphysics.  For panpsychism to be a possible scientific 
assumption, it must be compatible with naturalism.  Philosophy – at least in the analytic 
camp – does not consider supernatural or uneconomic theories about reality viable.  
However, theories that, through a metaphysical assumption eliminate the phenomena we 
are most intimate with for the sake of consistency are equally uneconomic.  Such theories 
get rid of too much.   
I affirm that panpsychism can fully to explain reality, and I argue that whatever 
disposition one assumes, that assumption must be compatible with naturalism. I have 
shown that panpsychism is compatible with naturalism and that this compatibility makes 
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panpsychism a valid research program for science and analytic philosophy.  I have shown 
the compatibility between naturalism and panpsychism by reconciling the core 
dispositions of naturalism with the four tenets of panpsychism.  The panpsychic 
disposition is not a supernatural doctrine, nor is panpsychism based upon unreasonable 
metaphysical assumptions.  Panpsychism is compatible with realism and, via the fourth 
tenet of panpsychism, adheres to an explanatory system based upon holding a layered 
world ontology.  The only alteration required is a weakening of the physicalist account 
from absolutist disposition to property fusion physicalism.  Otherwise, the rest of 
Vollmer’s core dispositions of naturalism are compatible with panpsychism, as I have 
shown, and thus we have naturalized panpsychism.     
If mental specialism is abandoned – as it must be for even a partial solution to the 
mind-body problem – then a structure of reality that is different from the reality posited 
by physicalists and eliminativists is required.  Yet, such a structure of reality is not as 
strange as people claim.  The rejection of mental specialism neither lands one into a 
supernaturalism, nor requires one to affirm the sheer mysteriousness of reality.  There 
certainly could be a supernatural panpsychism, but such a doctrine is not necessary or 
even prevalent in panpsychist theories.  It is certainly possible, as I have shown above, to 
have a natural panpsychist account of reality and the mind.  A panpsychist theory would 
not necessarily invalidate large tracks of established scientific dispositions or require 
large revisions in scientific thinking.  There may be additional principles to consider, but 
nothing revolutionary or that is not part of science somewhere, as attested in this chapter.  
To the objection that panpsychism injects purely metaphysical assumptions arbitrarily 
 81 
and without restraint, one must respond that metaphysical theories must be affirmed, 
though only when physical theories cannot suffice. 
The basic structure of a panpsychic universe is an event neutral monism.  There is 
one basic type of thing in reality, and these are events.  Each singular event is composed 
of both fundamental physical properties and fundamental mental properties.  These 
fundamental properties are coextensive and share an inherent connection.  Despite this 
connection the two fundamental properties are ontologically independent.
49
  They keep 
their identity despite the connection.  So, the connection is not one of mixing.  The 
connection is mental-physical property fusion.  This doctrine obviously rejects the 
fundamentalism interpretation of CCP, but allows for a robust modified version of CCP 
that retains the vital roles it plays in science, and it allows a possible resolution of some 
of the seemingly intractable problems of consciousness.   
 Property fusion allows for mental causation.  Since both mental and physical 
properties constitute, in their own way, a whole event, both types of properties have, as 
instantiated in the event, causal power via the causal power of the whole event.  As 
property fusion involves fundamental properties and not higher-level properties, such as 
consciousness, we are brought to the combination problem: the problem of explaining 
just how fundamental mental properties come together to form a higher-level mental 
property.
50
  The revised CCP and property fusion entail a layered conception of reality.  
This layered conception of reality requires an evolutionary paradigm in which more basic 
                                                          
49
 One may justly ask whether the mental and physical properties can exist without each other.  It would be 
premature to attempt to answer this question without first formulating the precise nature of the “mental.”  
This question must be tabled for now, but my suspicion is that this will be a question for empirical science 
and not for philosophy. 
50
 See Goff (2006, 2009) and Strawson (2006a, 2006b). 
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mental properties combine to form entirely new higher-level mental properties.  The 
combination problem is the topic of the following chapter, in which I offer a non-
mysterious solution.  Even though the combination problem stems from my commitment 
to a naturalized panpsychism and the acceptance of mental-physical property fusion, the 
problem afflicts any panpsychist theory.  My solution stems from adhering more closely 
to science and empirical fact, as well as from a minimum dependence on metaphysical 
argumentation and assumptions.  At all costs, over-reliance on metaphysical assumptions 
and appeals to mystery must be avoided when addressing the combination problem. 
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Chapter 3 
An Empirical, Non-Mysterious Solution to the Combination Problem 
 
 
 
3.0 The Task at Hand 
 
 
 
 My aim is to naturalize panpsychism.   Naturalizing panpsychism will 
demonstrate that a panpsychism hypothesis can be acceptable to science and is a 
beneficial research project.  In chapter one I showed that the position against 
panpsychism stems from an unwarranted assumption which I call mental specialism: the 
assumption that the mental is a false category or an anomaly in the universe.  I then 
developed an account of panpsychism based on what would have to be the case if one 
rejected mental specialism.   It is this account of panpsychism that I accept for my larger 
project.  In chapter two I established that naturalism and panpsychism are compatible.  
Granted, I use a variation of naturalism, which I believe is fairly standard, though there 
are many variations.  I do not find this problematic’ because it is now theoretically 
possible to demonstrate the compatibility of panpsychism and naturalism, save the most 
dogmatically eliminativist versions of naturalism. I also demonstrate that panpsychism 
can be shown to be amiable if not compatible with a minimally restructured physicalism 
that allows for property fusion between fundamental mental properties and fundamental 
physical properties.  Most importantly, I demonstrate a plausible account of mental 
causation.   
 The present chapter arises out of the implications of the last two chapters.  
Higher-order mental properties, under the version of panpsychism utilized here, emerge 
from lower-order, more fundamental mental properties.  These fundamental mental 
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properties are proto-consciousness or experiential simples.  How this emergence occurs is 
the combination problem, the major problem facing a panpsychic account of the mind.  
The issue stems from the accepted nature of an experiential property, namely the “what-
it-is-like” (Nagel 1974).  Experiential properties simply are not things that can combine 
or sum and still exist.  Combining to become something different entails that the 
experiential simple, by becoming a different “what-it-is-like,” loses its own “what-it-is-
like” and therefore ceases to exist.  Most solutions end up in doctrines of mysteriousness 
or vague transcendental arguments that seek to wave the problem away.  I offer an 
empirical solution to the combination problem by basing combination on Giulio Tononi’s 
Integration Information Theory of Consciousness (2008). 
I 
3.1 The Combination Problem in Recent Literature 
 
 
 
3.1.0 Introduction 
 
 
 
 Property fusion is the intrinsic connection between fundamental physical and 
mental properties.  It allows for a viable account of mental causation and entails the 
emergence of higher-level mental properties from more fundamental properties—that is 
the evolutionary paradigm of reality or smallism.
51
  Smallism is Sam Coleman’s term for 
the evolutionary paradigm (Coleman 2006).   Smallism entails the combination problem  
(Coleman 2006, 40).  The combination problem is the question of how to provide a 
sufficient theory of how higher-level mental properties, such as conscious states, emerge 
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 See Hanna and Maiese (2009) and chapter 2. 
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from fundamental proto-conscious properties.  The combination problem is particularly 
relevant for Galen Strawson’s panpsychic theory.  The crux of Strawson’s argument 
relies on the unacceptability of brute emergence, where there is seemingly no reason for a 
particular property to emerge from its base.  Liquidity emerges from micro-properties 
that are so constituted to produce liquidity.  The fundamental constituents of brute 
emergence have no such nature to produce its emergent properties.  But if brute 
emergence is rejected, then a transparent non-mysterious account of mental-from-mental 
emergence is needed.  Thus I shall offer an empirical, non-mysterious mental-from-
mental emergence solution to the combination problem.  My solution is based upon 
Giulio Tononi’s theory of consciousness as integrated information.52  Naturalized 
panpsychism holds that information is proto-consciousness: when integrated within a 
system of appropriate mechanisms, the system is conscious to the degree that the system 
integrates information.   
 It could be claimed that mental-from-mental emergence is less unintelligible than 
mental-from-non-mental (that is, physical) emergence (Strawson 2006a, 250).  Given that 
physical (i.e., non-mental)-from-physical (i.e., non-mental) emergence is accepted in 
scientific and analytic communities, mental-from-mental emergence is such an anomaly 
to the predominant worldview that the combination problem gives us sufficient reason to 
reject panpsychism.  Combination is too great a hurdle to be ignored or claimed as an 
assumption.  Panpsychism demands that we accept many assumptions, and if key 
explanations are not possible, then there are few reasons to accept these assumptions.   
Further, solutions to the combination problem tend to result in a doctrine of mysterious 
                                                          
52
 See Tononi (2008). 
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emergence, which is as defeating to panpsychism as the combination problem.  If 
mysteriousness is the solution to the combination problem, then nothing has been solved.  
We still lack an account of mental-from-mental emergence.  The panpsychic hypothesis 
cannot proceed until an acceptable account of combination is developed.   
 So, if an empirical, non-mysterious account of mental-from-mental emergence 
cannot be offered, then panpsychism is simply too counterintuitive to be pursued.  Why 
must such an account be empirical?  As a theory panpsychism needs to work within the 
broad scientific understanding of reality and the empirical systems of comprehension.  
The days of pure Rationalist armchair philosophy are done.  Details of the scientific 
system or even large tracts of contemporary theory may be critiqued or even rejected, but 
the scientific understanding of reality and how reality is investigated is thoroughly 
empirical.  Panpsychic theories may be amiable with empirical science, but such 
amiability could involve mere coexistence where two theories are separate and 
independent of each other.  Science could never falsify or validate such an amiable 
theory.  An empirical panpsychic theory, which I call naturalized panpsychism, will make 
sense within our empirical system and find support there.   
3.1.2 Synopsis of the Present Chapter 
 
 
 
 When H2O molecules come together, liquidity emerges.  Liquidity is a new 
property due to the summation of the relevant molecules which persist despite the 
emergence of liquidity.  There is nothing mysterious in this emergence.  If panpsychism 
is true, then mental properties must emerge from other, more basic mental properties, 
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given the truth of evolution.
53
  But mental properties are quite different from physical 
properties.  The emergence of higher-level mental properties is not a matter of the 
summing of lower-level mental properties.  The nature of conscious experience is its 
phenomenal feel, say a burning.  When the burning feel ends, the experience ends; it is no 
more.  So, if you combine several mental properties, say two burning-experiences, either 
the two experiences will end and a new phenomenal property will be produced, which 
means the new property is not composed of the two experiences, or the two experiences 
will continue and there will be no new experience.  Thus, mental properties cannot 
combine to produce new mental properties.  But, for any reasonable panpsychism to be 
possible mental-from-mental emergence is necessary.  This is the combination problem. 
 The most robust contribution to panpsychic theories has come from the work of 
Galen Strawson (2006a).  Even though heavily influenced by Cartesian philosophy, the 
panpsychic system that he develops is quite ingenious.
54
  But, despite Strawson’s 
ingenuity, this system cannot accommodate mental-from-mental emergence and the 
combination problem.  Philip Goff illustrates this point wonderfully in his critique 
Experiences Don’t Sum (2006).  Goff attributes Strawson’s failure to his adherence to the 
principle of the transparency of the mental.  Strawson objects to Goff’s analysis, stating 
that he does not accept such a principle, which commits one to the view that the subject 
of experience has full access to the whole nature of its experience.  Strawson claims that 
he is committed only to the “partial revelation” thesis that a subject of experience has 
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 This is not quite true, but the alternative makes for quite a crowded universe.  One could posit that every 
past, presents and future mental property exists whole and self-contained.  Each physical system capable of 
mental states then “participates” with these “universal mental properties.”  I am unsure whether the 
combination problem afflicts Gottfried Leibniz’s monadology, but I am quite sure that resorting to 
monadology to avoid the combination problem will not save panpsychism. 
54
 And so is Cartesian philosophy. 
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access only to certain aspects of its experience.  But the commitment to the “partial 
revelation thesis” commits Strawson to pure-panexperientialism: the belief that 
everything is entirely composed of ultimates which are wholly experiential.  Yet, even 
this move fails to save Strawson from the combination problem, and he resorts to an 
appeal to transcendental arguments.  Goff, in “Can the Panpsychist Get Around the 
Combination Problem?,” proposes a tactic that affirms the question in his title.  The 
panpsychist has to reject mental-from-mental emergence in the form of summing, like 
liquidity from H2O, but she can hold that there is a relationship into which mental 
ultimates can enter that entails new higher-level mental properties.  This requires, 
however, a reliance on the mysteriousness of the particular relationship between mental 
properties. 
 If the panpsychic theorist must rely on transcendental arguments or appeals to 
mystery, then the explanatory value of panpsychism does not advance the discussion of 
the mind-body problem and must be rejected.  What is needed is a scientific solution to 
the combination problem.  This is just what I propose here.  My solution utilizes Guilio 
Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness (IITC) (2008).  Tononi 
proposes that consciousness just is integrated information, both the existence of and 
character of specific conscious states.  The character of a given conscious state is a result 
of the relationships between different mechanisms that process information in a system, 
say a human brain.  So, combination results from one set of neurons communicating with 
another—thus systems that are part of a larger system.  Each system receives input that 
results in that system entrance into an internal informational state.  So, if two burning 
stimuli (lower-level conscious properties) are received by a system, that system then 
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enters into another internal informational state.  Combination is thus input that results in 
an internal state of a system. 
3.1.3 The Combination Problem, William James, and Recent Applications 
 
 
 
 The classic formulation of the combination problem comes from William James’ 
Principles of Psychology, in which James notes that individual mental properties are 
distinct entities and, when combined, exist independently in the composition, much like 
hydrogen and oxygen molecules in H2O (1983, 162).  Any new mental property would be 
completely novel and independent.  Since the full nature of an experience is transparent 
to the experiencer, the constituting parts of the novel, higher-level experience would still 
be fully experienced; otherwise the constituting experiences cannot be part of the new 
higher-level experience.  Further, as noted by William Seager and Sean Allen-
Hermanson, if there are fundamental mental properties, and it is these fundamental 
mental properties that combine to produce a higher-level mental property, such as 
consciousness, then why don’t higher-level mental properties combine to constitute an 
even higher-level experience (2005)?  It is James’ famous articulation of this objection 
that inspires Phillip Goff’s objection to Strawson. 
 The following describes how Strawson’s panpsychism entails the combination 
problem.  Emergence cannot be brute; any emergent property must emerge from more 
basic properties that are constituted for producing that emergent property.  Consciousness 
emerging from fundamental physical properties, properties that are in no way conscious, 
is a case of brute emergence, or a miracle.  Such physical properties cannot be constituted 
to produce consciousness.  Thus, we must embrace either material eliminativism or 
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panpsychism—the belief that there are fundamental properties that are constituted to 
produce consciousness (Strawson 2006a).  Smallism is built into this argument, which 
Strawson fully admits (2006a, 26). Combine smallism with Strawson’s ontological 
commitment—that each ultimate is itself an experiencing subject and his commitment to 
the transparency of the mental (TM), and that the nature of an experience is fully 
disclosed simply by having that experience—and we arrive at Strawson’s combination 
problem (2006a, 26). 
3.1.4  Goff’s Use of the Combination Problem to Object to Strawson 
 
 
 
 Philip Goff claims that Strawson merely trades one unintelligible form of 
emergence for another, describing Strawson’s approach as  “the emergence of novel 
‘macro experiential phenomena’ from ‘micro experiential phenomena’” (2006, 53).   For 
Strawson, ultimates are subjects.  So, all of the billions of ultimates that compose, say, a 
bat’s brain assemble to constitute an entirely new subject of experience.  Goff’s point is 
that Strawson has his own emergence “problem” to explain.  Emergentists need a 
physical-experiential explanation; Strawson has to explain the emergence of a new 
subject—the bat—from equally experiencing smaller subjects—bat-constituting-
ultimates.     
 Strawson’s argument rests on his commitment to the transparency of the mental 
(TM) and the denial of the transparency of the physical (TP) (P. Goff 2006, 55).  Thus, 
the fundamental nature of our experience is known to us merely by having that 
experience.  Introspection into one’s consciousness reveals a metaphysical reality, 
consciousness as it is in itself (P. Goff 2006, 57).  Yet, we are significantly ignorant of 
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the essential nature of the physical to the point that the doctrine that the physical is 
fundamentally non-experiential is ontologically unwarranted.
55
  TM is necessary for 
Realistic Monism (RMP), because if the subject of experience does not have a transparent 
understanding of the essential nature of her experience, that experience may turn out to 
be physical  (P. Goff 2006, 56). According to Goff, the metaphysical reality of our 
consciousness must be as it appears in our introspection (P. Goff 2006, 58).   
 According to Goff’s critique, Strawson’s subjects of experience are simply not the 
sort of thing that can combine to form a new qualitative subject.  A lower-order subject of 
experience cannot combine to form a new qualitative subject because when the “what-it-
is-like” of the lower-subject of experience ceases (as it must if some new qualitative 
subject of experience is formed) then the subject of experience ends and so cannot be a 
part of anything.  So, a lower-order subject of experience cannot constitute a higher-order 
subject of experience on pain of its inexistence—in short, it cannot be combined (P. Goff 
2006).  Strawson’s commitment to the identification of experience and the corresponding 
subject of experience is quite clear:  “There cannot be experience without a subject of 
experience.  There cannot be a subject of experience without experience”. (Strawson, 
Panpsychism? 2006a, 224)  A subject of experience exists only if some experience, 
whatever that experience may be, exists for it.  Strawson holds that there is no ontological 
distinction between the subject of experience and its experience (2006a192-3).  The lack 
of distinction between the subject and its experience makes the possibility of subjects 
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 I suspect, however, that Strawson is committed to transparency of the non-experiential, that the essential 
nature of the non-experiential is completely revealed to the observer.  As a metaphysical thesis, the 
assertion “all experiential reality and all non-experiential reality are mutually exclusive” can be founded 
only if both experiential and non-experiential reality is fully available for our inspection.  Otherwise the 
existence of the non-experiential and the “wholly non-experiential reality” could never be determined to be 
such (Strawson, Panpsychism? 2006b, 231).  This thesis only has value if observation of the experiential 
and the non-experiential has access to the essential nature of these two realities. 
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having new or novel experiences difficult to comprehend.  If a subject of experience is (in 
the sense of identity) its experience, then the subject has to be a particular experience.  
Strawson’s ultimates cannot change their particular experience and continue to exist.   To 
constitute anything, a lower-order subject of experience needs to retain its own particular 
experience or “what-it-is-like,” regardless of whatever non-essential properties, features, 
or being it has.   
3.1.4.0 Strawson’s Mistake of the Superior Intelligibility of Mental-From-Mental 
Emergence 
 
 
 
 Goff claims that mental-from-mental emergence is as unintelligible (meaning 
unable to be understood by us) as brute physical emergence.  Strawson replies that both 
brute emergence and mental-from-mental emergence are in fact unintelligible but that the 
latter mental-from-mental emergence is in a much better situation than the former brute 
emergence (2006a, 250). The emergent base from which higher-level mental properties 
emerge are constituted so as to produce higher-levels of mental properties, unlike mental-
from-physical emergence.  So, both types of emergence, brute and mental-from-mental, 
are unintelligible.  Mental-from-mental emergence is less so, according to Strawson. 
 There are two problems with Strawson’s claim that mental-from-mental 
emergence is more intelligible than brute emergence and thus the better choice of the 
two.  First, Strawson is committed to physical-from-physical emergence, like liquidity 
from water molecules (2006a).  Physical emergence is not between physical subjects such 
as Mary and Fred, but from physical fundamentals such as electrons, atoms and 
molecules.  Explanations of physical-from-physical emergence are different enough from 
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physical subject-from-physical subject emergence to require an entirely new sort of 
explanation.  If there is an instance of an individual human subject emerging from two 
other distinct human subjects, such emergence will require a radically different 
explanation than the physical-from-physical explanation with which we are familiar.  
This line of thought applies to Strawson’s claim as follows: ultimates are subjects of 
experience and like physical subjects, are discrete entities and are not the sorts of thing 
that one thinks of combining.  For instance, bats and humans are both experiential 
subjects, though infinitely more complex than Strawson’s ultimates.  What we know 
about subjects of experience is that they do not combine.  Similarly, two human psyches 
do not make a third novel psyche.  This is part of James’ point; psyches are not the sorts 
of things that combine.   If an experiential ultimate were like a string or electron, then 
mental-from-mental emergence would not be so problematic.  The model of emergence 
with which we have to work is non-subject emergence.  To account for “subject of 
experience”-from-“subject of experience,” an entirely new and different model of 
emergence is needed. 
 Second, Strawson is simply incorrect that mental-from-mental emergence is in 
better standing than mental-from-physical emergence.  Strawson bases his conclusion on 
the constitution of the emergent base of mental-from-mental emergence.  Liquidity 
emerges from constituents that are suited to produce liquidity.  Mental-from-physical 
emergence is brute, so any situation in which the emergent base matches the emergent 
property is more intelligible and thus preferable.  Mental-from-physical emergence is in 
good standing, because it possesses just what mental-from-mental emergence needs: a 
framework with which to understand emergence itself.  Mental-from-physical emergence 
 94 
exists within a framework of physical-from-physical emergence which has been very 
successful in providing us with an understanding of our world.
56
  This framework 
includes a successful mode of investigation and explanation.  The physical-from-physical 
emergence tells us how to answer questions and to address mysterious enigmas. Because 
of the success of standard scientific emergence, we have examples—many examples—of 
what to look for in a successful explanation of mental-from-physical emergence.  If we 
move outside of this framework, we no longer have examples on which to base our 
pursuit of an adequate example of mental-from-mental emergence.  The explanation of 
mental-from-physical emergence is nestled within a comprehensive, coherent, and 
intelligible system.  Mental-from-mental emergence has no such system.   We have no 
way to understand it except through metaphor based on physical-from-physical 
emergence.  How physical high-order constructs emerge from physical ultimates provides 
us with no understanding of how experiential ultimates-subjects constitute higher-order 
experiential subjects (Strawson 2006a, 7).  The ontological framework of experiential 
ultimates that Strawson gives is far from the evidence needed to back his claims.
57
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 In fact, consciousness is, arguably, the only fact of our universe that the traditional reductive model has 
failed to explain. 
57
 Strawson replies to this objection by simply noting that life reduces and experience does not (Strawson 
2006a).  Of course, this is just what is at stake, and so seems to be a mere restatement of the problem.  
Strawson holds that consciousness reduces, but experience does not.  His strongest point is that experience 
is universally (or nearly so) held to be an enigma, unlike the problem of life (Peressini n.d.) (Sytsma and 
Machery 2010).  This could be dismissed as a peculiarity of human interest rather than a serious 
metaphysical issue, however.  Life could have been a universal mysterious enigma, just not as popular as 
the problem of experience. 
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3.1.4.1.0 Deflecting Goff’s Combination Objection, Rejecting the Transparency of the 
Mental, and the Move to Pure Panexperientialism—Rejecting the Physical 
 
 
 
 Strawson’s solution to Goff’s objection is to reject the transparency of the mental.  
This allows Strawson to hold “partial revelation,” a subject is acquainted with certain 
aspects of the essential nature of a given experience (2006a, 252-253).  Thus, a 
panpsychist that holds only partial revelation or partial transparency can safely say that 
there is some hidden aspect of experience that combines to form novel higher-level 
experiences—therefore combination is simply a hidden fact of panpsychism (2006b, 252-
253).  Once Strawson accepts a doctrine of experiential mysteriousness, he has no basis 
to classify mental-from-physical emergence but not mental-from-mental emergence as 
brute, because a physicalist could easily assert the same claim—that there is some hidden 
aspect of fundamental physical properties that gives rise to consciousness.  The only way 
that Strawson can ensure that the nature of experience is entirely non-physical is to 
remove the physical as a category of reality.   
3.1.4.1.1 Strawson’s Argument for “Pure Panexperientialism” and Getting Rid of the 
Physical 
 
 
 
 Strawson’s argument begins with the thesis that experiential reality cannot be 
non-experiential reality (2006a, 234-235).  Given stuff monism that reality is of one 
fundamental type, and that reality is experiential and non-experiential, realty is either 
purely experiential (i.e., pure panexperientialism) or purely non-experiential (i.e., 
eliminativist) (2006a, 234-246).  Given our understanding of reality this result—a reality, 
without either the experiential or the non-experiential—is intolerable (2006a, 235).  The 
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eventual result is “equal-status fundamental-duality monism” (ESFD), which according 
to Strawson means:  “Reality is substantially single.  All reality is experiential and all 
reality is non-experiential.  Experiential and non-experiential beings exist in such a way 
that neither can be said to be based on or realized by, or in any way asymmetrically 
dependent on the other“ (2006a, 241).  According to Strawson, ESFD violates the law of 
non-contradiction by exhibiting two contradictory states simultaneously.  Without 
rejecting the law of non-contradiction, the monist has two choices for the ultimate nature 
of reality:  eliminitivist or pure panexperientialist.  Strawson claims that eliminitivism is 
not an option for a serious theorist and so adopts pure panexperientialism (2006a, 246).   
It is important to note, however, that this claim depends upon Strawson’s no-radical 
emergence thesis—or, the rejection of brute emergence.  If the no-radical thesis is false, 
or if mental-from-physical emergence is in fact not radical, then experience in fact 
becomes reducible to the physical, and Strawson’s project cannot begin. 
 3.1.4.1.2 Strawson’s Response to Goff’s Combination Problem and 
Strawson’s Move to Mysteriousness 
 
 
 
  Strawson asserts that TM is a thesis mistakenly attributed to him.  Strawson 
describes TM in his assertion:  “In the case of any particular experience, I am acquainted 
with the whole essential nature of the experience just by having it”  (2006a, 250-256).58 
Strawson rejects TM in favor for the partial revelation thesis (PR), stating: “in the case of 
any particular experience, I am acquainted with the essential nature of the experience in 
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 Emphasis mine. 
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certain respects, at least, just in having it” (2006a, 250-256).59 TM entails that 
combination is only a sum of parts, because the subject knows the whole essential nature 
and all of its constituting parts in their whole nature.  So, each ultimate remains fully 
individual and known while constituting a higher-order experience (2006a, 255).  Such 
ultimates cannot blend to create a novel, higher-order experience.  However, if Strawson 
is correct, PR enables such a blending by denying that a subject necessarily has direct 
acquaintance with its constituents.  We should note that PR makes Strawson an advocate 
of experiential ignorance, and thus his argument commits him to the belief in the 
mysteriousness of experience.  For him, ultimates seem to be something forever beyond 
our experience and our investigations.   
3.1.4.1.3 Goff’s Solution to the Combination Problem, Phenomenal Bonding, and the 
Mysteriousness of Experience 
 
 
 
  Goff’s solution is not an argument for a panpsychist hypothesis; Goff seems 
highly skeptical of panpsychism.  Goff only proposes a possible solution that a 
panpsychic may adopt.  His solution to the combination problem involves the following 
commitments: 1) the commitment is a fairly standard panexperientialist tenet, namely that 
particles experience.  It is clear that Goff takes these particles to be subjects of 
experience.  Goff does not seem to take these subjects as “thin subjects”, identical and 
existentially dependent on their experience (Goff 2009, 129-134).   The next commitment 
is that there is a “phenomenal bonding relation which unites the mini-subjects of 
                                                          
59 Do “certain respects” entail ignorance of experience only in regard to objections made against 
Strawson’s system?  Strawson needs to explain how one can be sure of anything regarding one’s 
experience, if there are aspects of one’s experience with which one is not acquainted.  If it is admitted that 
there are hidden aspects of our experience, then some sort of criteria is needed to establish that we are 
acquainted at all with the essential nature of our own experiences.  Does this entail that there are non-
experiential aspects of experience? 
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experience into ‘larger’ subjects of experience” (P. Goff 2009, 135). This view leads to a 
certain amount of mysteriousness and faith.
60
   
 Under certain conditions, i.e. the hot interior of our planet, when carbon 
molecules will align in a specific arrangement to produce the higher-order property of 
crystal-ness when certain conditions arise, groups of H2O molecules result in the 
emergent quality of liquidity.  Of course, subjects of phenomenal qualities are different.  
Subjects of experience do not combine to necessarily result in a novel emergent quality.  
There is no entailment in experience from experience emergence (P. Goff 2009, 130-1).   
Goff formulates the following principle of experience emergence: No Summing of 
Subjects (NSS), asserting that it can reasonably be known a priori:   
The existence of a group of subjects of experience, S1…SN, 
instantiating certain phenomenal characters, never necessitates the 
existence of a subject of experience T, such that what it is like to be T 
is different from what it is like to be any of S1…SN (P. Goff 2009, 
130).
61
 
What Goff calls NSS is a truth about subjects of experience and not the phenomenal 
characters that they have.  Subjects of experience are simply not the sort of things that act 
like carbon molecules.   What this does not eliminate however is the possibility that 
S1…SN, instead of merely being grouped together, can enter into a relationship of a 
certain character that necessitates a higher-order subject of experience. Goff explains 
further: 
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 As I noted above (and Goff notes as well), if there is insufficient benefit for this mysteriousness, then the 
panexperientialist view is simply not warranted.  Some would think that the existence of ultimates that are 
the subjects of experience are too tall of an order to grant.  If granting such an ontology doesn’t lead to real 
progress to the mind-body problem, it should be obvious that panexperientialism should be abandoned. 
61
 NSS does not depend on TM nor does phenomenal bonding depend on PR.  NSS is a truth about the 
concepts and their relationship, so it is not something derived from experience. 
 99 
To put it another way, NSS implies that there is no state of affairs of the 
form <subject of experience S1 exists which phenomenal character X, 
and subject of experience S2 exists phenomenal character y> which 
necessitates <subject of experience S3 exist with phenomenal character 
z>.  But it does not imply that there is not some state of affairs of the 
form <subject of experience S1 exists which phenomenal character X 
bears relationship R to subject of experience S2 exists phenomenal 
character y> which necessitates <subject of experience S3 exist with 
phenomenal character z>.    Such a sense of experiences summing is not 
ruled out by NSS (P. Goff 2009, 132). 
 “Thus, phenomenal bonding” is different from Strawson’s attempted solution to the 
combination problem.  NSS entails that the sort of combination that Strawson requires
62
 
is impossible.  NSS leaves open the possibility that lower-order subjects of experience 
could enter into a relationship with each other, a relationship that could entail a higher-
order subject of experience.  Goff does not argue that such a relationship exists or that it 
needs to.  Part of the reason for this is that Goff is not advancing a panpsychist or 
panexperientialist hypothesis per se, even though his solution advances the panpsychist 
project.   
3.1.4.1.4 Rejection of Mysteriousness and Statement of Method Demonstrating a Non-
Mysteriousness Solution to the Combination Problem; How Experiences Sum  
 
 
 
 Strawson, in Goff’s words, has nothing more than faith that ultimates come 
together to create a novel higher-order experience.  Strawson holds that the only 
argument possible is a transcendental one based on the veracity of smallist 
panexperientialism (Strawson 2006a, 262).  If the only way that experience can be 
explained under a panexperiential hypothesis is “it must happen somehow”, then the 
metaphysical advantage of panexperientialism fades, and the panpsychist approach is 
revealed as grandiose “system building”  (Strawson 2006a, 262).  We need a universe 
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 At least under Strawson’s panexperientialism (Strawson 2006a & 2006b). 
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with much fewer assumptions than a panpsychist requires; in the future, experience will 
be successfully reduced to the physical.  Strawson’s weak panexperientialism leaves us 
with a counterintuitive and rather crowded universe with ultimates as experiencing 
subjects.   If we pursue Strawson’s pure panexperientialism, then we have a universe 
lacking the non-experiential (i.e., the physical), an equally counterintuitive universe.  The 
problem is that Strawson has taken up residence in a small French flat with a comfy 
armchair, using only First Philosophy to determine the truth of reality.  Of course, 
Strawson would accuse me of embracing a naturalistic tenet and he would be right.  I 
make the assumption that any theory offered to solve the mind-body problem must be 
confirmed by science.  Thus any appeal to mystery or transcendental argumentation must 
be rejected.  Strawson just hasn’t given us a theory with that sort of benefit.  It is true that 
panpsychist and panexperiential theorists do not have to worry about where 
consciousness comes from.  This is an essential aspect of my thesis.  But when Strawson 
reaches the position of rejecting the law of non-contradiction (which he is inclined to do) 
or embracing a thesis of physical specialism or the non-reality of the physical, the 
explanation of an origin of consciousness is outweighed by the overall cost of the theory.  
 Science generally rejects the notion that experience is fundamental to the 
universe.  As stated in chapter one, the prevailing worldview is mental specialism—that 
there are very few entities in the universe that have experience.  Panpsychism, while not 
contradictory to science and naturalism, is neither necessary for either science or 
naturalism to embrace, nor is it particularly attractive to science or naturalism.  If 
panpsychism is true, then there must be an additional existent in the universe.  This 
existent, under Strawson’s ontology, is a subject of experience that is identical to its 
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experiences.  Experience has been famously elusive to science and observation.  Thus, 
panpsychism posits a fundamental existent that is beyond the ken of science.  Science 
must expand to include a fundamental yet hidden aspect of the universe.  Yet, according 
to Goff and Strawson, we cannot know how this fundamental existent allows our higher-
order subjective experiences to emerge.  The only advantage that I can determine is that 
we know where experience comes from—despite not knowing how or being able to 
detect these fundamental existents.  It is little wonder that science and naturalism do not 
rush to embrace this sort of panpsychism—nor do I. 
 I agree that the above characterization of panpsychism must be rejected.  
However, there is an acceptable panpsychic hypothetical solution to the mind-body 
problem that is at least on par with the hypothesis heretofore considered.  The answer is a 
naturalized panpsychism, a panpsychism adhering to the naturalistic principles outlined 
in chapter two.   First and foremost, if a panpsychic theory posits entities that are outside 
the natural world whose actions cannot be understood as part of the natural world, then 
the theory must be rejected.  Panpsychic entities must obey the principle of causal 
closure.  Panpsychic entities must be predictable and accountable within our scientific 
community.  Such entities must be, at least in theory, observable—either indirectly or 
directly—by science.  It will be the task of science to test a panpsychic hypothesis.  It is, 
of course, the place of science and not of first philosophy to determine the validity of a 
panpsychic hypothesis.
63
  Finally, metaphysical commitments must be kept to a 
                                                          
63
 Conformity with a deeply held, competing hypothesis is not an acceptable criterion by with which to 
judge a panpsychic—or any new—hypothesis.  While it is the place of science to ultimately judge the 
merits of any ontological theory, it is the theorists’ ultimate responsibility to ensure that the judgment that 
science produces is fair.  Obviously, scientific experiments and investigations are performed by individuals 
that may be prejudiced against certain hypotheses, especially hypotheses that do not fall within those 
individual’s preconceptions. 
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minimum, following the rule of allowing substantial advancement toward resolutions of 
dilemmas or facilitating further investigations into reality.  This is the outline of a 
naturalized panpsychism.  So, if possible, a panpsychic theorist needs to provide an 
empirical solution to the combination problem, or at least a solution conducive to our 
empirical commitments regarding experience.   The success of this proposed solution is 
not ultimately necessary.  If a truly empirical solution is proposed yet fails, the 
plausibility of an eventual empirical solution increases, and thus the plausibility of a 
naturalized panpsychism increases.   
 In the following discussion I shall offer just such a solution to the combination 
problem, a solution that does not, in the end, rely on any sort of mysteriousness.  I will 
explain the process by which proto-experiences combine to produce higher-order 
experiences without reference to vague relationships or transcendental appeals.  It will be 
through this solution that I will also delineate the basic features of my panpsychic 
hypothesis.  My solution and my panpsychic hypothesis adopt Giulio Tononi’s theory, 
according to which experience is integrated information (Tononi 2008).  However, note 
that Tononi correlates the amount of consciousness of a system to the amount of 
integrated information of a system and how that system integrates information.  He 
claims that his theory is consistent with many of our observations regarding the 
correlation of consciousness with neural processes (Tononi 2008, 216).  Tononi denies 
that his hypothesis is  panpsychic  (Tononi 2008, 236).  Nevertheless, his theory is 
certainly amiable to panpsychicism.  Thus, I maintain that proto-consciousness, the lower 
level constituent of experience, is information.  When information is integrated within a 
system, we have consciousness, and—potentially—human experience.   Tononi’s 
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hypothesis, when suitably explained, will provide us not only with an empirical solution 
to the combination problem but will eventually provide the basis for a naturalized 
panpsychism. 
 
3.2 Towards a Naturalized Panpsychism 
 
 
 
3.2.0 Important Points from the Preceding Section 
 
 
 
 The primary finding from our discussion of Goff and Strawson is that any appeal 
to mysteriousness, faith-based assumptions, or transcendental arguments must be rejected 
as ultimately unsatisfactory.  I assume the naturalist disposition of a minimalist 
metaphysics, necessary to any adequate philosophic theory, and thus any theory over-
burdened with metaphysical assumptions must be rejected.  Nevertheless, if a panpsychic 
theorist cannot offer a clear explanation for the appearance of higher-level mental 
properties superior to current physical theories, then panpsychism must be abandoned.  
The reason for this is that panpsychism is not merely an assumption that works within the 
current scientific conception but entails at the very least the acceptance of a new 
fundamental property in the universe, thus requiring a modicum of alteration to scientific 
dogma.  If the best that a panpsychist can do is offer either a transcendental argument or 
resort to a doctrine of mysteriousness, then the panpsychist fails to make any advance on 
the mind-body problem.  Any theory must provide and advance new avenues of debate.  
Failing this, panpsychism is only a metaphysical dead-end.   
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 I have argued that physicalism assumes mental specialism without any real 
support, other than that physicalism’s systems is built upon it.  It is this assumption that 
leads to the commitment that mental properties emerge from essentially non-mental 
properties.  Mental specialism and panpsychism are both metaphysical assumptions, yet it 
is panpsychism that challenges the established ontology.  It may be true, as David 
Skribina claims, that physicalism “has made a mess” of the investigation of the mind.64  It 
must also be equally admitted that in just about every other area of investigation of 
reality, physicalism and the naturalist research program have explained more and allowed 
for more consensus than any a priori investigation.  Science’s dossier of successes 
strongly advocates physicalism’s plausibility.  For this reason, any panpsychic theory 
must strive for the clarity and standards of an empirical theory.  Since any appeals to 
mysteriousness or reliance on transcendental argumentation are unacceptable to science, 
they must be unacceptable to the panpsychist, excluding the tenets of metaphysical 
minimalism. 
 Next, what is clear is that we must reject the principle of the transparency of the 
mental (TM) and Strawson’s partial revelation thesis (PR), and therefore return to the 
preferred role of introspection in the investigation of the mind.  TM leads to a particularly 
intractable version of the combination problem.  PR either leads to the intuitively 
implausible pure panpsychism or leads to the renewed plausibility of a physicalist 
account of the mind, in which experience emerges from a physical basis.  Thus, neither 
TM nor PR achieves a new understanding of experience mostly because each blocks an 
                                                          
64
 It is interesting to note that physicalists claim that Cartesian Dualism, the near opposite of physicalism, 
similarly made a “mess” of the investigation of the mind.  Just what is meant by a “mess” is and who 
makes it is quite subjective. 
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empirical contribution to the mind-body debate.   Finally both TM and PR violate the 
core concept of naturalism, namely, that science must be the final arbiter on issues on the 
mind.  This must be rejected. If it is introspection that provides insight into the essential 
nature of experience, then due to its subjectivity, science cannot delve into the nature of 
the mind, as Thomas Nagel demonstrated (Nagel 1974).  Both TM and PR entail that 
experience can only be investigated via introspection.  And PR, which does not lead to 
pure panpsychism demands a physicalist application.
65
   
 Third, we must reject ultimates as subjects of experience.  This thesis is strongly 
supernatural and violates the lex parsimoniae.  First, as I stated in chapter two, I accept 
Stroud’s definition of supernatural, namely any agent or force that stands outside the 
familiar natural world and whose operations can’t be explained as part of the familiar 
natural world (Stroud 2004).  It is one thing to posit a property not currently recognized 
or accepted by the scientific and analytic community, but it is quite another to posit a 
property whose existence cannot remotely be understood according to our current 
conceptual systems.  Ultimates, like strings or energy or electrons, have no 
representational apparatus with which to have experience.
66
  If something like a string, 
having barely any structure, could experience, as Strawson claims, it would be something 
akin to the miraculous.  This is because science could not explain how a subject 
experiences that lacks any sort of the required complexity for experience.  Thus, science 
                                                          
65 Yet behind TM there is a principle that is responsible for TM’s apparent plausibility.  There is something 
we know about experience simply by having it, namely the ‘what-it-is-like’ of a particular experience.  The 
phenomenal feel of an experience is essential to that particular experience but it is not essential to the 
nature of experience in general.  As a subject of experience one’s experience has a particular ‘feel’, but this 
feel gives no insight into the experience’s origin or its constituents, only into the particular experience’s 
particular character.  Introspection will in fact provide valuable information into the character of one’s 
experiences but not to the nature of experience in general.   
66
 Sam Coleman makes a similar critique in Being Realistic: Why Physicalism May Entail 
Panexperientialism (Coleman 2006). 
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could not determine whether something like a string or an electron or even a rock is 
experiencing, let alone the character of said experience.  If it is beyond the ken of 
science, then it must be abandoned.  The situation is even less acceptable if it is asserted 
that the subject is a thin subject of experience, as does Strawson, where the subject and 
the experience are not ontologically distinct.  Subjects that we have experience with are 
what Strawson calls traditional subjects, subjects that are distinct from their experiences 
(Strawson 2006a, 192-193).  This is significant, because we apparently lack the cognitive 
background to understand, let alone provide a clear exposition, of what it means to have a 
subject identical to its experience or provide an explanation of how such a subject exists 
and operates.  To accept ultimates as subjects of experience requires commitment to a 
new category of subject-hood, a category cloaked in mysteriousness and beyond the ken 
of science.  To draw on Strawson, ultimates as thin experiencing subjects might be clear 
to God’s physics, but they just boggle the human mind (Strawson 2006a, 15). 
 Luckily, Strawson’s special subjects are not necessary to posit.  Granted, 
Strawson rightly asserts that experience necessitates an agent; experience is an 
experience for something (Strawson 2006a, 189).  If ultimates were an act of 
experiencing, then some sort of subject-hood for experience would be necessary to posit.   
But, Strawson wrongly holds that ultimates must be an act of experiencing.  Strawson 
defends panpsychism by rejecting brute emergentism, emergence in which the emergent 
property has no basis in the emergent base.  Let us examine this example of proper 
emergence offered by Strawson, namely H2O and liquidity.   
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Liquidity is often proposed as a translucent example of an emergent 
phenomenon, and the facts seem straightforward.  Liquidity is not a 
characteristic of individual H2O molecules.  Nor is it a characteristic of 
the ultimates of which H2O molecules are composed.  Yet when you put 
many H2O molecules together they constitute a liquid in certain 
temperatures, at least, the constitute something liquid.  So liquidity is a 
truly emergent property of certain groups of H2O molecules.  It is not 
there at the bottom of things, and then it is there. (Strawson 2006a, 13) 
Strawson calls the example of liquidity emergence “shiningly easy to grasp” (Strawson 
2006a, 13).  What I wish to highlight is that the emergent property of liquidity is not 
actually present in individual H2O molecules or its constituents, as Strawson well notes.  
In any sort of emergence that we can comprehend, the emergent property is not present in 
the emergent base.  What are present are the conditions that will give rise to the emergent 
property.  Note that it is not that the property of liquidity cannot emerge from something 
lacking the property of liquidity itself.  As Strawson says, liquidity is not a characteristic 
of individual H2O molecules.  So, liquidity does emerge from non-liquidity.  Yet he 
advances an unwarranted assertion that experience cannot come from something wholly 
non-experiential (Strawson 2006a, 24).  Now if he means that experience must emerge 
from a base constituted in such a way as to produce it, then that is certainly correct and 
in-line with his examples and known emergence.  But the assertion that experience must 
come from an emergent base that is an experience itself contradicts both Strawson’s 
examples, the description of the desired explanation of experiential emergence, and 
known emergence.  All that is necessary is a properly constituted base, a proto-
consciousness.  So, positing such a strange entity as Strawson’s thin-subjects is 
unnecessary.  What is sufficient is an ultimate that is a proto-experience which combines 
particularly into complex entities with mechanisms of representation and information-
processing.  To be clear, I am not asserting that proto-consciousness is a low-level 
experience on a continuum of experience, but that proto-conscious is merely the building 
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block of experience that is not itself experiential, much as H2O is the base of liquidity 
without itself exhibiting liquidness.  These proto-experiential ultimates may in fact be 
present and be some of the basic, even quantum, constituents of the universe, but fail to 
produce human or mammal experience unless certain conditions are met, conditions that 
may even now be described by neuroscience.  This panpsychism is consistent with the 
findings of neuroscience and empirical science. 
 Finally, we need to reflect on the nature of proto-experience.  Our project is to 
explain the nature of experience itself via proto-experience.  The thesis that the 
“phenomenal feel” is the essential nature of experience has been rejected, as has been the 
thesis that panpsychic ultimates are “experiencing.”  Combined with our commitment 
against mysteriousness, a new explanation of the nature of proto-experience and its 
relation to experience is needed.   This explanation must be as open to empirical 
investigation as possible.  It is clear that this explanation cannot be a reduction to the 
physical, since our thesis entails that the mental is independent from the physical.  
Experience exists as its own phenomenon.  As a panpsychist thesis, proto-experience 
must be a fundamental property of reality—that is, it must have its own causal efficacy 
(described in chapter two) and a description independent of any other fundamental 
property.  It is also clear that proto-experience, though ontologically independent from 
physical properties, must have an intrinsic connection with some physical property.  
These two properties, proto-experience and physicality, will be coextensive—that is, 
unable to be separated in the single space-time event in which they occur—yet they 
cannot be empirically or logically reduced to one or the other.  Explanations of higher-
level mental properties must rely, at least partially, on reference to proto-experience.   
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 There is a theory of experience that may meet our needs outlined above.  The 
theory is the identification of consciousness with integrated information (II), or the 
Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness (IITC), mentioned above (Tononi 2008).  
The theory is an identity theory.  Tononi himself denies that IITC is a panpsychic theory, 
and while the theory may not perfectly fit our version of panpsychism or specifically 
meet all of our needs for a panpsychic theory, I will show that IITC is amiable to 
panpsychism and that Tononi’s basic tenets can be successfully developed into a 
satisfactory scientific panpsychism (Tononi 2008).  Thus, in what follows I shall first 
provide an exposition of IITC.  Then I shall discuss: 1) Tononi’s position on 
panpsychism, 2) the compatibility of IITC with panpsychism and how it meets our needs 
to develop a working panpsychic theory, and 3) application of our expanded panpsychic 
theory to the combination theory, formulating a solution that avoids the problems that 
plague both Goff and Strawson. 
3.2.1 Exposition of Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness 
 
 
 
 IITC advances that consciousness just is integrated information (II) (Tononi 
2008).  Integrated information (II) is the amount of information produced by a complex 
of elements () above and beyond the information produced by its parts.  More 
concisely, 1) the quantity of consciousness equates to the amount of II produced by ; 
the quality of consciousness is determined by the set of informational relationships 
generated within one mechanism (Tononi 2008, 216).  Information is the reduction of 
uncertainty within a given system; reduction of uncertainty is the elimination of 
alternatives in a given configuration.  The more alternatives that are eliminated, the more 
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uncertainty is reduced and the more information produced.  Thus, simple machines have 
informational states and even some integration in their connections that can solve no-zero 
, but this simplicity keeps information, low so that it possesses a minimal consciousness 
or is minimally experiential.
67
  Under II, though, simple diodes are conscious to the 
degree of one bit, which is not even remotely near human consciousness.  A human brain 
involves a vastly greater amount of information, because connections and states are on 
the order of billions and have vastly greater amounts of alternatives.  What is more, the 
integration of neurons is high such that humans have a much higher quantity of II and a 
much higher grade of consciousness than simple machines.  Further, simple machines 
may discriminate many alternatives depending on their size, but have only a minimal 
amount of integrated information.  A highly-developed mammal’s brain is highly 
connected, much like a web in which the states of a particular neuron resonates with 
thousands of other neurons, guaranteeing a high level of  (Tononi 2008, 216). 
 The quality of a particular experience is a result of the set of informational 
relationships contributing to integration that a system’s mechanisms produce.  
Experiences have a particular quality.  Discriminating a particular experience is a matter 
of picking an experience out of a group of alternatives but distinguishing at once, in a 
special way, between every alternative.  The mechanisms of a neural complex work in 
conjunction, contributing their own information to the system as a whole, above and 
beyond the sum of their own information (Tononi 2008, 224).  II is produced by these 
mechanisms generating information.  These mechanisms produce information, which the 
mechanisms contribute in a specific relationship between said mechanisms.  A web of 
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 Minimal consciousness is still a higher-order mental property and so is not proto-consciousness. 
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informational connections exists between a complex’s mechanisms.  This web Tononi 
calls “Q-space.”  Experience is a “shape” in Q-space.  IITC holds that this shape 
determines the quality of a complex’s experience.  So, the specific ways that the various 
mechanisms communicate determine the quality of an experience.  Different experiences 
result from different mechanisms communicating in different paths (Tononi 2008, 224-
227).   
 Tononi argues for IITC with two thought experiments, both comparing human 
conscious systems with unconscious systems: a photodiode and a camera.  Tononi uses 
the example of a photodiode and a human discerning between a lighted screen and a 
darkened one to draw out the difference between the non-conscious and the conscious.  
The photodiode can discern when the screen is lighted and when it is not, but it isn’t and 
cannot be conscious of the screen’s state.68  The difference is the amount of information 
that is generated by a human compared to a photodiode.  The photodiode generates one 
bit of information corresponding to the one alternative that it eliminates.  But, a higher-
order organism like a human being eliminates vastly, perhaps un-calculable, amounts of 
information.  This generates the higher-order consciousness of the human being, why 
there is “something-it-is-like” at the conscious level.  It follows that the degree of 
experience corresponds to the degree of discrimination a subject is able to perform when 
interacting with the environment, or with one’s own states.   
 This model seems to fit well with our common-sense view of development within 
higher-order experiencing species and the continuum of experience from less complex 
                                                          
68
 I wish to draw attention to the fact that I use the term “conscious” rather than “experience”, in which I 
mean that the photodiode cannot have higher-order experience of the screen’s state.  However, I leave open 
the possibility that the photodiode has lower-order experience of the type attributed to ultimates. 
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organisms to more complex organisms.  We commonly view the experiential states of 
later-term fetuses and infants, though existing, to be of a lesser degree or less complex 
than a developed adult.  A developed adult is simply conscious of more things and to a 
greater degree than a newborn.  IITC explains this intuition well.  The fetus and newborn 
have fewer alternatives with which to discriminate between events of their environment.  
Their mechanisms have a basic ability (due to lack of development) to discriminate and 
generate information.  The degree of consciousness of a sea slug is lower than that of a 
bat, because the sea slug’s mechanisms of discrimination are less developed and a slug 
has fewer alternatives.  
 But mere discrimination, thought to be essential for experience, does not account 
for the subject-hood of experience.  A camera, for instance, can discriminate many 
different events in an environment, but it still lacks consciousness (Tononi 2008, 218).  
Tononi asks: what is the difference between the camera and an entity that has 
consciousness?  The difference is that the information in conscious entities is integrated, 
but not so in the camera.  The camera does not have a point of view.  The camera 
generates bits of information that are independent of each other, information that lacks 
integration into a whole, and it does so in a way that the complex has more information 
that the sum of its parts.  In a human being, however, information fits together like a 
entirely unique puzzle.  When information-discriminators connect and discriminate as a 
whole, integration occurs.  Take the cones and rods in an eye, Cn and Rn.  Let us consider 
these nodes as information-discriminators, much like a photodiode.  Let us suppose that, 
like a photodiode, the cones and rods only have two options to discriminate, X or Y.  
Consciousness arises not from the mere discrimination between X or Y between the 
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separate cones and rods in Cn and Rn, but from the causal relationships between C1, 
C2…Cn and R1, R2…Rn discriminated from the history and full repertoire of a 
discriminator’s possible alternatives.  The full repertoire of possible alternatives of 
discrimination generates high integrated information and hence high subject-hood or 
experience. 
 The qualitative “feel” of an experience, the “what-it-is-like” is an aspect of how 
integrated information is generated (Tononi 2008, 224).  First, Tononi must hold that the 
feel of experience, between more-and-less complex discriminators, is a matter of degree.  
The quality of experience is a matter of the relationship of information generated by the 
discriminating mechanism.  Within a particular human mental life,
69
 a person’s 
memories, sensations, thoughts, beliefs—the entirety of one’s psyche—is connected via 
associations that connect particular mental events with other events.  The reason for this 
connection seems to be, originally, that particular mental events occur together, and thus 
the association is created by this causal connection of sequence.  That the relationships 
between specific instances of information, to which Tononi refers as generating the 
qualitative feel of consciousness, are best understood in terms of this association.  Thanks 
to how information is originally acquired and the spatial and temporal connections 
between different bits of information, and the similarity between the information and 
other stored information, causal connections are formed.  The best evidence for this is 
that we experience within a web of mental or neural events.  It is generating integrated 
information from this web that produces the quantity and quality of consciousness.     
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 I use this term to denote the entirety of a person’s psyche, including memories, sub-consciousness, 
beliefs, etc. 
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3.2.1.1 On Any Similarities between IITC and Panpsychism 
 
 
 
 Tononi’s discussion of any similarities between IITC and panpsychism is brief 
and terse.  Tononi understands panpsychism primarily as a doctrine that “holds that 
everything in the universe has some kind of consciousness” (236).  I call this the All-
thesis.  Presumably panpsychists attribute consciousness not just to living things, but also 
to cars, rocks, socks, frocks, electrons, strings, gravity, mass, violins, and all other 
existents.  While “some kind of consciousness” is vague, it signifies that Tononi confuses 
panpsychists with panexperientialists like Strawson.  Tononi is committed to holding that 
photodiodes and other like systems that have informational states are, in a miniscule 
amount at least, conscious (Tononi 2008, 236).  Unlike Strawson and other 
panexperientialists, Tononi requires a functional mechanism for consciousness, a point 
with which I agree.    
 Tononi’s notes three faults with panpsychism (Tononi 2008, 236).  First, it has no 
conceptual foundation, being merely an avenue to circumvent dualism. So, it is not really 
a theory in its own right.  Second, it offers no guidance when seeking a way to determine 
what does and does not have consciousness and just what degree of consciousness the 
former enjoy.  Third, panpsychism cannot explain the character of particular experiences.  
Objections two and three are powerful, because these are two questions that a successful 
theory of mind must answer.  But it is unclear whether Tononi cites these objections to 
distinguish IITC from panpsychism or to argue against panpsychism itself.  Tononi 
certainly believes that IITC can answer these objections, but if IITC is a form of 
panpsychism or could be adapted to fit a panpsychic theory, then these objections would 
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be nullified.  So, the real issue separating IITC and panpsychism is the all-thesis.  Since 
the All-thesis is more closely affiliated with pan-experientialism rather than 
panpsychism, interpreting IITC as a panpsychic hypothesis is plausible. 
3.2.1.2 Interpreting IITC as a Panpsychic Theory 
 
 
 
 My version of panpsychism—naturalized panpsychism (NP)—holds that mental 
properties are fundamental properties:  irreducible properties with their own causal 
efficacy.  These properties appear throughout the universe, but it is not necessary that 
every single physical property has a corresponding mental property, though every event 
will have both. There is a possibility that there is a physical property that lacks an 
intrinsic connection to a mental property. “Fundamental property” does not entail that 
every single existent has that property, only that the property cannot be explained via 
some other property, much like gravity cannot be described via mass or electrical charge.  
Mental properties are also ontologically independent from the basic physical constituents 
of reality, so mental properties do not depend on physical properties for their nature.  
Finally, higher-level mental properties emerge from lower-level, more basic mental 
properties, much as  liquidity emerges from H2O.   Mental properties, according to NP, 
are not equivalent to experiential properties.  Experiential properties are certainly a type 
of mental property.  Experiential properties are higher-level mental properties that 
emerge from proto-consciousness much like liquidity from H2O.  Thus, not every 
existent, under NP, experiences.  So, NP rejects the All-thesis.  NP holds that for 
experience, whether gnat, human, or suitably complex robot, a representational or 
functional apparatus—the mechanism by which discrimination of alternatives occurs—is 
 116 
necessary.  The representational apparatus, however, is not sufficient.  It needs proto-
conscious properties for experience to emerge.  NP holds that proto-consciousness is 
information.  To spell out this identification I shall first provide an analysis of Tononi’s 
two examples of a photodiode and a camera. 
 A photodiode is a simple light sensor reacting to the light or dark state of, for 
example, a luminescent device.  In Tononi’s example, the photodiode has two possible 
internal states:  light (S) and dark (~S).  By “internal” I mean present or occurring within 
a system—in this case the photodiode—or within one of the parts of a system.  These two 
internal photodiode states respond to the two possible states of the luminescent device 
external to the photodiode, either light (L) or dark (~L).  These two states are external to 
the photodiode though the photodiode could easily distinguish between its own internal 
states.  The luminescent device and photodiode could occur within a larger system.  If L 
obtains, then within the photodiode S obtains; if ~L, then ~S obtains.  I shall denote this 
relationship as:  (LS)v(~L~S).  The internal states of the photodiode will change iff 
the actual state of affairs change in the world.  Prior to the change between states S and 
~S, the photodiode is “uncertain” about the actual state of affairs of L or ~L.  When the 
internal state of affairs obtains between S and ~S, uncertainty is reduced, and one bit of 
information is produced.  So, a system distinguishing between one state of affairs rather 
than another is the reduction of uncertainty and thus production of information.  There 
are only two states within a photodiode that can obtain—light or dark—so it eliminates 
only one alternative.    Systems with robust experience, such as humans, eliminate many 
more alternatives and generate many more bits of information than a photodiode (218).  
Producing higher-levels of experience is not merely a matter of combining more 
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photodiodes.   Unless a system of discrimination mechanisms are integrated, high levels 
of consciousness and subject-hood do not arise.  Tononi offers an example of a camera 
with detectors able to distinguish between 2
1,000,000
 alternate states.  This equals to one 
million bits of information (218).  The camera is not an integrated system; its information 
bits do not have a connection between its mechanisms, because its photodiodes are 
isolated from each other and do not communicate with each other.  The brain, as a 
system, causally interacts, producing an integrated system with subject-hood (219).  So, 
when a particular state obtains, such as ~S, not only are more alternatives eliminated 
within the system, but also alternatives are eliminated by the system’s discrimination 
mechanisms en masse.    
 The above discussion demonstrates the compatibility of information and proto-
consciousness and their provisional identification.  First, information is not contingent on 
a particular physical instantiation.  L and ~L are not information states but states of 
affairs in the world.  In the case of either L or ~L, they can be explained by reference to 
the physical states of their constituents.  L and ~L reduce.  S and ~S may be distinguished 
by many diverse systems.  Tononi compares the systems of the photodiode and the 
human in terms of distinguishing between an “on” or “off” state as equivalent, or nearly 
so (217).  The one bit of information is the same.  So, between S and ~S, if ~L obtains in 
the world, then ~S obtains within the system.   A particular set of physical constituents is 
not necessary to reduce the uncertainty of  S and ~S to ~S.  Some sort of physical 
instantiation is necessary, but the one bit of information is not contingent merely on a 
certain physical construction.  For instance, let us say that there are four systems 
watching the luminescent device above:  a photodiode, a film with different chemicals 
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which react to light or darkness, a system that measures wavelengths of light, and a 
human being.   Let us further suppose that a particular state of affairs obtains, ~L.  Each 
of the above four systems react and discriminate between alternatives to reduce the 
uncertainty of S and ~S to ~S.  That bit of information is the same between all four 
systems.  Further, it seems likely, depending on the complexity of a given system, that 
the physical base of information may change within a system.  For instance, a camera that 
is part of a computer may have multiple types of recording devices with which to convert 
the information.  So, information is not contingent on its particular physical 
instantiations.  Assuredly information needs some sort of physical basis to exist, but its 
nature is not determined by that base.  Moreover, that a physical base is a physical 
instantiation of a particular bit of information depends more on the bit of information 
than on the physical base.  So as a whole event, both informational property and physical 
property are necessary.   Next, it follows that information cannot be reduced to its 
physical base.  The above four systems have different physical bases expressing the bit of 
information corresponding to ~S, yet the bit of information is the same.  What this 
implies is that the physical base of information is practically limitless.  Merely looking at 
the physical base will not provide the nature of that bit of information.  Not only is 
reduction of information to a physical base improbable, but a description of information 
must be given in terms of information and not in some other mode of description.  
Finally, if we accept the possibility of communicating information either between 
mechanisms within a particular system or between individual systems, we have also to 
accept that information has causal efficacy.  If a particular bit of information, I, is 
irreducible to its physical base, then the physical base therefore cannot cause another 
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physical base to instantiate I, especially if physical bases are of varying sorts—that is, 
ranging from sound waves to electrical impulses in the brain or from music on vinyl 
records to digital recordings.  If we hold that the music is the same between the vinyl 
record and the digital recording, but the particular physical configuration of the vinyl 
record and the digital recording are different, then there seems to be something over and 
above the vinyl record that is the music. 
 Thus, information is a plausible candidate for proto-consciousness.  Just how 
profuse information is in the universe will depend on just how profuse are systems able to 
discriminate between alternatives, thus reducing uncertainty.  So, a system is a system of 
discrimination that generates information if it answers to the description of a photodiode 
mentioned above, namely (LS)v(~L~S).  I venture that (LS)v(~L~S) provides 
both necessary and sufficient conditions for an information system.  It does not seem 
necessary that a system be intended by an agent to be an information system, since this 
would rule out any natural system, such as a human   information system.  We also 
cannot rule out non-living systems as information systems, since that would rule out 
computers, which are obviously information systems.  (LS)v(~L~S) can describe 
many diverse phenomena, phenomena that are not normally considered to be conscious.  
I hypothesize that (FG)v(~F~G) can apply to tree rings, to mechanical devices such 
as cars and thermostats, to surfaces reflecting and absorbing light, to the ice records of 
glaciers, to phosphorous compounds and to camera film.  Tononi states that his theory 
“implies that even a binary photodiode is not completely unconscious, but rather enjoys 
exactly 1 bit of consciousness” (236).  “One bit of consciousness” is not any sort of 
consciousness that can be successfully imagined.  Otherwise there would be a point of 
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view, a subject-hood of one bit of consciousness.  But there is no attribution of human 
qualities to cars and like objects.  Human consciousness is not attributed to these objects, 
but I will suspend this discussion until later.  It is enough at this point to conclude along 
with Tononi that information and information systems are more profuse than isolated 
corners of the universe (233). 
 The more important question is whether information is fundamental to the 
universe.  We have shown that information has its own causal efficacy, and that 
information is independent of any other description, such as a physical description.  But, 
one may object, do we need to include an account of information for a complete 
understanding of the universe?  One may argue that a complete understanding of the 
universe does not require an account of consciousness since the universe may not have 
contained conscious existents.  The same could be asserted about information.  Of course, 
we could similarly assert that the universe could lack any of its existents, such as strings, 
mass, gravity, or electrical charge.  Our universe, however, does include such things as 
gravity, electrical charge, consciousness, and information.  Granted, it is possible that 
information did not exist and thus would not be necessary for a complete account of the 
universe.
70
  But the point is that information does exist.  If it cannot be reduced to some 
other phenomena, then it requires its own account and is a property of the universe in its 
own right, thus and fundamental.   
 Tononi discusses II as a fundamental property in much the same terms as I have 
above.  The identification of consciousness with II, Tononi claims, has ontological 
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 In some explanations of the universe, however, the basis of the universe itself is information and so there 
would be no universe without information (Moyer 2012; Bekenstein 2007).   
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consequences, and I believe these consequences to be quite deep.  II is as fundamental as 
mass, charge and energy, which seems to entail that II is as basic to the universe or as 
essential a part of it as mass and the other fundamental properties (233).  The typical 
view of the universe reduces it to the properties of mass, charge, energy, and the other 
various elements.  We see the universe as large complexes of mass, charge, and energy 
(233).  Tononi suggests that the ontological consequences of IITC implies that we see the 
universe as populated by II, because II cannot be reduced or understood in terms of mere 
conglomerates of mass, charge and energy.  Tononi writes: 
However, if consciousness (i.e., integrated information) exists as a 
fundamental property, an equally valid view of the universe is this:  a 
vast empty space that contains mostly nothing and occasionally just 
specks of integrated information ()—mere dust, indeed—even there 
where the mass charge-energy perspective reveals huge conglomerates.  
On the other hand, one small corner of the known universe contains a 
remarkable concentration of extremely bright entities (where brightness 
reflects high ), order of magnitude bright than anything around them 
(233). 
Thus, large concentrations of matter do not necessitate large concentrations of II.  II 
cannot be reduced to mere physical descriptions.  Tononi asserts that as long as there are 
functional mechanisms in a certain state, information must exist as II (233).
71
  By 
“fundamental” Tononi holds that II is an essential part of the universe that cannot be 
reduced to the mere matter of the functional mechanism.  To have II is for a mechanism 
to be in a state that can only be described via reference to information.  
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3.2.1.2 The Combination Problem and the Integrated Information Theory of 
Consciousness 
 
 
 
 Beginning his refutation of the summing of mental states, Phillip Goff writes the 
following: 
Consider a physical ultimate that feels slightly pained, call it LITTLE 
PAIN 1.  Consider ten such slightly pained ultimates, LITTLE PAIN 1, 
LITTLE PAIN 2, etc., coming together to constitute a severely pained 
macroscopic thing, call it BIG PAIN.  The pained-ness of each of the 
ultimates comes together to constitute the pained-ness of BIG PAIN:  
an entity that feels ten times the pain of each LITTLE PAIN.  The 
severe pained-ness of BIG PAIN is wholly constituted by the slight 
pained-ness of all the LITTLE PAINS. (P. Goff 2006, 57) 
 “No-Summing-of-Subjects” (NSS) denies that LITTLE PAIN1, LITTLE PAIN2, etc., 
sum to necessitate BIG PAIN.  NSS leaves open the possibility, however, that LITTLE 
PAIN1, LITTLE PAIN2 enter into a relationship to necessitate BIG PAIN.  Higher-level 
mental properties are not mere collections of more basic, lower-level mental states.  
Higher-level mental properties are a result of proto-conscious ultimates entering into a 
certain relationship with a given system.  Articulating this relationship is the solution to 
the combination problem.  This solution is readily available under Integrated Information 
Theory, which means that combination simply is information integration.  IIT identifies 
consciousness with an “emergent function.”  An emergent function is not merely an 
activity of a thing or what a thing does but a function of various components that 
combine to produce a new property, for example the emergence of liquidity.   Behavior is 
not an emergent function, because behavior is the response of a thing to its environment 
or to input from an internal source.  No new property is produced.  Integration brings 
elements together, and now they function as a system resulting in a new property.  
 123 
 A pain discriminator system (PDS) is much the same sort of mechanism as a 
photodiode, which is a system that receives input from an external state of affairs (in this 
case, a chemical state of affairs), discriminates between the inputs to produce an internal 
state, and then communicates which internal state obtains.  The photodiode that Tononi 
discusses is a solitary system, but it could be easily considered to be a part of a greater 
system, as in the camera thought experiment.  The PDS example like the camera thought 
experiment, but let us begin with explaining the generation of a LITTLE PAIN (LP).   
 A PDS has a sensor which responds to the chemical states of a system external to 
this particular PDS.  Thus the system external to the PDS may be part of a larger and 
more complex system that contains both the PDS and the external system.  Let us call the 
external system Cell A.  For simplicity’s sake, let us say that Cell A has only two states, 
chemical state and no chemical state, C and ~C.  PDS is designed to respond S1 when C 
obtains or S2 when ~C obtains.  S1 and S2 is each one bit of information and are integrated 
into a system, because the actual state of affairs has been distinguished between 
alternatives.  This one bit of information corresponds to one bit of experience.  LITTLE 
PAIN1 can be represented as:  (CS)1.   
 The phenomenal character of LITTLE PAIN1 is determined by the relationships 
between a system’s mechanisms.  A complex system such as a person has a multitude of 
systems which communicate with each other, make connections with each other and 
distinguish between states of affairs with an inconceivably greater number of alternatives 
than a mere photodiode or even a PDS.  So, PDS1 discriminates (CS)1, or LITTLE 
PAIN1.  Considering the aggregate of LITTLE PAIN1, LITTLE PAIN2,…LITTLE 
PAIN10, LITTLE PAINS1-10  enter into an information relationship discriminated against 
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a range of alternatives, An, by a range of discriminatory mechanisms, DMn.  It is this act 
of An by DMn that discriminates LITTLE PAINS1-10 to BIG PAIN .   
 Tononi notes that damage to different parts of the cerebral cortex will eliminate 
different properties of a person’s overall experience (224).  This may support and at least 
provide a mode of research into the above conception of combination.  Consider 
particular brain damage, for instance the story of a Russian soldier who, after receiving a 
head-wound that resulted in damage to various parts of his brain, lost all ability to 
remember (in the normal sense of remember) his past life.  His past life was not 
retrievable consciously.  Yet, the soldier could write his biography by hand.  Blind-sight 
patients also seem to support this approach to combination.  Blind-sight patients cannot 
consciously “see” certain aspect of their visual field, yet can, at times, answer visually-
based questions about what they are not consciously seeing.  If we interpret these 
instances as certain discriminatory mechanisms failing to enter into information 
relationships, then in the case of the Russian soldier, the cognitive discriminatory 
mechanisms and the memory mechanisms could no longer communicate due to damage 
to the connection between the two—though there remained an information relationship 
between memory and writing mechanisms.  Blind-sight patients likewise are missing 
information relationships between mechanisms.  If this is accurate, a conscious field as a 
whole is a result of discriminatory mechanisms entering into information relationships, or 
a result of the account of combination.  
 Earlier in the chapter I noted that Seager and Allen-Hermanson offer a corollary 
problem to the combination problem.  Granted that higher-level mental properties, such 
as consciousness, emerge from lower-level mental properties, such as Strawson’s 
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ultimates, why don’t higher-level mental properties combine into even higher-level 
mental properties?
72
  At first it would seem that naturalized panpsychism (NP) is not 
susceptible to this objection, because NP does not posit Strawsonian ultimates—that is, 
experience that is a subject of experience.  NP posits proto-consciousness, ultimates that 
are so constituted to combine unlike higher-level mental properties that are not so 
constituted.  But this tactic is unavailable, because LITTLE PAINs, higher-level mental 
properties, combine to give rise to BIG PAIN.  Even though neither LITTLE PAIN nor 
BIG PAIN are subjects of experience, one may reasonably expect an answer to Seager 
and Allen-Hermanson.  However, the problem is only dire if ultimates are subjects of 
experience, for it would follow that higher-level subjects of experience, such as a person, 
would also combine.  But, according to NP, ultimates and higher-level mental properties 
are not subjects but properties of an event.  Further, NP is committed to the thesis that 
combination only occurs within specific self-contained systems and not across systems.  
It is possible to have systems as parts of other systems, but these parts would be 
configured as parts and are not self-contained.  Yet, in a very important sense, NP holds 
that no mental property of a system is closed but may continually expand.  The 
connections of neurons in a human brain are in the billions.  A particular informational 
state may be analyzed, compared and computed in billions of different modes within such 
a complex system.  No thought is closed, but n fact possesses vast possibilities to be 
expanded.  If one allows the communication of thoughts between systems and times, the 
possibilities for new analysis, comparisons, computations, and conceptions are practically 
infinite.  NP allows and explains the openness of mental properties and, I venture, argues 
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 Mental-from-physical emergence does not have this problem because the emergent base is dissimilar 
from the emergent property.  The problem for panpsychism arises due to the similarity of base and 
emergent.  Both should have the same properties, because they are the same sort of property. 
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against a mere physical association of mental properties, because the possibilities of 
physical properties are closed.   
3.2.2 Possible Objections 
 
 
 
3.2.2.1 Objection One:  Naturalized Panpsychism is Merely Physicalism by Another 
Name 
 
 
 
 One might ask, but isn’t this just physicalism?  Aren’t information and integrated 
information contingent upon physical states and facts?  There is no reason to turn to a 
pan-theory at all:  simply apply IIT to the problem of emergence, and physicalism is 
vindicated.  It would be pedantic of me, perhaps, to point out that such concerns are 
beyond the scope of this chapter.  As it stands I have provided a hypothesis to explain the 
relationship between ultimates such that a higher-order experiential state emerges.  The 
hypothesis may fail, but my aim was to provide a suggestion for how a pan-theory may 
address the mysteriousness of Goff’s solution to the combination problem.  One might 
ask, why information and not just integrated information?  Information is a direct and 
integral constituent of integrated information in addition to certain relation-states.  
Integrated information just is information in certain relationships.  So, if information is an 
aspect of the universe but not reducible to physical facts, it follows that integrated 
information has irreducible and thus fundamental constituents.  This result is sufficient 
evidence to claim that physicalism and naturalized panpsychism are not interchangeable.  
This objection is beyond the scope of my discussion at this time, but I will gesture toward 
what I consider to be the beginning of an answer. 
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 I think it will be granted to me that a given bit of information can be stored and 
communicated in many different mediums, such as chemical, magnetic, electrical, 
optical, crystalline, synapses, vibrations, DNA, bones, tree rings, ice, and earth, to name a 
few.  First, it is perfectly consistent with my hypothesis that experience and 
consciousness will need some form of physical mechanism.  After all, an event is 
constituted by both a physical and experiential existence. This fact does not entail that 
physical facts determine facts about consciousness or that consciousness is reducible to 
the physical mechanism (or that a physical system) or even a given set of physical 
systems,
73
 necessitates conscious states or all aspects of a conscious state.  Information 
seems to possess a certain freedom from physical determination.  Consider a certain 
environmental state of the world, call it .  The state of the world  is a certain set of 
conditions, N.  N is information that is in turn recorded in multiple sources, like tree 
rings, ice, the bones of animals, soil, etc.  N can eventually be “read” from sources 
which recorded N.  Let us call this I.  Granted, some information will be lost but some 
will not.  Even though , the original physical conditions of N, is no longer existent, a 
portion of the information has survived.  Now, if physical conditions (i.e. ) fully 
necessitated I, then I could not survive without .  In some way, then, I is not fully 
necessitated by its physical conditions and is thus in some way unable to be reduced to 
physical facts.   
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 I refer to disjunctive statements where logical behaviorism attempted. 
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3.2.22 Objection Two:  Information Isn’t Fundamental 
 
 
 
 Anthony Peressini denies that II is “fundamental” and “intrinsic’, holding that 
Tononi’s claim is actually that II is an observer-independent (i.e., real) quality (Peressini 
17).  II does not act like a fundamental property, according to Peressini.  He says about II 
behavior that: 
it is the behavior of higher-level, functional, organizational, relational, 
or even “emergent” properties.  Thus, in a strict philosophical sense, 
like fitness, II is relational (not intrinsic) and higher-level (not 
fundamental), though still an objective property (Peressini n.d., 17).   
Fundamental properties can be found at all the various levels of reality, while II can be 
found only at a higher-level where there are complexes.  II is a property of complexes but 
not of the complex’s parts, while fundamental properties like mass are present and equal 
in the whole and in the sum of the parts (Peressini n.d., 17). 
 The property that I argue to be fundamental, however, is not II or consciousness.  
II is indeed an emergent property and thus would not be fundamental.  Rather, the 
fundamental property is the proto-conscious, or information.  So my question is, can we 
understand information as a fundamental property?  I suspect Peressini will answer in the 
negative, arguing that: if we consider the bit of information produced by the photodiode 
as (LS)v(~L~S), it is clear that information is both an emergent property and a 
relational property.  It is also clear that the parts of the photodiode do not have portions of 
the bit of information of the photodiode system.  The photodiode as a given system has 
the property of information solely due to the interaction of the photodiode with the 
illuminated screen, though not in the same fashion as liquidity emerging from H2O.  
Liquidity requires specific elements.  One can also imagine a change in particular 
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elements without a change in the bit of information.    The defining aspect in the rise of 
the bit of information is the interaction between systems rather than the constituting 
elements of those systems.  (LS)v(~L~S) is relational and the operation of complex 
systems, at least as complex as a photodiode.   
 But this is not the sense of “fundamental” that is important for my argument.  
Peressini notes that there are two senses of the term “fundamental”:  the mass-sense of 
fundamental and the fitness-sense of fundamental.  The fitness-sense is fundamental as an 
explanation is fundamental, in, say, population genetics and evolutionary biology.  
Fitness is theoretically indispensible or irreducible in the explanation of these disciplines 
(Peressini n.d., 17).  II, Peressini claims correctly, possesses this sense of fundamentality.  
The issue arises as to whether this sense of fundamental is sufficient for NP.  The notion 
of fundamentality that we have been working with has been that of irreducible properties 
with their own causal efficacy.  Of course, proposition two of NP holds that proto-
consciousness is ontologically independent, and this would entail that supervenience if 
forbidden.  Ontological independence equates to non-contingency on the physical, and I 
have described above why a physical explanation cannot explain information. Proposition 
one of NP, however, equates to Peressini’s claim concerning the fundamental nature of 
fitness.  The sense of fundamental that we seek is in fact irreducible as an explanation of 
the phenomena of consciousness where causation is taken as explanation.  This is just the 
sense of fundamental that Peressini suggests.  But it is clear that NP is not merely an 
explanatory thesis but an ontological thesis positing the mental as a fundamental property 
of the universe, as evidenced by propositions two and three of NP.  But for my present 
purposes it is enough to note that, while this is a significant problem with Tononi’s 
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argument, developing an empirical answer to the combination problem can proceed 
without establishing the fundamentality of information.  Thus NP requires a strong 
ontological sense of “fundamental.”  Peressini’s analysis threatens the NP project, yet I 
cannot attempt reconciliation here.  I shall revisit this objection, and other objections 
posed by Peressini, in chapter four. 
3.2.2.3 Objection Three:  Naturalized Panpsychism Cannot Fill the Explanatory Gap 
 
 
 
 The main problem with physicalist emergentism, according to Strawson, is that 
their explanation for experience is brute, or a miracle.  The emergent foundation has no 
explanatory value when predicting the existence and character of experience.  This is an 
expression of the explanatory gap problem, which is basically that there exists a missing 
step between a complete description of human physiology and an explanation of 
experience.  An opponent of physicalism, Strawson asserts that the explanatory gap 
cannot be closed, because the emergent base is considered wholly non-experiential.   
There is no explanatory gap within other emergent relationships, such as liquidity and 
H2O.  A complete description of the chemical composition of H2O molecules and their 
relationship to each other offers a complete explanation of the liquidity of water.  This 
example of emergence, and others similar to it, are necessary; the emergent foundation 
entails the existence of the particular property (Carruthers and Schechter 2006, 33).  But 
complete accounts of human physiology do not entail the existence or character of mental 
properties.  There is a disconnect between these phenomenon.  The issue is that any 
physicalist/functional explanation of consciousness seems to be missing some aspect that 
provides for the necessity of reductive explanations for those inherent properties in the 
 131 
reductions of water to H2O.    Strawson asserts, as we have discussed prior, that assuming 
panpsychism, that the emergent base is experiential, solves this problem.  But as 
Carruthers and Schechter argue, Strawson’s resort to panpsychism—and any resort to 
panpsychism—fails to bridge the explanatory gap.  
 Carruthers and Schechter object to Strawson indirectly by arguing against a 
weaker and more plausible version of panpsychism.  Instead of Strawson’s problematic 
panpsychism in which ultimates are subjects of experience, Carruthers and Schechter 
evaluate the theory that ultimates are qualia bearing, having properties that are 
responsible for the phenomenological “feel” of our experience  (Carruthers and Schechter 
2006, 36).  Attacking Strawson directly, Carruthers and Schechter imply, would only 
concern one unlikely theory rather than panpsychism as a whole.  Their first evaluation is 
that panpsychism can only bridge the gap if the experientiality of ultimates that constitute 
a higher-order mental property is clearly known (Carruthers and Schechter 2006, 36-37).  
This seems obvious, especially if we consider Strawson’s example of liquidity and 
reduction.  The reason the reduction of liquidity to the properties of H2O works is due to 
the transparency of these molecules and their properties.  There is no explanatory gap, 
because we understand all aspects of the emergence.  The experientiality of the ultimates 
is not able to be known via introspection, since we do not have access even to the mere 
physical properties of the ultimates that constitute us.  The only mental properties that we 
have access to are our higher-level mental properties (Carruthers and Schechter 2006, 36-
37).   
 Carruthers and Schechter claim that even if we grant knowledge of ultimates’ 
qualia, panpsychism still does nothing to bridge the explanatory gap.  First, we must note 
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that when considering successful reductions in science (such as heat to molecular 
movement, water to H2O, liquidity to the properties of H2O, lightning to electrical 
discharge, or thunder to the expansion of air heated by a lightning discharge) if one 
understands the properties and reduction, one cannot help but find it necessary to identify 
the emergent property and the emergent foundation.  True, someone ignorant of science 
and molecular chemistry, or who failed or did not take a basic high school science class 
may deny that thunder is the expansion of air heated by a lightning discharge and claim 
that it is angels bowling.  But any educated individual you simply cannot deny, even 
when hearing if for the first time, that every instance of thunder is an instance of air 
expanding due to a lightning discharge.  This is not the case for panpsychic ultimates and 
higher-order mental properties.  There is no entailment that is forced upon us by this 
reduction, according to Carruthers and Schechter, even if complete knowledge of 
experiential ultimates is granted.  Philosophic zombies—humans that are prefect physical 
replicas of conscious humans yet are unconscious—are still conceivable because the 
reduction is incomplete in that it lacks that command of necessity (Carruthers and 
Schechter 2006, 37-39).   
  Even though NP is substantially different standard form panpsychism, I admit that 
NP has not established the necessity to bridge the explanatory gap.  But I do not think this 
is particularly harmful.  Observe that I have been offering an a priori discussion.  The 
explanatory gap preys particularly on metaphysical theories—theories lacking in the 
empirical research that establishes and supports the instances of reduction that we have 
mentioned.  What is going to bridge the explanatory gap, if anything will, will be 
empirical research like the research that established the reduction of water to H2O.  What 
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I have done is to offer a hypothesis that may, with empirical research offer new topics for 
research and discussion, if not eventually bridge the explanatory gap.  It is my contention 
that metaphysical solutions to the explanatory gap will always be doomed to fail simply 
because the gap is not really between phenomenal and physical concepts, but depends on 
metaphysical reasoning which produces a hypothesis and empirical research which either 
affirms or falsifies the hypothesis by showing why the hypothesis holds necessarily.  We 
should note that if all we had were metaphysical reasoning supporting the reduction of 
thunder to air expanding to a lightning strike, the reduction would lack the necessity to 
prevent the thought experiments separating the two phenomena.  But I will assert that if 
NP is verified through empirical evidence, then it will have closed the explanatory gap.   
3.3 Conclusion  
 
 
 
  According to NP, which adopts Giulio Tononi’s project, consciousness just is 
integrated information.   As will be argued in chapter four, consciousness is identified 
with subjective experience, something-it-is-like (SIL), and qualitative experience (Q)—
all make a qualitative experience a qualitative experience.  So, integrated information just 
is SIL and Q.  Integrated information (II) is the amount of information produced by a 
complex system above and beyond the information produced by its parts.  Information is 
the reduction of uncertainty by a system.  So, in any system that reduces any uncertainty, 
one bit is the least amount of information able to be produced:  it integrates information 
and thus is conscious on par with the number of bits of information produced.  More 
concisely, (1) the quantity of consciousness is equal to the amount of II produced by a 
system and (2) the quality of consciousness is determined by the set of informational 
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relationships generated within one mechanism (Tononi 2008, 216).  Proto-consciousness, 
I posit, is information.  Information (i.e., proto-consciousness) is fundamental to the 
universe and is the element that is so constituted to produce full consciousness in 
complex systems, much like fundamental, micro-level properties are so constituted to 
produce macro-level properties.
74
  The photodiode, as Tononi and as I am committed to 
it, is conscious to the degree of one bit, or however many bits of information that the 
system produces. This basic consciousness is nothing like human consciousness.  Human 
brains produce millions of bits of information in a complex system that interacts in the 
form of information relationships to produce the quale of particular conscious properties.   
  Information occurs only within the context of a system.  While information must 
have an inherent connection to a physical property, the character of that information is 
not contingent on the character of the physical property.  So, a physical explanation of the 
system will not provide an explanation of the information occurring within that system.  
A particular bit of information can only be explained in terms of information.  
Information has been identified with proto-consciousness, and so the nature of any 
mental property, in some fashion, will be information.  Combined with the commitment 
to event neutral-monism, it follows that some events are constituted by both mental (i.e., 
proto-consciousness) and physical properties, and some are constituted only by physical 
properties.  The difference between the two—events constituted by physical properties 
(i.e., simple events) and the mental/physical property constituted events (complex 
events)—is that latter are systems in which information occurs and the former are not.  
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 I heartily concede that the fundamentality of information is a controversial point, but it is such a massive 
point that I offer only precursory arguments with the intent to pursue the matter further in chapter four. 
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The nature of information precludes events with only mental properties.  This may seem 
to give the physical priority in the constitution of the universe, but it does not.  Even if 
the physical was given priority, it would not endanger NP.   Many fundamental 
properties, such as mass, gravity, or electrical charge, require an intrinsic connection with 
physical properties, and some, like electrical charges, are absent in some objects, such as 
tachyons.  So, events, like brains, have mental and physical properties, and some, like 
rocks, have only physical properties.  So, systems are events composed of several 
fundamental properties, mass, electrical charge, and mental properties, as well as physical 
properties.  Physical properties, thus, are the basis through which fundamental properties 
occur.  It is these fundamental properties that give physical properties definition, or make 
the physical property this sort of physical property. 
 How profuse are mental properties in the universe according to NP?  Traditional 
panpsychism holds that everything physical is conscious (this is the all-ness principle).  
Such a thesis, however is intuitively unpalatable, smacks of supernaturalism, and, I think, 
would forever make the nature of consciousness beyond the reach of science.  First, let us 
accept the commitment from Peressini and others that consciousness is constituted by a 
phenomenal quality and a subjective quality, a feel and a self-hood.
75
  So, if everything 
physical is conscious, then everything physical not only experiences a phenomenal 
quality, such as itchiness, but also has the sense that the itchiness has a “mine-ness.”   
Take a physical ultimate, say a string.  As a physical thing, the string is conscious in that 
it experiences, say itchiness, and that the itchiness has a “mine-ness” or is the strings.  Let 
us grant this position.  From this, it is clear that the phenomenal and subjective quality of 
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consciousness cannot be due to brains neurons.  Nor can the typical organs of sensation 
have a role, since strings have no sense organs.  We are quickly entering the realm of 
magic where science has no place.  Science cannot make sense of sensation without sense 
organs and nor can selves without a representational apparatus.  Let us grant the thesis 
that consciousness is on a continuum and thus that some physical things have a bare 
minimum of consciousness.  Does this help the traditional panpsychist?  No.  Let us say 
we can measure consciousness from one to one-hundred percent.  Let us say a human is 
one-hundred percent conscious.  In that case, the string has one percent of consciousness.  
But to be conscious at all there must be a “feel” and a “mine-ness.”  So, a human and a 
string both have the same experience, say the increased gravity and slowed time of a 
singularity, say heaviness.  There is the feel of the heaviness and the mine-ness of the 
experience.  The string has one percent of the heaviness and mine-ness that a human 
does.  It is not that the gravity has less pull nor that the experience is less mine of either 
entity.  The experience of the string is not one percent its own and ninety-nine percent the 
human’s.  One could say one-percent means that it only has one percent access to its 
environment, but then why would a human have more?  It could not be due to the 
human’s complexity or organs, because the string has one percent access to its 
environment without any complexity or organs or anything whatsoever.  One could 
suppose that the string is a self-experiencing-self such that the phenomenal feel is the 
mine-ness and vice-versa—that one percent consciousness is the feel of mine-ness.  This 
is close to Strawson’s view on ultimates (2006a).  But this view cuts off the ultimate’s 
connection with its environment, at least experientially, from the rest of the universe.  
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One is naturally moved to ask, if the ultimate has no connection with anything external to 
it, then how it can combine experientially to form higher-level experiences?   
 NP rejects the all-ness principle as unscientific and supernatural.  Information 
(i.e., mentality) is system-dependent so that the profuseness of the mental is in proportion 
to the number systems in the universe.  As said earlier, the basic system is:  
[(LS)v(~L~S)].  So, any events that can meet this description will posses mental 
properties.  However, we must note that this does not require commitment to mental 
specialism—that the mental is an aberration in the universe.  In so far that the universe is 
the type of universe that it is, the mental (that is, at least proto-conscious) has to be a part 
of it, because the universe given its form due to its fundamental properties, proto-
conscious included.   
 I have offered a combined theory of panpsychicism and II in order to offer a 
transparent and empirical solution to the combination problem, or how mental properties 
emerge from constituting mental properties.  Constituting mental properties do not mix, 
sum, or “build” the next higher mental property, but rather mechanisms for 
discrimination, such as a PDS, when registering different constitutive mental properties, 
enter into a new internal state that equates to a new mental property.  This is integration.  
This system works due to the intrinsic and non-contingent connection that a mental 
property has with a physical property to form a  space-time event.   
 The way that I have answered the combination problem, by combining NP with 
IITC, I have similarly combined the fate of NP with that of IITC, but not the reverse.  If 
Tononi’s project fails, NP’s solution to the combination problem, at least, fails.  Without 
 138 
a sufficiently empirical solution to the combination problem, NP fails.  So much depends 
on the connection between NP and IITC.  An objection to Tononi’s theory was 
mentioned above.  This objection states that II is neither a fundamental nor an intrinsic 
property.  Peressini’s reasoning was discussed in that section, but it follows that if II is 
not a fundamental entity, then neither is information.  Since proto-consciousness must be 
a fundamental property (if Peressini is correct) NP cannot connect to IIT.  Peressini also 
objects that Tononi’ identification is false, consciousness cannot be identified with II.  
Tononi confuses the notion of consciousness, conflating qualia and consciousness.  At 
best Tononi offers a theory of the nature of qualia—that is, the qualitative feel of an 
experience.  I am going to take up Peressini’s objection in the next chapter.  My only 
wish here is to note the necessity to defend IITC. 
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Chapter 4 
Objections to Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness, Replies 
 
 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
 
 
 In the last chapter, I offered a solution to the combination problem, which is 
traditionally seen as the major stumbling block for a successful panpsychic theory.  The 
combination problem highlights the difficulty in positing that higher-level mental 
properties emerge from foundational lower-level mental properties, or ultimates.  Most 
previously attempted solutions either relied on transcendental arguments or end up in 
some type of mysteriousness, a claim that a solution necessarily precluded.  Earlier I 
proposed a solution that implemented Guilio Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory of 
Consciousness (ITTC).  Consciousness is integrated information, according to Tononi.  I 
argued that within Tononi’s framework, identifying proto-consciousness (mental 
ultimates) with information allows for a mental-from-mental emergence because the 
integrated information (which is consciousness for Tononi) emerges from (non-
integrated) information (i.e., proto-conscious mental ultimates) because of the integrated 
structure of the brain.   My solution is dependent on IITC, and there are philosophic 
concerns with this theory, as illustrated by Anthony Peressini in his article 
“Consciousness as Integrated Infomration: a Provisional Philosophical Critique” 
(forthcoming). 
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4.1 Synopsis of the Present Chapter  
 
 
 
 In this chapter I will first describe Peressini’s objections to IITC and their 
ramifications.  I will offer a general summary of Peressini’s article.  Following a more 
detailed discussion of Peressini’s objections to IITC, I will argue that Peressini’s division 
of qualitative experience and subjective experience is not warranted.  I argue that 
introspection and conceptual distinctions (that is, being able to talk about phenomena as 
if they are different) are problematic.  Such modes of distinction can be made fairly 
arbitrarily and require some form of criteria to ensure that such distinctions are 
ontological distinctions and are not fabricated merely for manageability.  One can 
certainly deal with two aspects of a phenomenon, say color qualitative experience and 
perspective qualitative experience, but that does not mean that there are two different 
types of experiences as such.  Next I show how discussions of qualia are oversimplified, 
because the focus on only a single aspect of a whole experience—that is a manifold of 
experience.  When experience is considered in its entirety, subjective experience is but 
seen as a type of qualitative experience.   
 I then argue that information, and thus proto-consciousness, is intrinsic to a 
system.  I establish information’s intrinsic-ness by demonstrating that information meets 
the basic intuition about the “intrinsic”: namely, that if an informational system was in a 
lonely universe (that is, if it was the only existent), that system would still have 
information.  Then I argue that information is fundamental by utilizing Galen Strawson’s 
argument that emergent experience requires an emergent base that is fundamentally 
mental (Strawson 2006a).  Next I argue that information is fundamental if one considers 
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its role in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics.  Finally I explain that since 
full-blown consciousness is, in fact, an arrangement of fundamental properties, it has the 
theoretical and ontological strength to carry IITC’s basic propositions.   
4.2.0 Tononi’s “Ambiguity of Consciousness” and its Ramifications 
 
 
 
 Peressini’s concerns regarding Guilio Tononi’s integrated information theory of 
consciousness (IITC) focus on the concepts of consciousness and qualia, and on whether 
the IITC uses them in a consistent and plausible way.  Tononi is definitely unclear in his 
use of the term “consciousness” when he states: 
Everybody knows what consciousness is:  it is what vanishes every night when we fall 
into dreamless sleep and reappears when we wake up or when we dream.  It is also all we 
are and all we have:  Lose consciousness and, as far as you are concerned, your own self 
and the entire world dissolve into nothingness (216). 
This is the clearest Tononi is in his use of “consciousness.”  While it is true that everyone 
is familiar with their own conscious states, this certainly does not help to impart a 
theoretical understanding.  It is not sufficient for a theory of consciousness.  Tononi’s 
confusion is not unique in this regard, as Peressini notes (forthcoming, 11).  The best 
Tononi can offer, according to Peressini, is an account of qualia, the qualitative aspects of 
experience (17).
76
   Peressini also questions Tononi’s understanding of integrated 
information (II) and thus of consciousness as a fundamental and intrinsic property.  
Peressini compares mass and II and finds little congruence between the two (25-30).  
                                                          
76
  When an experiencer has an experience, say the taste of Foldgers coffee in the morning, the way the 
taste of the coffee appears to one is the coffee quale.  Peressini notes the following features of qualia:  
practically ineffable, non-relational, non-public, and having  immediate access for the particular subject 
(forthcoming , 12).  I do not accept the preceding features as characterizing a quale.  The feature “non-
relational” is not included in other significant philosophy work such as Johnsen (1997) and Tye (2002).  I 
follow Johnsen’s characterization of qualia as “the way things seem to us”, and agree that no more is 
needed to understand or state the nature of qualia (1997, 54).  
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Tononi misunderstands II to be a fundamental property, like mass.  II is a relational and 
higher-level property (27).  II, Peressini suggests, is better understood as a property such 
as fitness (26).  Fitness has a fundamental explanatory role in such phenomena as 
population genetics and evolutionary biology.  Fitness is fundamental in the sense that it 
is theoretically indispensible or irreducible.  So, II is only explanatorily fundamental and 
still supervenes on lower-level physical properties (27).  At this point in his assessment, 
Peressini abandons IITC and argues that Tononi’s best chance for a contribution to the 
mind/body debate is on the qualia front, namely with an integrated information theory of 
qualia (IITQ).  This is Tononi’s best bet according to Peressini.  However, if Tononi’s 
program is going to work in general, II has to be fundamental in the sense of non-identity 
or irreducibility to physical properties (27).  Peressini explains that this sense of 
fundamental cannot do the work that Tononi needs it to do for the IITC project, but the 
comparatively modest project of IITQ has theoretical and empirical promise.  IITQ 
simply does not have the problems that plague IITC.  For instance, Tononi simply does 
not have enough evidence connecting consciousness and II.  Further, Tononi 
unconvincingly characterizes II as a fundamental/intrinsic property, whereas both II and 
consciousness seem to be emergent properties.  This leads to the consequence that 
consciousness is an indefinite property, a property that will be measured differently 
depending on the level on which one focuses.  Thus, any designation of level of 
description of the brain as conscious will be drawn arbitrarily.  IITQ simply does not 
have these needs.  First, Tononi makes a more convincing case for II as qualia or 
qualitative experience.  Further, since qualia are not quantitative but qualitative, 
measurements of qualia are not as important as with consciousness.  Finally, the theorist 
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is able to use subjective experience to define qualitative experience, to determine just 
what “grain size” equates to consciousness.  Since measuring the quantity of II is relative 
to the grain size focused upon, just which level can be pinned as the “level of 
consciousness” becomes problematic.  Without some principle of determination, any 
level chosen or any amount of II chosen would be chosen arbitrarily. 
 Naturalized panpsychism could accept Peressini’s modification of Tononi’s 
theory.  NP and IITQ are reconcilable.  By embracing IITQ, NP could still retain its 
solution to the combination problem.  The combination of proto-consciousness with 
produce qualitative experiences is fully explicable under IITQ.  This in itself is a 
philosophic feat.  Further, that II is not fundamental except in an explanatory sense is of 
no real import to NP, because NP holds that information itself is fundamental—not II.  
NP can hold that the subjective aspect of experience is a different problem from the 
concern of an NP interpretation of qualitative experience.  To tackle the problems 
separately is not a sign of failure, because a great deal of progress has been made by 
separating problems into manageable tasks.  The real issue, however, is that thus far IITC 
has done the real philosophic work.  One would be justified, so far, to ask, why NP?  
Why not merely IITC?  NP does have an important contribution to this philosophic 
project, which I shall demonstrate by rejecting Peressini’s division of qualitative and 
subject experience. 
 As stated above, Tononi is not clear in his characterization of “consciousness.”  
Peressini proposes understanding “consciousness” as “something-it-is-like-to-be”—that 
is a particular being (forthcoming, 11).  Peressini notes two sorts of problems in the 
pursuit of a theory of consciousness: the problem of what makes an entity a subjective 
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experiencer (SIL)
 77
  and what makes a particular state a qualitative state (Q) (12).  
Peressini presses the importance of keeping the two queries separate.  To be precise, 
Peressini argues that SIL is not the same as Q, that SIL is about the subjective character 
of consciousness, and qualia is about the qualitative character of consciousness.   
 The point of Peressini’s distinction is that Tononi not only moves between SIL 
and Q, but also takes the property of being conscious as identical to having Q 
(forthcoming, 14).  Peressini illustrates the equivocation in Tononi’s necessary for the 
identification of consciousness and II.  Two reasons are offered in support of II.  First, 
there is a correlation between the amount of II and the presence of consciousness.  
Second, the qualitative aspects of consciousness can be mathematically modeled so that 
many properties of conscious experience are captured by the formal properties of the 
model (14).  The latter reason addresses Q, but the former is Tononi’s attempt to address 
SIL, however Tononi confuses SIL and the property of having qualitative states as one 
and the same property (14-15).  As a way to interpret Tononi’s account, Peressini 
suggests that Tononi advances a reduction of SIL to the sum total of all qualitative states 
experienced at a given time.  Since this eliminates or ignores the subjectivity of 
consciousness, it is unattractive, and Peressini wonders how this approach differs from 
eliminative materialism (15).
78
  The best hope for Tononi’s theory is to reduce its scope, 
changing it from a theory about consciousness to a theory about the nature of qualia (15).  
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 See (Nagel 1974).  Peressini abbreviates “something-it-is-like” as SIL(x).  I shall use this abbreviation 
SIL.   
78
 See Peressini, endnote #16. 
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4.2.1 Peressini’s Argument for the Move from IITC to IITQ 
 
 
 
 According to Peressini, Tononi’s argument, either: 1) does not directly deal with 
SIL, by confusing SIL with the property of having qualitative states, or by conflating SIL 
and Q into one entity, or 2) offers an argument that poorly defends the identification of 
SIL with II.  Either way, without adequately arguing for the identification between SIL 
and II, IITC fails as a theory for consciousness, but it may be adequate for the 
identification of Q and II.  First, Tononi’s argument, reconstructed above, does not 
support that II equals the subject of conscious experience, but instead that II equals qualia 
(17).  A proponent of Tononi’s project would have to offer an account how of having 
qualia entails a subject of experience.  Such a proponent must establish either (a) that II 
rich complexes are themselves subjects of experience or necessarily part of such a 
subject, or (b) that there is no entailment between having qualia and being a subject of 
experience (17).  Neither option is promising, nor does Tononi’s argument seem to have 
the strength to establish II rich complexes s subjects of experience.   
 Pace Peressini, Tononi does offer evidence for the identification of SIL with II in 
the form of the thought experiments described in my third chapter.  I shall not repeat an 
exposition of those two thought experiments here.  Suffice it to say that Tononi hopes to 
establish his thesis by reasoning that the unity of one’s phenomenal experience is 
irreducible and holistic.  For neural systems high in II are irreducible to components and 
are essentially connected to their components on pain of inexistence.  Peressini rightly 
notes that such argumentation establishes only a limited quantity of awareness and is 
generally too weak to support Tononi’s identity claim (18).   
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 So, Tononi simply does not have the evidence or argumentation to establish 
consciousness equals  II.  But he does have a case for identifying qualia with II.  
Peressini’s best reason to reject IITC and to adopt IITQ is that IITQ opens up scientific 
investigation, much like the successful empirical investigations of the mind have 
occurred by bracketing off memory and therefore from other topics in the general 
investigation of the mental.  Viewing Tononi’s project as IITQ allows for the same sort of 
bracketing as occurred in the case of memory, possibly allowing for similar advances in 
qualia, all the while bracketing the question of what makes qualia experience part of a 
conscious experiencer.   
4.2.2 Fundamental and Intrinsic Property Argument for IITQ 
 
 
 
 Tononi’s II proposal reduces consciousness to informational properties and not 
neurological properties, sidestepping the intuition that qualitative properties cannot be 
reduced to physical properties.  In order for such a reduction to work, Peressini points 
out, II must be fundamental in at least the sense that II is irreducible to physical 
properties (27).   The best candidate for a kind of fundamentality for II is explanatory 
fundamentality, not the ontological fundamentality that Tononi needs.  II simply does not 
resemble familiar ontologically fundamental properties, for two reasons.  First, II is found 
only at higher-levels of reality in which complexes exist, so II does not exist at lower 
levels of reality.  Traditionally, fundamental properties are understood to exist at all 
levels of existence, as in the case of mass or electrical charge.  Second, II is a relational 
property, while traditional fundamental properties are not (Peressini, 26).  II is best 
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thought of as a relational, emergent property, because it depends crucially on the relations 
among components, and on any intrinsic properties of such components (Peressini, 27). 
 Peressini argues that the real threat to identity of consciousness and II is the 
relativity of II to the framework one uses to measure II.  The same amount of II is not 
generated on all spatio-temporal measuring scales.  When measuring the II of a given 
system, different answers are obtained at different levels, because the amount of II is 
relative to the scale of measurement.  II is not a definitive property, but a relative one.  
This undercuts Tononi’s project because another explanation must be introduced, which 
will be the “key” to consciousness, one that defines consciousness as this level and not 
any other levels.  So, any designation of consciousness at this level, without said “key”, 
will be an arbitrary principle demanding further justification (Peressini, 28).  These 
criticisms leveled against understanding consciousness as II are not so devastating for an 
account of qualia.  First, there is support for qualia as non-intrinsic properties.
79
  Second, 
since qualia are essentially qualitative and not quantitative, the multi-level indefiniteness 
plaguing II as consciousness does not similarly plague an account of II as qualia, because 
indefiniteness enters only in the attempt to quantify the amount of consciousness 
(Peressini, 29). 
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 Peressini refers to Johnsen (1997), Nikolinakos (1994), and Tye (2007) in (footnote 24 forthcoming, 38). 
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4.3.0 Rejecting Peressini’s Distinction between Qualitative and Subjective 
Experience; The “What it is Like” Just Is “What it is Like for Me”  
 
 
 
 Before moving on to my objections to Peressini, I wish to make the subject of our 
discussion clear.  First, by “subjective experience” I do not mean a sense of self or a 
relation of one’s self to one’s history.  Subjective experience is an aspect of other 
experiences where the experiences are “felt” to belong, but do not specifically belong to a 
“me” are felt to have a sense of “mine-ness.”  This phenomenon, I assert, is best 
understood as a unity of consciousness, as something separate it from a sense of “me-
ness.” I do not deny a conceptual distinction between subjective experience and 
qualitative experience.  One can talk as if these two are separate quite readily, as can one 
talk about one’s psyche and oneself as separate.  I make the assumption that merely being 
able to talk as if two things are separate does not prove that they actually are.  Nor does 
not being able to talk about two things separately demonstrate that there is only one thing.  
Finally, I assume that while introspection may give us insights into our psyche, before 
any distinctions may be made by appeal to introspection, there must be some criteria to 
determine valid and invalid distinctions. 
 Peressini’s main argument against IITC and in support of IITQ centers upon the 
distinction between qualitative experience and subjective experience.   Peressini sums up 
his position as follows:  “The point I am urging both philosophers and scientists to 
recognize is that the problem of subjective experience (i.e., SIL-consciousness) ought not 
to be thought of as identical to the problem of qualia” (13).  Peressini’s assessment 
depends upon this distinction.   Yet the support for this distinction is weak at best.  
Peressini remarks that, despite the fact that consciousness and qualia are often taken as 
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one problem, “It isn’t obvious that the problem of what makes an organism a subjective 
experience in Nagel’s sense (i.e., SIL-consciousness) and the problem of what makes a 
state a qualitative state (i.e., qualia) are so simply related” (12).80  Granted, it isn’t 
obvious that the two problems are identical.  Yet, if it isn’t obvious that they are identical, 
then it also isn’t obvious that they are not.  The main support for Peressini’s distinction 
seems to be that he is in good company; he mentions Leopold Stubenberg (1998) (who 
actually argues against Peressini’s distinction) and Michael Beaton (2009).  My point is 
that Peressini makes this distinction with little argumentation, making his distinction 
arbitrary without something more.  Peressini may make an appeal to introspection, 
namely that when we introspect we experience our subjectivity as something different 
from our qualitative states.  This seems to me to lead to an explosion of different 
problems for investigation.  Could we not make a distinction between all sorts of 
experiences?  For instance, visual qualitative states are different from inner bodily 
qualitative states, sense of equilibrium states, recognitional qualitative states, or 
qualitative states of well being, sound qualitative states, and sense of self qualitative 
states:  a full blown sense of character and history.  I can speak conceptually about my 
emotional qualitative states without referring to my visual qualitative states.  Temporal 
qualitative states seem to be sufficiently different from visual qualitative states to warrant 
a new “problem” of experience.  My point is that, depending on what a theorist wants, 
different aspects of experience can be peeled off from each other.  Without some sort of 
criteria to govern the distinctions from introspection, the distinctions seem to be arbitrary 
or contrived.   Peressini could also make an appeal to what the terms mean and suggest 
that these different meanings imply different referents.  There is no evidence that the 
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 Emphasis Peressini’s. 
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terms “qualitative experience” and “subjective experience” refer to the same object. This 
brings me to my second observation.  Mere ability to talk about a phenomenon as 
comprised of different phenomena does not necessitate that the two are actually different 
phenomena or problems.  Nor does introspection lead to such separateness unless some 
further criteria are established.  No, it may certainly be the case that it is useful to handle 
consciousness as two problems, qualitative and subjective, but such usefulness does not 
establish an actual distinction. 
 Researchers characteristically oversimplify discussions of qualia; they speak of a 
red quale, a blue quale, etc. even though (unless an individual is locked in an entirely red 
room without thoughts, textile sensation, the ability to hear—even one’s own bodily 
processes like pulse—and so forth) qualia never appear so isolated.  When considering 
isolated qualia, which are almost always visual, and SIL, the two seem more distinct than 
they actually are.  Or, the distinction between qualitative consciousness and subjective 
consciousness does not hold when qualitative states are fully explicated.  First, conscious 
beings (like humans) are experiencing almost the entirety of their lives.  True, dreamless 
sleep may signal a complete loss of consciousness, but this is not a sleeper’s complete 
experience (Tononi 2008, 216).  Sleepers also dream and experience during sleep.  A 
qualitative state of consciousness has an incalculable amount of qualia and is a virtual 
tapestry of qualia.  What types of qualia are there?  We can distinguish between external 
and internal qualia.  External qualia are qualia concerning outer objects, like red stop 
signs and blue walls.  External qualia are not necessarily the same as sensations.  There 
are secondary objects, like Tom and Mike, ships and cars, trees and shrubberies.  There 
are also depth-qualia and distance-qualia.  There are also time-qualia, but time qualia like 
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“present-experience”, seems to be both external and internal.  Anything that appears in a 
certain way will have a quale.  Now, internal qualia are qualia originating from within the 
limits of a body and of inner thoughts, including various “mental” or “abstract” entities 
such as numbers and laws of nature.  General experiences, such as the experience of 
experiencing, should be considered internal.  It may be impossible to denote all the 
composite parts of a particular experience, but what is necessary to note is that an 
experience is comprised of a great deal of qualia, and part of the nature of each of these 
quale is the fact that the quale has an intrinsic connection to other qualia.  No being has a 
qualitative experience of merely a “red quale,” but a qualitative experience is something 
that is connected at least to internal qualitative composites.  To be a subject with a red 
quale is to be a subject experiencing itself experiencing a red quale.  A subject that 
experiences also experiences experiencing.  In fact, the primary qualitative experience 
will most likely be internal qualitative composites of an experience.  It is no wonder that 
one would take the unity of qualitative experience and the qualitative experience of a 
unity as at least separate types of qualitative experience which demands a different 
discussion.  It may be useful to peel off a solitary quale for a particular discussion, but the 
fact of the matter is that a solitary red-quale is not a qualitative experience, but only a 
small part of an experience.  The qualitative state of consciousness is a manifold of 
innumerable qualia that appear simultaneously as the result of a subject’s relationship to 
the external world, of its relationship to its body, and finally of its relationship to its own 
mental states or conscious states.   All of these composites are interconnected and 
comprise a qualitative state of consciousness.  The red-quale of the stop sign is connected 
to the shape-quale of the stop sign, to the white-quale of the stop sign, to the green-quale 
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of the stop sign’s post, all of which are connected to the black-quale of the asphalt of the 
street to the crisp-cool-morning-air-quale to the bodily-chill-quale of the being in the 
center of a sphere of an experience.  When cognized in this way, committing to the 
statement “subjective states are the sum of all qualitative states” is more believable, 
though the statement should be, “a subjective state is a qualitative state of a manifold of 
qualitative states.”   The key is that qualia are interconnected and interrelated within a 
qualitative state, and that one particular qualitative state, like a visual qualitative state, is 
a mine-ness, a qualitative state of having a qualitative state. 
 Neuroscientists who work on the neural explanation of self-consciousness have 
found that when a limb-movement is initiated in the brain, two signals are sent out: one to 
the limb and one to another section in the brain (Zimmer 2005, 94-95).  The subject’s 
brain compares the sensation of the limb-movement to the signal sent to the brain, which 
predicts the limb-movement.  Sensation and prediction are compared, and if the two are 
consistent, it has been found that the sensation of ‘ownership’ arises.  When the two are 
not so consistent, then the limb-movement is deemed to be an alien movement.   
Ownership of the limb and of the limb-movement is thus deduced from sensations:  
predicted sensation and perceived sensation.  Sensations are traditionally within the 
category of qualitative experiences.  It seems possible that a subjective experience is the 
qualitative experience of different qualitative experiences   (Zimmer 2005, 94-95).  So, if 
a subjective experience is merely the qualitative experience of an organism’s qualitative 
experiences, then there is only the qualitative problem of experience.   This means that 
having qualia is sufficient for SIL, contra Peressini’s argument. 
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 Strawson would assert that there is no real distinction between the experience and 
the subject of experience (2006b, 204).  Strawson interprets Descartes as holding that 
there is no real distinction between a thing and its properties (2006b, 207).
81
  Strawson 
also notes that Immanuel Kant, David Armstrong, and Friedrich Nietzsche share this 
view (2006b, 196).  So it seems that I am in equally good company in my commitment to 
the identification of qualitative and subjective experience. 
82
 
 Presumably, one could object that the same thing is said of biology and physics:  
biology is about the inter-connectedness of physical material and thus, according to my 
argument above, the two disciplines should be handled as the same problem.  And yet we 
need to distinguish biology from physics – they are different concepts, just as Peressini 
suggests qualia and SIL are different concepts.  First, I agree that the distinction between 
biology and physics is valid, though the goal of science is to eventually explain the 
entirety of the universe through physics.  So, the goal of much of science is to reduce all 
of the various phenomena to one theory.  We should note that between biology and 
physics there is more than a conceptual and introspective distinction: there are differences 
in objects and methodology.  Further, understanding the reason why the distinction is 
necessary is important.  Is the distinction because the work would otherwise be 
unmanageable?  Or are the two distinguished phenomena in principle unable to be 
pursued together?  My intuition is that the various distinctions in science are due to 
manageability and to the limits of the researchers rather than to any inherent distinction.  
My assertion regarding SIL and qualia is a bit different.  I assert that subjective 
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 See Kant (1999), A414/B441.  Strawson quotes Kant as follows:  “In their relation to substance, 
accidents [or properties] are not really subordinated to it, but are the mode of existing of the substance 
itself.”   
82
 For a contemporary defense for the identification of qualitative and SIL experience see Kriegel (2009). 
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experience is the experience of qualitatively experiencing.  For the analogy to hold, 
biology would have to be how we investigate physics. 
4.3.1 The Fundamentality of Information 
 
 
 
 Peressini argues that integrated information (II) is not a fundamental property.  He 
draws out the non-fundamentality of II through comparison with mass, primarily, I 
surmise, because Tononi compares the fundamentality of II with that of mass.  Mass has 
the following attributes, which are integral for fundamentality, according to Peressini: 
first, the mass of a composite is equal to the sum of the mass of that composite’s parts; 
second, mass exists at all levels of reality; finally, mass is a non-emergent property.  II, 
on the other hand, exists only at higher-levels of reality where there are systems of 
suitable complexity.  The amount of II is dependent on the measuring device.  The 
component parts of a system do not posses II.  Above all, II is an emergent property 
(Peressini, 25-27).  The important sense of fundamentality, which Peressini notes, is the 
irreducibility or independence from physical properties, and the informational property’s 
causal efficacy.  Peressini clearly holds that II is emergent and lacking in any causal 
effect.  “But,” Peressini notes “informational properties are quite likely to be 
supervenient on the physical properties of the system under consideration, after all it is in 
virtue of the current state’s ability to ‘redistribute’ the probability distribution of the 
previous state via the causal properties of the mechanism that it carries information at all” 
(27-28).   
 The real threat of Peressini’s attack on the fundamentality of IITC is 
consciousness’ lack of definiteness.  Depending on the level of measurement under 
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scrutiny, II admits of different degrees.  Peressini writes, “It isn’t just that there is a level 
at which it doesn’t make sense to ask about II, but rather that one obtains different 
(nonzero) answers to how much II is present at different levels/grain sizes” (28).  This 
means that II cannot be the “key” to consciousness, because some other factor has to be 
brought in to make any judgment as to what level is conscious, or to determine the degree 
of consciousness at a particular level from being arbitrary.  There has to be some 
additional explanation for the consciousness found at any level.   
4.3.1.1 Arguments Establishing Information as Intrinsic and Fundamental 
 
 
 
 Naturalized panpsychism accepts and endorses Peressini’s observations that 
integrated information (II) is neither fundamental nor intrinsic.  NP holds that proto-
consciousness, or information is intrinsic to a given system’s fundamental property of 
reality.  Consciousness is a matter of how information is arranged or integrated.  Since 
information (such as mental ultimates) is fundamental; consciousness is one short level 
up from the level of fundamentality. While consciousness is not strictly fundamental and 
intrinsic, as I shall explain,  it is strong enough to do the work necessary in IITC. 
 The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties is a matter of current 
philosophic debate, though there are some common themes and views.  The basic idea of 
an intrinsic property is a property that is non-relational or a property of a thing, x, that all 
x duplicates would possess (Seager 2006, 129).  Mass for example may be an intrinsic 
property of x, but x’s “position from London” would depend upon circumstances of x’s 
relation to London, and thus would be an extrinsic property.  It is not my purpose to enter 
into the debate of the valid characterization of the terms “intrinsic” and “extrinsic.”  It 
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suffices to adopt Seager’s characterization of “intrinsic property”, namely:   a property 
that a thing would possess even if it were the only thing in the universe (Seager, 141).  I 
shall now demonstrate that information is an intrinsic property.   
 Before we begin, I must first explain the sense of “information” that I use.  The 
issue is not that all informational properties of a given system are intrinsic.  Nor is the 
issue whether there are given systems with informational properties.  Whether there are 
systems with informational properties has no effect on the intrinsic nature of information, 
just as whether there are systems with mass does not alter whether mass is an intrinsic 
property or not.  The question is, if there is a system, and that system is a system with 
information properties, then are these information properties intrinsic?  We are asking 
whether information, in general, is intrinsic to a system.  To rephrase the question more 
clearly, we are asking whether an informational system is informational intrinsically, and 
not whether none, some, or all instances of information are intrinsic.   
 Answering this question is not a matter of determining whether a particular bit of 
information would be possessed by a system in a lonely universe.  Nor would it suffice to 
demonstrate that one needs input from some other source of information.  The question is 
rather, could a information be predicated of a system if that system occurred in a lonely 
universe?  There is a distinction between being an informational system and possessing 
information or possessing a particular bit of information.  Now, being an informational 
system is being a system capable of reducing uncertainty (Tononi 2008, 217).  In chapter 
three I characterized information as:  (LS)v(~L~S), in reference to the thought 
example of the photodiode discussed by Tononi (217-218).  Strictly speaking this 
proposition does not entail the existence of anything external to the photodiode.  The 
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alternatives discriminated are in fact states of sensation in which nothing external need be 
entailed.  Sensations can be entirely internal, as is demonstrated by cases of 
hallucinations, introspection, or inner-system observations.
83
  So, a given system, such as 
a human being, can have sensation, or at least introspection and inner-state sensation.  So, 
if any given human existed in a lonely universe, sensation could still exist, as presumably 
could thinking in general.  Further, if there were a human in a lonely universe (assuming 
a living and functional human being) that being would sense and think.  Thinking and 
sensing are part of the very nature of a living and functional human being.  Sensation and 
thinking generates information.  So, a living and functional human being cannot help 
generating information and possessing bits of information.  Thus, information in general 
is intrinsic to the nature of a given information system.
84
 
 In chapter three we discussed Galen Strawson’s argument for panpsychism.  The 
argument ran something like this:  the emergence of experience from the fundamentally 
non-experiential is impossible.  Thus, if one accepts that experience really exists, as any 
serious theorist must, there must be experiential ultimates (such as proto-conscious) from 
which experience emerges.  Thus, proto-consciousness must be fundamental.  Any case 
of actual emergence is from, ultimately, fundamental properties.  Further, emergent 
properties need a fundamental base predisposed for such an emergence.  A property does 
not magically “appear” from fundamental particles without the structure to produce said 
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 The best defense of the intrinsic nature of sensation is Descartes’ discussion of thinking in Meditations 
on First Philosophy (1641/2003).   
84
 Bertrand Russell argues that the intrinsic physical events’ nature is mental events (1927/19920, 
(1956/1995).  Strawson bases much of his recent work on panpsychism on Russell and Eddington (1928).  
See Strawson 2006 a/2006b.  If one accepts the reasoning behind the intrinsic argument for panpsychism, 
then it will be reasonable, if one combines NP with the intrinsic argument, that information is the intrinsic 
nature of physical objects.  For an excellent discussion of the intrinsic argument for panpsychism, see 
Seager (2006). 
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property.  The base is the sort to produce a given property.  Thus, if experience emerges, 
then the emergent base has some sort of fundamental property from which experience 
emerges—otherwise, a miracle has occurred.  Now, neither naturalism nor science 
accepts miracles, so either they must deny experience (embrace eliminativism) or accept 
fundamental mental properties, proto-consciousness, or ultimates.    
 Further evidence for the fundamentality of information can be gleaned from 
quantum physics, in particular from the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum physics.  
Before exploring this argument, however, I wish to offer some general remarks upon the 
term “observation.”  First, observation is an activity of a conscious system.  Shan notes 
the fact that conscious entities can distinguish non-orthogonal single states while other 
physical, non-conscious systems cannot (2003, 8).  When contemplating the point of 
view of a camera compared to that of, say, a human, the camera meaningfully lacks a 
“what-it-is-like” compared to that of a human.  The human observes while the camera 
merely records.  Further, each act of observation likewise is an act of information-
gathering.  When one observes, one eliminates alternatives, and thus produces 
information.  So, observation is an act of producing information.   
 As stated before, quantum physics is eerily proficient at prediction—so proficient 
that it has been correct almost completely, if not completely.  That said, John Gribbin has 
the following to say about the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum physics:  “The 
Copenhagen interpretation is definitely “right” in the sense that it works; any better 
interpretation of the quantum rules must include the Copenhagen Interpretation as a 
working view that enables experimenters to predict the outcome of their experiments—at 
least in a statistical sense—and enables engineers to design working laser systems, 
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computers, and so on” (1984, 177).  I note this to demonstrate that the Copenhagen 
Interpretation (CI) cannot be easily dismissed, despite its implications, which are a source 
of irritation to some theorists.  CI holds that subatomic entities such as electrons exist 
only probabilistically between many superimposed states until determined to be a single 
state by an act of observation.  John Wheeler further hypothesized that reality is 
participatory, requiring the act of observation and thus consciousness (Ford and Wheeler 
1998, 323-344).  CI implies that subatomic particles (e.g. the graviton, the thirteen gauge 
bosons, electrons, leptons, and neutrinos) exist in an actual state due to observation.  
Now, subatomic particles are the foundation of reality.  So, the macro-universe rests upon 
the micro universe.  But the micro-universe exists only due to observation and 
observation is an act of information production.  So, as Wheeler states, the “it comes 
from the bit” (323).85  CI implies the fundamentality of information, since fundamental 
particles require information for their determinability.   
4.3.2 The Indefiniteness of Consciousness; a Solution Through Proto-Consciousness  
 
 
 
 Peressini’s modification of the philosophical understanding of Tononi’s project 
(IITQ) offers a solution to the problem of indefiniteness of consciousness, however.  
IITQ does not have to be fundamental or intrinsic in the strong sense as required for 
consciousness (Peressini, 29).  The above problem is not an issue for a qualia 
interpretation of Tononi, because quantity is not a term applicable to qualia.  The 
question of where a particular qualitative experience occurs in the spatiotemporal grain 
size can be settled by appealing to details of subjectivity, since qualia are dependent upon 
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  I have seen this expression in reference to Wheeler and his work, but have found it most notably as the 
title for Ford and Wheeler’s chapter ‘It from the Bit’ (1998). 
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subjective experience (Peressini, 29).
86
  Peressini’s solution only works if qualitative 
consciousness and subjective consciousness are ontologically separated in such a way 
that they can be physically isolated from each other.  If Peressini’s discussion is merely 
one of manageability when dealing with a complex topic or a mere conceptual 
distinction, then the discussion is only one of conceptual aspects and the inquiry must, as 
some point, abandon conceptual conveniences and address the actual nature of 
consciousness.  Peressini’s distinction, then, has become quite strong.  There can be 
discrete connections between the two, and there must be such connections if theorists are 
to track qualitative consciousness with subjective consciousness.  As properties, they 
must be distinct.  If my discussion is correct, or rather if one accepts my interpretation of 
Q and SIL, then Peressini’s solution will not work, and some other way to determine the 
grain size of consciousness must be found. 
 Thus naturalized panpsychism is in a position to contribute something valuable to 
IITC.  NP is able to fix the grain size/level for IITC.   NP holds that proto-consciousness 
(that is, the property that mental properties emerge from) simply is information.  
Information, as has been argued above, is both intrinsic to a system and fundamental to 
reality.   Consciousness, according to IITC, is information arranged in the correct way.  
So, human consciousness is information in a particular arrangement.  As information is 
fundamental, and consciousness emerges from directly fundamental properties, 
consciousness would closely resemble subatomic composite properties, properties of 
bound states of two or more fundamental properties (such as particles).  So, 
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 Note that my discussion above does not contradict this point because subjectivity, as I portray it, is how 
qualitative experiences are experienced, which is still a problem of qualitative experience.  Subjectivity is 
the experience of an experience. 
 161 
consciousness is not strictly fundamental, but neither is it strictly non-fundamental, or 
emergent.  As such, consciousness as a directly composite property of fundamental proto-
conscious will have the ability to settle the question of the grain size and, generally, to do 
the work necessary in Tononi’s theory. 
4.3.3 How NP’s Event Monism Accounts for the Subjective Aspect of Consciousness 
 
 
 
 In chapter two I offered an event-monism conception of reality as a consequence 
of the account of mental causation that I adopted from Robert Hanna and Michelle 
Maiese (2009).  Causation, it will be recalled, occurs between concrete events.  Events 
are the most basic ontological entities.  Events are made up of, at least, mental and 
physical properties which share a fundamental, intrinsic bond.
87
  This was dubbed 
“property fusion.”  Property fusion does not occur at the macro-level.  In quantum 
physics’ fundamental particles are the basis of the macro-world.  Fundamental particles 
combine to produce macro-level events.  Some events have mental qualities, such as 
consciousness.  This is explained by the information-bit sharing an intrinsic fundamental 
bond with the appropriated fundamental particles arranged in the appropriate 
configuration, namely integration.  Information, like the information on this page, is 
fused with the fundamental properties of the fundamental, physical properties of the page.  
Complex systems produce information by reducing uncertainty and thus integrating 
information (i.e., being conscious). 
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 I leave open the possibility that each event is made up of many different types of fundamental properties, 
like protons, electrons, gravitons, tachyons, and information.  So, “physical” should be taken more as a 
category of types of fundamental particles that are studied by physics.  However, if information is in fact 
fundamental as I posit then it would make more sense to reject the classes in this sense and talk about 
information as having fundamental intrinsic bonds with other specific fundamental properties. 
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 What should be noted is how NP elegantly solves an criticism in event monism, 
namely that event monism leaves out SIL.  Thomas Nagel argues that Bertrand Russell’s 
conception of event monism leaves out the problem of relating SIL with its physical 
character (Nagel 2000).  NP can provide an account of this relation.  First, it must be 
noted that information, as such, is not a property that is opposed to the physical as 
fundamental conscious properties are to fundamental not-conscious properties.  
Information and fundamental physical properties are not contradictories.  They work in 
unison.  This co-relation is a well-accepted fact.  Information occurs in physical systems, 
and this fact is not contested.  SIL is the arrangement of information in a complex system, 
or put differently, SIL is what a system does with information.  Since it is agreed that 
simple and complex systems produce information, the NP theorist does not need to 
explain how information relates to the physical character of the complex system.  Then 
the matter of the particular arrangement of information that produces the quantity and 
quality of consciousness becomes an empirical question.  As for how fundamental 
properties come together to produce a particular event, all the NP theorist must do is to 
rely on quantum physics and its account of how micro-properties (i.e., fundamental 
properties) produce macro-events.   
4.4 Conclusion 
 
 
 
 To meet Peressini’s objections I have argued (a) that the problem of qualitative 
experience and subjective experience are best understood as the same problem, and (b) 
that information is a fundamental property of the universe despite being a property of a 
system.  The main support for (a) is the arbitrary manner in which Peressini determines 
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that qualitative and subjective experience are two problems.   There are many aspects of 
experience that may introspectively seem different.  There are many aspects of 
experience that can be talked about distinctly from each other.  However, unless Peressini 
wishes to hold that any aspect of experience that a person introspects as distinct from 
experience in general or from qualitative experience is ontologically distinct, anything 
that can be conceived as distinct is ontologically so—two principles that are highly 
doubtful—separating subjective experience from qualitative experience requires further 
argumentation, and some sort of criteria for valid and invalid distinctions.    Also, 
traditionally, the two problems are considered the same: there is some neurobiological 
evidence that supports subjectivity as stemming from qualitative experience, and 
traditionally qualia are mistakenly simplified as experiences, where instead they are best 
understood as components of a whole experience.  My support for (b) rises from my 
discussion describing information as applicable to a system, even if that system is 
situated as the only existing thing in a universe.  I argue that information is fundamental 
by relying on Strawson’s argument against brute emergence.  Most significantly, I argue 
that the fundamentality of information is implied by the Copenhagen Interpretation of 
quantum physics.  Thus, the problem of the indefiniteness of consciousness that was 
invoked by Peressini’s argument establishing the non-fundamentality of integrated 
information is circumvented by identifying information with proto-consciousness, or 
ultimates, or mental simples.  Information is fundamental and intrinsic to a system.  Full-
blown consciousness, such as that enjoyed by higher-level mammals, is a matter of  
fundamental proto-consciousness or information arranged in a specific way (that is, 
integrated).  Since consciousness directly emerges from fundamental properties, we can 
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understand consciousness as a fundamental composite property, much like protons are 
subatomic (fundamental) composite particles.  So we have established that consciousness 
as such has the theoretical strength that Tononi’s account requires. 
 At this point we are left with this image of the mind:  the nature of the mind is 
information, which is a fundamental property of the universe and intrinsic to a given 
system.  Higher-level mental properties emerge from proto-consciousness, perhaps 
combining via integration as suggested by Guilio Tononi (2008), or perhaps along some 
other trajectory, maybe biological lines favored by Block, or the global workspace 
version of Baars.  I am not committed to II – it is just one possibility, to be confirmed 
empirically, and not by we philosophers.  Mental properties share an intrinsic connection 
with physical properties to constitute concrete events.  Mental properties do not 
supervene on or emerge from physical properties.  Events cause events, and as both types 
of properties constitute an event, both have causal efficacy.  Consciousness occurs at the 
grain-size in the brain that it does due to the fundamentality of information.  Information 
is proto-consciousness, and so any mental property must emerge from there. This sets 
consciousness, at least at the lowest measurement of information, as equal to one bit. 
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Chapter 5 
Naturalized Panpsychism and the Nature of the Mind 
 
 
 
 In the past four chapters I have argued for the viability of a naturalized 
panpsychism.   This project stems from the idea that consciousness is a fundamental part 
of the universe and not merely some supervenient property of non-conscious material.  
The problem with many panpsychic theories is their supernatural implications.  I have 
argued that a naturalized panpsychism is a possibility, because it avoids such 
implications.  I began this agreement by philosophically investigating an assumption of 
physicalist theories, namely mental specialism.  I argued that this assumption is not 
necessarily a part of science, just as physicalism is not a necessary view of science.  Next 
I argued for the compatibility of naturalism with panpsychism.  In chapter three I offered 
a non-mysterious solution to the combination problem by adopting Guilio Tononi’s 
integrated information theory of consciousness (IITC).  In chapter four I defended IITC 
against a critique by Anthony Peressini.  Chapter five, the final chapter, answers two 
questions.  The first question is:  What is naturalized panpsychism (NP)?  The second is:  
What is the character of human consciousness according to naturalized panpsychism?  I 
shall conclude with a brief examination of areas that require further investigation and 
some possible areas that NP may benefit. 
5.1 What is Naturalized Panpsychism? 
 
 
 
 Panpsychism holds that physicalism cannot fully explain the universe.  at the 
same time, physicalism holds that consciousness and the mental in general are anomalies 
in the universe.  Therefore, consciousness is not a property or phenomena in its own right 
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but is rather just physical (i.e., non-mental) properties configured in different ways.  Thus 
in no real sense is there is a category “mental” according to physicalism.  Traditional 
panpsychism holds that the mental is a fundamental property of the universe.  NP agrees 
with this assessment.  What NP does not accept from the traditional panpsychic account 
is what I termed the “all-thesis.”  The “all-thesis” attributes consciousness to everything 
in the universe, or at least everything physical.  So, the beams holding up the ceiling of 
the coffee shop I sit in while writing these words experience in some degree and so does 
the ceiling, the coffee shop, the floor, and my chair.  NP rejects the all-thesis as 
scientifically and intuitively untenable, or at least at the present time.  The all-thesis is 
supernatural because rocks and blocks, atoms and strings, have none of the complex 
mechanisms thought to be required for consciousness.  There are no mechanisms for 
sensation, for instance.  There is no mechanism for memory, etc.  The consciousness 
attributed to all things by the all-thesis is like no consciousness that realistically can be 
imagined.  The relationship between consciousness and a complex system like the human 
body is, if one embraces the all-thesis, in the end a substance dualism, with consciousness 
as a Cartesian ghost.  The all-thesis implies that consciousness can occur without some 
sort of functional mechanism, as if consciousness and the body were separate substances.   
An alternative all-thesis posits consciousness as a feature of the fundamental properties of 
the universe, e.g., protons, electrons, and strings.  NP rejects this assertion as 
unwarranted.  NP posits proto-consciousness as fundamental and intrinsic to the universe, 
in the same way that mass and electrical charge. Consciousness itself, however, is a 
higher-level mental property which emerges from proto-consciousness.  The difference 
between traditional panpsychism and NP is that NP seeks to develop its commitments 
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within the bounds of science rather than through grandiose metaphysical world-building.  
So, science is the final arbiter of any hypothesis advanced by NP.  Naturalized 
panpsychism is a scientific panpsychism. 
 Intuitively it may seem that NP contradicts itself, that panpsychism cannot be 
scientific.  This stems from the false impression that science is committed to what I term 
in chapter one as mental specialism, the thesis that the mental is an aberration or anomaly 
in the universe, that at best the mental emerges from the physical (i.e., non-mental).  
Physicalism (as traditionally construed) is committed to mental specialism, but science is 
not committed to such a physicalism.  Physicalism is at best a research disposition, a 
hypothesis with which to investigate the universe; if a better, evolving, non-monolithic 
research disposition would be found, science would abandon physicalism.  So, because 
physicalism is not intrinsic to science, there is room for a panpsychic research program 
within the discipline of science.  
 NP is an alternative research paradigm to physicalism, holding that the physical is 
not the only category in the universe and that the mental is its own category.  NP is 
comprised of four basic principles.
88
  The first is that proto-consciousness is fundamental 
to the universe, meaning that proto-consciousness cannot be reduced to physical 
properties, and it possesses its own causal efficacy.  The second is that the proto-
consciousness is ontologically independent of the physical, or isn’t contingent on the 
physical.  The third is that physicalism, by embracing mental specialism, leaves 
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 When I originally formulated these four principles in chapter one I used the generic term “mental.”  Here 
I shall use the term “proto-consciousness,” for I am not asserting that higher-level mental properties such as 
the properties of human consciousness are fundamental to the universe or intrinsic to the universe.  I assert 
rather that proto-consciousness is as a fundamental to the universe as are the fundamental properties of 
physics. 
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something out of its account of the universe.  By accepting the physicalist position, 
science fails to take into account a vital part of the universe.  This vital part is proto-
consciousness.  One should ask why science has not formerly detected this fundamental 
category of reality, the “proto-conscious.”  Actually, science has.  NP holds that proto-
consciousness is nothing other than information.  Information is, in fact, an observable—
though theoretical—phenomenon, and information theory has been around since 1948, 
founded by Claude Shannon.  What science has therefore missed is the not-so-obvious 
connection between information and consciousness.  Finally, the fourth principle is that 
higher-level mental properties emerge from proto-consciousness as well as from other 
lower-level mental properties.  The greater part of the preceding chapters has been to 
develop and to argue for the above four principles.  I will offer a brief summary of 
principles one, two, and four in what follows. 
5.1.1 Principles One:  Proto-Consciousness is Fundamental  & Principle Two:  
Ontological Independence of Proto-consciousness 
 
 
 
 In chapter three I identified proto-consciousness with information.  I adopt large 
portions of Guilio Tononi’s integrated information theory of consciousness (IITC) 
(2008).  IITC is important to NP, for Tononi’s hypothesis allows an elegant solution to 
the combination problem, which is the problem of how to account for the emergence of 
higher-level mental properties from proto-consciousness.  In order for my identification 
to proceed I held to defend the fundamentality of information, that information properties 
are irreducible to the physical.  Let us consider one bit of information, X, and the 
physical property it instantiates, Y.   First, it is true that information is a property of a 
system, but it seems equally true that X could be a property of vastly different systems: 
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neuronal, silicon, vibrations, etc.  X is not contingent on any particular physical 
instantiation.  Second, within a system, information changes its physical base from, say, 
chemical to electrical and back and to chemical, and from one sort of chemical to another 
chemical.  One could offer a sort of token-token identity between information properties 
and physical properties, since this would seem to allow for such a liberal change in 
physical properties.  Let us agree to such a prospect.  So, for example, a given system, Z, 
has an inner state which carries one bit of information.  This one bit of information is 
instantiated in a hormonal chemical.  The chemical composition of the hormone is not 
identical to the one bit of information.  To give an account of the one bit of information, 
one cannot refer to the physical base of the hormone, only to the alternatives eliminated.  
A description of the one bit of information can only be given by reference to aspects of 
information.  In other examples of reduction, say heat to molecular movement or liquidity 
and H2O, an account of the emergent base provides a full account of the emergent 
property.  There is no explanatory gap; there is simply nothing more to be said regarding 
the nature of the emergent property but to describe the emergent base.  Information is 
simply not reducible in this sense, at least with respect to physical properties.   From this 
I conclude that information is fundamental and ontologically independent from the 
physical. 
 In chapter four I offered two other arguments to establish the fundamentality of 
proto-consciousness.  The first refers back to Galen Strawson’s argument against brute 
emergence.  Basically, if one takes brute emergence to be impossible, then the 
fundamental emergent base for consciousness must have as a component some sort of 
mental ultimate, or proto-consciousness.  When something emerges, what it emerges 
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from must be so constituted as to produce that property, otherwise you have a miracle.  
The second argument is to connect information to the Copenhagen interpretation of 
quantum physics.  Observation is necessary for the determination of subatomic particles 
like electrons.  Observation is a case of a system having an information property.  
Observing electrons and other subatomic particles is similar to the thought experiment of 
the photodiode discussed by Tononi (217). 
 In chapter four I also argue that information is intrinsic to a given system.  I 
understand “intrinsic” to be a non-relational part of a system.  A test for intrinsic-ness is 
to discuss the possibility that a given property would still be a property of a given system 
if that system were in a lonely universe or a universe with a population of only one 
existent.  Any complex system (that is, a system with inner states and the ability to 
observe these states) would have informational properties.  That there are no other 
entities in the universe would not matter.  Of course, this does not mean that information 
is intrinsic to a simple or to a simple universe.
89
   
 In chapter two I demonstrate the causal efficacy of the mental by drawing on the 
theories proposed by Robert Hanna and Michelle Maise in their book Embodied Minds in 
Action (2009).  First, Hanna and Maise propose an event neutral monism where the 
universe is comprised of one type of thing, events.  NP adopts this assertion.  Some 
events are comprised of both physical properties and mental properties.  The key to 
                                                          
89 The question that I would ask at this point is to what extent complex systems occurring in this universe 
are intrinsic to this universe.  After all what exists in this universe does not seem to be relational to this 
universe.  So, if a property (p) is intrinsic to a property that intrinsic to a universe, is (p) intrinsic to the 
universe?    
 
 171 
Hanna and Maise’s system is the rejection of what they call fundamentalism, which is an 
interpretation of the causal closure principle that fundamental physical properties exclude 
any sort of  intrinsic connection to fundamental mental properties.  Thus, it is possible 
that some fundamentally physical properties can have an intrinsic connection to 
fundamental mental properties.  Hanna and Maise dub this “mental-physical property 
fusion.”  This is important, because mental properties now co-determine an event along 
with physical properties and are thus partially responsible for the causal efficacy of the 
particular event.   
5.1.2 Principle Four:  The Emergence of Higher-level Mental Properties from Proto-
Consciousness; the Combination Problem 
 
 
 
 The combination problem has been a major stumbling block for a successful 
panpsychic theory of mind.  Unlike fundamental particles that combine to constitute 
higher-level physical properties, experiences are not the sorts of things that combine.  
The nature of an experience is its qualitative feel.  “Feels” do not combine.  One pain-feel 
plus another pain-feel does not add up to a new pain feel, big pain-feel.  Big pain-feel is a 
novel experience without any sort of constituent pain-feels.  If there were a collection of 
the original pain-feels, then there would merely be the first pain-feel and the second pain-
feel but not the new pain-feel, because the complete loss of the characteristic “feel” is the 
loss of the qualitative experience.  So, since combination entails elimination of the feel 
and thus the experience, experiences do not combine and thus, under a panpsychic theory, 
psychic properties do not emerge.  There are four possible answers to the combination 
problem that I can determine:  1) Theorists could deny mental-from-mental emergence 
and posit mental properties with a similar nature to universals and embrace a 
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participation theory, 2) Rely on a transcendental argument and say that combination must 
occur because it is necessary for the theory presented, 3) Develop a way of living with 
the problem.  This avenue of argumentation usually appeals to the eventual 
inexplicability of combination.  This is an advance upon the proposals in 1-2, 4) Develop 
an account of combination that is partially empirical, or relies upon an empirical 
hypothesis of consciousness.  Scientific reductions have produced significant results 
towards understanding the universe.  The fourth proposal seeks to apply scientific 
reduction as a model for a theory explaining psychic emergence.  Possibilities 1-3 fail to 
provide a convincing account.  The first is due to the difficulty in understanding the 
principle of participation.  The problems with the second and third proposals are that both 
have been tried with little prospect of success.  Transcendental arguments and appeals to 
mystery haven’t convinced anyone to accept panpsychism.  NP’s answer is to adopt an 
empirical theory, Guilio Tononi’s IITC theory, and to use that theory to offer a solution 
to the combination problem.  Tononi asserts that experience or consciousness is 
integrated information.  So, particular qualitative experiences correspond to locations in 
Q-space that arise as a result of eliminating a vast array of alternatives to reduce 
uncertainty and produce information.  A qualitative state is the information produced by 
connections (that is, integration) between the various mechanisms of the brain.  The 
informational states of a human brain are highly connected and integrated.  So, 
combination is not based in “summing,” but in integration.   
 
 
 173 
5.1.3 Naturalized Panpsychism and Reality 
 
 
 
 Naturalized panpsychism is not a doctrine of reality but rather a research 
disposition into reality, a disposition offered as an alteration of physicalism.  NP and 
physicalism are not absolutely contradictory, as demonstrated in chapter two.  NP differs 
from physicalism in the following ways:  1) NP rejects the possibility of the reduction of 
the mental to the physical; 2) proto-consciousness is a fundamental property of the 
universe; 3) NP asserts that proto-consciousness is a natural part of the universe much 
like fundamental particles or properties, so proto-consciousness is one of many 
fundamental properties of the universe; 4) NP rejects fundamentalism, (that is, the idea 
that fundamental physical properties and fundamental mental properties cannot share an 
intrinsic connection); 5) (4) allows that fundamental mental properties and fundamental 
physical properties co-determine concrete events and so co-determine the causal efficacy 
of such events.   
5.2 The Character of Human Consciousness 
 
 
 
 In this section I will describe, albeit superficially, naturalized panpsychism’s 
conception of human consciousness.   I will discuss what sorts of things are conscious 
and what sorts of things are not.   I will explicate “how much” consciousness such 
entities have.  Then I will describe under what conditions consciousness arises and 
dissipates.   I will also cover how one might tell whether a particular system is conscious 
or not.  I will not discuss further what the nature or mark of consciousness is since it has 
been thoroughly established as integrated proto-consciousness (i.e., information). 
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 Consciousness, like the production of information, is a matter of degree.  Some 
systems produce only one bit of information, like a photodiode.  Some systems, like 
humans, produce millions of bits of information.  A system is conscious in proportion to 
a system’s repertoire of discrimination states (Tononi 2008, 236).  A photodiode, 
therefore, is conscious to the measurement of one bit.  There are several interesting 
implications of this thesis.  But first let us discuss just what “grade consciousness” might 
be like.  If we take, for example, qualitative consciousness, conscious gradation would 
manifest in the array of how things would seem or appear to a system.  Take an earth 
worm, for instance.  This system certainly has a repertoire of discrimination states, 
though a small one compared to the repertoire of a bird or cat.  The worm’s conscious 
world is small or has few “quale” that make up its perception.  There are few “something-
it-is-like” states for a worm.  NP and IITC entail that artificial consciousness has been 
achieved, because there are machines that possess informational states.  It also follows 
that the larger the repertoire of discrimination alternatives, the more conscious these 
machines and computers are.  Of course, this artificial consciousness in no way compares 
to human consciousness.  The sheer number of the discriminations and connections the 
human brain can make are staggering.  Further, there are many different types of 
information systems in the human brain, such as olfactory, visual, textile, and so forth.  
However, the most interesting implication is that there is no upper limit, save the limit of 
the mechanism, to the size of a system’s repertoire.  So, there is no limit, except 
hardware, to the how conscious a system could become.  There may exist beings that are 
simply more conscious of reality, seeing and cognizing more than a human ever could.  
And humans may continue to higher states of consciousness.  So, not only are humans 
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not the height of consciousness, but humans have the potential for a much wider world 
than the one in which they currently live.  The next implication, since level of 
consciousness equates to the size of one’s discrimination repertoire, not all humans are 
equally conscious.  Life experiences—undergoing activities and challenges—and 
education, personal or otherwise, open oneself up to a multitude of different perspectives 
and alternatives, increasing one’s consciousness and making one’s mental life fuller.  We 
know this, of course, but NP and IITC validates this intuition.    
 How would one describe human consciousness under NP?  On one hand there is 
no “human consciousness,” simply due to the fact that there is no set number of 
discriminatory alternatives that a human being possesses.  When we speak of “human” 
we generally mean “adult human of normal cognitive ability,” if I may use the term 
normal without defending a particular definition.  This system will have incalculable 
alternatives with which to make information discriminations.  There are also certain 
human sense organs, organs that sense only within certain ranges.  But such levels of 
consciousness develop over time.  The human infant’s world is limited, small.  As more 
connections develop and more information is integrated, their world increases in size.  
Human consciousness is having a wide world.  This is a highly metaphorical phrase, but I 
do not apologize.  There may be some animals that are more conscious than some 
humans, say a chimpanzee compared to a television addict who is a permanent fixture on 
a couch.  So, the term “human consciousness” is misleading.  It is best to think only in 
terms of high, medium, and low consciousness, since there is the possibility of some 
humans having chimpanzee-level consciousness and some humans that go beyond 
“normal human” consciousness.  For instance, it has been long reputed—and there is now 
 176 
preliminary scientific evidence to support—that Buddhist monks go beyond the normal 
human threshold of consciousness to higher states.
90
 
 Consciousness is only a property of complex systems—systems at least as 
complex as a photodiode.  What is and is not conscious is an empirical question, best 
answered by biologists, information theorists, and engineers.  Bees and wasps, slugs and 
worms are conscious systems according to NP.  Bacteria and viruses may be conscious 
like a photodiode, but again this is a matter for biologists to discern.  But we now have a 
solid idea of how to look for and measure consciousness.  NP offers us a possible non-
arbitrary way to distinguish between conscious and non-conscious systems, to determine 
approximately how conscious is each system is, and, finally, to theorize what their 
consciousness would, at least superficially, be like.  First, any system that contains 
integrated information will be a conscious system.  The system is as conscious as the 
amount of information produced.  How to measure the amount of information produced  
is a matter for neuroscientists, information theorists, and biologists.  But in theory, the 
amount of consciousness can be measured by the degree of II (that is, integrated 
information), measured by Q (qualia).  But, part of the character can at least be cognized.  
So, how wide a system’s world is in terms of amount of information can be estimated and 
thus we have a basis for the beginning of understanding, conceptually, if not 
experimentally, what the conscious world, say, of a worm would be.  So, NP can give us 
a method to understand other radically different systems.  Interestingly, we have the 
beginning of an argument against the unnecessary suffering of animals.  Some opponents 
of animal rights claim that animals do not feel in any significant manner, but NP can 
                                                          
90
 See Davidson (2008). 
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address this question, and, based on preliminary accounts of II, it seems that animals do 
have comparable levels of qualia. 
5.3 Further Research 
 
 
 
 I offer six areas that need to be considered more fully.  The first is the intrinsic 
connection between proto-consciousness and fundamental physical properties, or 
property fusion.  The second is the further explication and clarification of co-property 
causation.  The third is the nature of the neutral-monism assumed by NP.  The fourth is to 
further solidify the identification between information and proto-consciousness.  The fifth 
issue is the connection between qualitative and subjective experience and consciousness 
itself.  I argued that at best this distinction is a matter of convenience and not an actual 
distinction, but my argument is provisional only.  The sixth is to argue more fully for the 
intrinsic-ness and fundamental-ness of proto-consciousness.   
 While the next and most important project for NP will be to explore the possible 
solutions that NP could offer to the traditional problems of consciousness (such as 
inverted spectrum, zombies, intentionality, and the knowledge argument) there are some 
other aspects of NP that are interesting.  The first will be to explore the issue of personal 
identity over time.  Integration of information is the psyche of the system.  If personal 
identity is an issue of the psychology of a system, then personal survival will be an issue 
of survival of integrated information.  The next issue to explore further would be artificial 
consciousness, by which I mean artificial high-consciousness.  NP would seem to support 
MIT’s Cog and Lazlo efforts to develop AI in terms of developing high level of 
connections within those two systems.  Finally, if one takes high levels of consciousness 
 178 
as the preferred state (and I believe they are) then NP poses some interesting questions 
about how people live their lives.  That there are higher-levels of consciousness available 
for humanity would seem to lend credence to John Stuart Mill’s assertion that there are 
higher and lower pleasures, the higher being more valuable.  Or better yet, NP may 
provide a ground for a robust Virtue Ethics.  The gradation of consciousness may also 
lend an interesting aspect to virtue theory as a new paradigm of character.  Finally, as 
high levels of consciousness seem to correspond to high levels so of perceived self-
determination, NP should explore the possibility that high-levels of consciousness 
correspond to self-determination, with the intuition that self-determination is a matter of 
having alternatives for discrimination. 
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